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We examine the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE), asymmetry in pay for skill/luck, and compensation benchmarking for a sample of firms involved in a spinoff. The spinoff affects firm characteristics that influence the use of the identified compensation practices. We test for differences in the compensation practices for the pre- and post-spinoff firms. We find that RPE is used for post-spinoff CEOs, but not pre-spinoff CEOs. Post-spinoff CEOs are also paid asymmetrically for luck where they are rewarded for good luck but not punished for bad luck. Both pre- and post-spinoff CEOs receive similar levels of compensation benchmarking. The study provides additional evidence on factors that influence compensation practices. Our spinoff sample allows us to examine how compensation practices are affected by changes in firm characteristics while keeping other determinants of compensation constant (i.e., the board and, in many cases, the CEO). Our findings contribute to the understanding of how the identified compensation practices are used.

We study how giving depends on income and luck, and how culture and information about the determinants of others’ income affect this relationship. Our data come from an experiment conducted in two countries, the USA and Spain – each of which have different beliefs about how income inequality arises. We find that when individuals are informed about the determinants of income, there are no cross-cultural differences in giving. When uninformed, however, Americans give less than the Spanish. This difference persists even after controlling for beliefs, personal characteristics, and values.

Luck remains an elusive theoretical concept in the business literature yet a fascinating practical phenomenon in business reality. In addition to effective strategic maneuvering and well‐run internal management, luck often plays a non‐trivial role as a determinant of competitive advantage and firm performance. Understanding the various types of luck and the contextual conditions under which luck strikes is therefore expected to help a firm gain competitive advantage. This paper advances a typology of different scenarios of luck – pure luck, prepared luck, useful weeds, and skunk work – and expounds the strategic implications of these scenarios for the firm’s search for competitive advantage. Taking a proactive approach, it untangles the typical environmental sources of luck as well as the intra‐firm mechanisms and processes through which a firm could better induce, recognize, and exploit lucky incidents of innovations from useful weeds or skunk works.

The optimal contracting view assumes that compensation arrangements should not reward performance upward that is beyond the management's control. Critics to this view assert, however that unearned compensation boom may be suggestive of pay for luck. Hence, the authors ask if CEOs' incentive pay is sensitive to lucky as to purely corporate performance. If such, one could question: Are CEOs rewarded for luck? Do institutional features matter for CEOs pay‐for‐luck? How does systematic incentive effect sensitive to luck's nature? Accepting the premises of both contacting and skimming agency's approaches, this paper aims to answer these questions.

General and separate ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) estimations have been run to estimate the general sensitivity of CEOs' pay, respectively, to performance and luck. These estimations are based on a sample of 300 publicly traded firms covering four countries from the Anglo‐American and Euro‐Continental corporate governance models for the period 2004 to 2008.

In support of the paper's theorizing, it was found that CEOs pay to be positively related to outside contingencies as well as to shareholders' interests. Positive pay sensitivity to exogenous shocks, which we label systematic incentive effect, shows that management take advantage of lucky external events. Further analyses show, moreover, two stylized facts. First, this effect is asymmetric as executives are rewarded more for good luck than penalized for bad luck. Second, it is less generous under stronger corporate governance, higher investor rights protection, and stricter law enforcement rules. The latter institutional factors seem to be overwhelmingly influential variables in explaining the differences in such effect across countries.

The paper contributes to the CEO compensation research by: showing that a simple contracting view can mislead shareholders about the effective CEOs' skills and efforts; and filling the lack of consensus within the empirical literature as to whether pay for luck depends on institutional features such as the law enforcement level, the degree of investors' right protection, and the corporate governance system's quality.

The paper's findings offer insights to shareholders, pay consultants, and regulators about the effects that unobservable macroeconomic shocks can have towards the design and the efficiency of a CEO pay contract. The findings help, however, academics understanding the international pay gap's causes.

Strategic management scholars seek to link strategic factors to performance. When specific causal links cannot be identified, however, other potential explanations should be considered, including the notion of luck. This paper aims to introduce a distinction between scholarly and practitioner perspectives of luck and identifies why this distinction is critical to both scholars and practitioners.

This paper proposes a framework linking luck and competitive advantage. It also reports the results of an exploratory empirical investigation on the perceived role of luck in firm performance.

Scholars and practitioners have different views of luck's role in organizational performance. Managers are more likely to assign luck for bad outcomes rather than good. In addition, the more quantitative a manager's work function, the less likely he or she is to perceive a luck‐performance linkage, and the higher the manager is in the organization, the more likely he or she is to perceive luck as affecting outcomes.

There are a number of reasons why luck should receive prominence when considering the strategy‐performance relationship: many of the linkages between strategic factors and performance are identified after the fact – they are viewed as causal when they were actually lucky; empirical research may identify relationships whether they actually exist; researchers tend to find what they are looking for; and academics will be more likely to explain “luck” if they are using the appropriate tools to reveal it.

The positive link between management level and luck's role in performance identified in this study suggests that the more a manager knows about a firm's resources and attributes, the more likely he or she is to downplay the role they actually play in performance. From this perspective, managers seem more willing to acknowledge the role played by luck as they progress into greater levels of responsibility and control.

A significant portion of empirical work seeks to explain differences in performance across organizations by identifying the links between various strategic factors and performance. Although this research has contributed much to the knowledge about the strategy‐performance nexus, it assumes that strategy‐performance linkages necessarily exist and that they can be readily identified. In other words, most scholarly work in this area is based on assumptions that minimize or preclude the role of luck or randomness in the determination of firm performance. Building on previous work, this paper adopts an alternative perspective on the strategy‐performance relationship, highlighting the often overlooked role of luck.

This paper aims to examine the experience of gaining research independence by becoming a principal investigator (PI) – an aspiration for many post-PhD researchers about whom little is known. It provides insight into this experience by using a qualitative narrative approach to document how 60 PIs from a range of disciplines in one European and two UK universities experienced working towards and achieving this significant goal.

Within the context of a semi-structured interview, individuals drew and elaborated a map representing the emotional high and low experiences of the journey from PhD graduation to first PI grant, and completed a biographic questionnaire.

Regardless of the length of the journey from PhD graduation to first PI grant, more than a third noted the role that luck played in getting the grant. Luck was also perceived to have an influence in other aspects of academic work. This influence made it even more important for these individuals to sustain a belief in themselves and be agentive and persistent in managing the challenges of the journey.

The study, unusual in its cross-national perspective, and its mixed mode data collection, offers a nuanced perspective on the interaction between agency and an environment where the “randomness factor” plays a role in success. The function of luck as a support for sustained agency and resilience is explored.

The Chinese fund market has witnessed significant developments in recent years. However, although there has been a range of studies assessing fund performance in developed industries, the rapidly developing fund industry in China has received very little attention. This study aims to examine the performance of open-end securities investment funds investing in Chinese domestic equity during the period May 2003 to September 2020. Specifically, applying a non-parametric bootstrap methodology from the literature on fund performance, the authors investigate the role of skill versus luck in this rapidly evolving investment funds industry.

This study evaluates the performance of Chinese equity securities investment funds from 2003–2020 using a bootstrap methodology to distinguish skill from luck in performance. The authors consider unconditional and conditional performance models.

The bootstrap methodology incorporates non-normality in the idiosyncratic risk of fund returns, which is a major drawback in “conventional” performance statistics. The evidence does not support the existence of “genuine” skilled fund managers. In addition, it indicates that poor performance is mainly attributable to bad stock picking skills.

The authors find that the top-ranked funds with positive abnormal performance are attributed to “good luck” not “good skill” while the negative abnormal performance of bottom funds is mainly due to “bad skill.” Therefore, sensible advice for most Chinese equity investors would be against trying to “pick winners funds” among Chinese securities investment funds but it would be recommended to avoid holding “losers.” At the present time, investors should consider other types of funds, such as index/tracker funds with lower transactions. In addition, less risk-averse investors may consider Chinese hedge funds [Zhao (2012)] or exchange-traded fund [Han (2012)].

The paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, the authors examine a wide range (over 50) of risk-adjusted performance models, which account for both unconditional and conditional risk factors. The authors also control for the profitability and investment risks in Fama and French (2015). Second, the authors select the “best-fit” model across all risk-adjusted models examined and a single “best-fit” model from each of the three classes. Therefore, the bootstrap analysis, which is mainly based on the selected best-fit models, is more precise and robust. Third, the authors reduce the possibility that findings may be sample-period specific or may be a survivor (upward) biased. Fourth, the authors consider further analysis based on sub-periods and compare fund performance in different market conditions to provide more implications to investors and practitioners. Fifth, the authors carry out extensive robustness checks and show that the findings are robust in relation to different minimum fund histories and serial correlation and heteroscedasticity adjustments. Sixth, the authors use higher frequency weekly data to improve statistical estimation.

To provide theoretical guidance on improving luxury brands’ marketing performance, this study aims to examine the impact mechanism and boundary conditions of luxury brand buyers’ consumption resources on observers’ brand attitudes from the perspective of consumers’ power distance beliefs (PDBs).

Four experimental studies were conducted. Study 1 examined the influence of the interaction of consumption resources and PDBs on luxury brand attitudes; Study 2 examined the mediating role of prestige perception. Study 3 excluded alternative explanations of (dis)association motivation and envy. Finally, Study 4 examined the moderating effect of brand relationship norms.

Consumers with low PDBs had lower attitudes towards luxury brands when consumption resources were acquired through luck (rather than effort). However, no significant difference in luxury brand attitudes was found between these two consumer groups when PDBs were high. Consumers’ perceptions of prestige played a mediating role in the main effect, whereas brand relationship norms moderated the main effect.

First, this study reveals the unique role of PDBs in shaping consumer attitudes towards luxury brands. Second, it uses consumption resources as a signal for luxury consumption and identifies a way to influence consumers’ attitudes towards luxury brands, namely, their perceptions of prestige. Third, it uncovers the influence of consumers’ brand relationship norms on the formation of luxury brand attitudes.

Looks at the concept of luck, featuring illustrative stories ‐ one of which relates to personal experience. Suggests that we need to learn from good and bad experiences and not merely dismiss them as matters of luck. Underlines the need for discipline and attention to quality systems in business.

Chance models – mechanisms that explain empirical regularities through unsystematic variance – have a long tradition in the sciences but have been historically marginalized in management scholarship, relative to an agentic worldview about the role of managers and organizations. An exception is the work of James G. March and his coauthors, who proposed a variety of chance models that explain important management phenomena, including the careers of top executives, managerial risk taking, and organizational anarchy, learning, and adaptation. This paper serves as a tribute to the beauty of these “little ideas” and demonstrates how they can be recombined to generate novel implications. In particular, we focus on the example of an inverted V-shaped performance association centering around the year when executives were featured in a prominent listing, Barron’s annual list of Top 30 chief executive officers. Our recombination of several chance models developed by March and his coauthors provides a novel explanation for why many of the executives’ exceptional performances did not persist. In contrast to the common accounts of complacency, hubris, and statistical regression, the results show that declines from high performance may result from the way luck interacts with these executives’ slow adaptation, incompetence, and self-reinforced risk taking. We conclude by elaborating on the normative implications of chance models, which address many current management and societal challenges. We further encourage the continued development of chance models to help explain performance differences, shifting from accounts that favor heroic stories of corporate leaders toward accounts that favor their changing fortunes.