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The central question in this article is: do recurring types of corporate lobbying strategies exist (in the same way as for generic strategies, for example)? The objective of this research is to define a typology of lobbying strategies implemented by French and UK firms, and then to discuss to what extent firms' political strategies are universal or country‐specific.

An empirical study examined 679 lobbying campaigns (also known as “political action”) of French and UK firms. They were grouped into categories and described using statistical data analysis techniques (multiple correspondence analysis and classification).

The results highlight a pattern in the corporate lobbying phenomenon: five types of lobbying strategy (that can be described and illustrated) exist for French firms, and four for UK firms. Tentative explanations can be put forward: implementation of lobbying strategies appears to depend on the type of issues addressed (which could be universal), but also on the country's political environment (which could be country specific). The study shows the interdependent influence of organisational resources, economic structures and the political environment (laws and the role of the state) on firms' lobbying strategies. Thus, societal effects theory could be applied to firms' political strategies, which are global and local at the same time.

Lobbying public decision makers is an increasingly widespread managerial practice, but has so far attracted little research attention in Europe.

This paper develops a typology of argumentation strategies used in lobbying. Unlike in other strategic communication functions such as crisis or risk communication, such typologies have not been proposed in the sub-field of public affairs.

The article synthesises the strategic communication, political communication and policy studies literature and employs exchange theory to explain the communicative-strategic exchange in public affairs. It showcases its explanatory potential with illustrative examples from Big Tech lobbying.

The paper describes that categories of argumentation strategies that a public affairs professional will choose are based on the contingency of the issue, policy objective and lobbying objective. The descriptive typology will require empirical testing to develop further.

The paper describes how public affairs professionals influence public policy through their argumentation strategies, which sheds light on the usually opaque activities of lobbying.

The proposed typology is the first of its kind for the field of public affairs. Beyond, it contributes communication-scientific insights from a rhetorical tradition to strategic communication research and other social science fields where lobbying is studied, e.g. policy studies.

Presents a modern definition of lobbying suitable for the use of organizational lobbyists and a theory of lobbying as conflict accommodation which arouses ethical considerations. A contingency model of effective lobbying strategies and dynamics of lobbying is developed and tested in a multiple‐case study. Finnish interest group representatives are interviewed to construct cases based on their lobbying efforts on political issues at the national and the EU‐level of political decision making. It is concluded that the definition of lobbying corresponds well to the activities of the interviewees' associations and that it is fruitful to apply the theory of conflict resolution in the study of lobbying. The new model of lobbying reflects the reality excellently. It can be used as a tool for planning and evaluating lobbying in different political issues and at different levels of political decision making.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect of venture capital (VC) funding as a form of ownership on lobbying strategies of venture-backed companies.

The sample consists of venture-backed IPO companies between 1999 and 2014. The authors collected IPO data from the Thompson Securities Data Company (SDC) database. The authors collected VC data from SDC VentureXpert database and lobbying data from the Center for Responsive Politics database (opensecrets.org).

Consistent with the hypotheses, the authors find that VC-backed companies spend less on lobbying compared to non-VC-backed counterparts. However, this relationship is moderated by companies’ R&D intensity. R&D intensive VC-backed companies choose to spend more on lobbying.

The research indicates that although VC backing has a negative impact on lobbying efforts, R&D intensity creates an incentive for VC-backed companies to spend more on lobbying in order to shape public policy to their benefit. The study consists of VC-backed companies that are public. The authors believe that future research can explore political strategies of VC-backed companies during their pre-IPO stage.

The authors believe that political strategies are powerful yet underutilized resources that VC-backed companies can rely on to shift industries and invest in innovative products that challenge norms and fight the status quo. Lobbying and other forms of political involvement can help them shape public policy.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the study makes a unique contribution to the literature by exploring the political strategies of VC-backed companies.

In Finland the use of public relations (PR) agencies and consultants in political decision making has increased in the last two decades. The development of the Finnish political realm has been similar to that of other Nordic countries where the PR industry has built a strong linkage to the political sphere. The present study analyses how Finnish PR consultants with a political background use and attempt to influence the news media as part of lobbying processes to advance their clients' causes. The chapter is based on 11 interviews with PR consultants that were conducted during November 2018. The main findings indicate that Finnish PR consultants consider the news media and journalists as an important part of lobbying. The media and journalists are considered supportive or alternative forums for advocacy and political debate. PR consultants use the media strategically to establish relationships and networks with journalists, and to advocate long-term political decision making and agendas. Overall, the study indicates that Finnish PR consultants want to be active political interpreters, who together with their clients engage in shaping the political agenda and discourses. This is done by taking advantage of previous political experience and networks, constructing the political agenda for media communication, organising a network of media representatives to influence and finally by framing political messages to the media.

Firms influence a government to their advantage in one of two ways: either through lobbying a government to change the rule, or through bribing bureaucrats to circumvent the rule. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether and under what conditions do corporate political activities facilitate firm growth in a multinational context, especially in developing economies.

This study is based on the data of the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, conducted by the World Bank in the 2002 to 2006 period in 12 countries. To deal with a multilevel structure, the authors applied multilevel regression as the main analysis method.

The analysis reveals that both political activities are prevalent in emerging markets, but they play very different roles on firm growth. The authors also find that the effect of lobbying is more pronounced in politically durable countries where firms can secure their vested benefits by lobbying.

The paper contributes to the corporate political activities literature by investigating the distinguishing and contingent role of bribery and lobbying on firm performance.

Extant work on lobbying primarily focuses on who is lobbying and is lobbied as well as strategies of how to exert influence. More fundamentally, we address (1) what drives firms to engage in lobbying activities at all and (2) what factors determine the alignment of corporate lobbying. More concrete, we investigate why and also how firms do lobbying. Another intention is to further anchor this highly relevant instrument of business practice in the scientific discourse of strategic management.

It turns out that the dynamic, systemic, cognitive, and holistic rationale of the competence perspective is a very strong contributor of fresh thoughts to the debate on lobbying as a strategic means. We adopt this perspective by specifically making use of the Competence-based Theory of the Firm (CbTF) in order to scrutinize this issue in theoretical terms. Especially path-dependent developments when building and leveraging a firm's resources and competences as well as resource/competence specificity cause organizational inertia and limited adaptability to changing environmental conditions. Instead of passively adapting to changing environmental conditions, lobbying activities directly aim at entrepreneurial and goal-oriented attempts to exert influence and to steer changes in the relevant business environment, basic conditions underlying every market process, or institutional migration paths at points of inflection. Acknowledging their discretionary potential to act, agents seek to achieve a strategic fit between market requirements and the output they are able to render based on their competences by using the lever of manipulating their environment.

Empirically, propositions are derived and validated with an integrated set of qualitative empirical methods applied in the German healthcare system between 2004 and 2008.

This paper aims to prepare executives to pilot a US lobbying effort within the bounds of the US Federal law. Lobbying law may be thought of as the “regulation of regulation”, as it defines the ground rules for those wishing to have a direct impact upon all other regulatory systems. The article outlines what the US lobbying law requires, what it forbids and, perhaps most important, what the law does NOT regulate.

The paper takes the full spectrum of US laws and regulations relevant to lobbying – including the Internal Revenue Service Code (tax code), the Federal Election Campaign Act, the Ethics in Government Act, the internal rules of both the House and Senate, the US Criminal Code and the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act – and organizes them into a single 2 × 2 matrix, explaining what all parties must do as well as what they must not do. Via this approach, the rules that govern the “marketplace” for lobbying in the USA are explained. The competition to shape US government policy transpires within this marketplace.

Few activities the executive may engage in carry the potential payback of a well-executed lobbying campaign: empirical estimates range to returns on investment in the thousands of per cent. But the uninitiated may easily step over the line and invite both legal and public relations (PR) nightmares.

Effective lobbying can afford a corporation or industry a lasting competitive advantage. Every well-rounded business strategy should include such a component, and every well-rounded executive should be capable of performing in this arena. A solid grounding in the legal matrix forming the boundaries of this activity is a prerequisite for effective performance.

The paper organizes and outlines lobbying law in a fashion digestible by executives without legal training. It is of value to anyone wishing to engage in lobbying activities targeted at the US Government.

In the context of an industrial complex where corporate political activity (CPA) and political corporate social responsibility (political CSR) are not related, this study aims to investigate the possible relationship between citizens’ perceptions of these two non-market strategies and residents’ trust in companies located in the industrial complex.

Data were collected from 740 citizens living near a petrochemical complex in Tarragona (Spain). The results were analysed using structural equation modelling.

Based on institutional theory, the key findings of the study are that CPA and political CSR are differently related to citizens’ trust in companies. The results also verify that the negative relationship (between CPA and trust) outweighs the positive one (between political CSR and trust).

The lack of fit between political CSR and CPA in the complex analysed suggests that firms are neglecting approaches shared by these non-market strategies, and thus wasting a huge opportunity to improve citizens’ trust in and acceptance of the complex firms. Moreover, the ethical dimension should always be present when these firms take on political responsibilities.

To date, CPA and political CSR have largely been dealt with separately in the literature. This study attempted to bridge this gap by examining a situation where there is no strategic relationship between CPA and political CSR to analyse, from the perspective of citizens’ perceptions, the relationship each strategy has with the important academic concept of citizens’ trust in companies.

Why are state business relations in Egypt characterized by widely acknowledged high levels of cronyism? The purpose of this paper is to investigate the institutional factors explaining this research question with a focus on pre-2011 Egypt.

Based on a general theoretical discussion, certain institutions were proposed as being responsible. A game theoretical model is then introduced. It explains why cronyism was the best strategy for various business players in contrast to aggregating and lobbying their efforts to obtain government available resources, whether these resources are energy subsidies, public banks’ credit or regulations. Then pre-2011 Egypt is discussed as a case study. This discussion is enriched by the available literature and empirical data.

Choosing cronyism was attributed to the presence of a weak and dependent private sector, where businesspeople are unable to aggregate their power; a relatively stronger government; poor governance performance; higher levels of regime legitimization practices, such as providing generous consumer subsidies; and economic growth caused by an increase in resources rather than by governance institutional improvement. A discussion of the available literature and empirical data on pre-2011 Egypt, going over the various proposed institutional factors, helped to support these arguments.

Further empirical evidence is needed to support and modify the suggestions of this paper. More detailed indicators would have further helped this research. Moreover, more case studies, other than the case of pre-2011 Egypt, are also needed. It is hoped that this paper would encourage further research endeavors that would cover these limitations.

Governance institutional reform is needed to minimize cronyism, especially institutions such as voice and accountability, rule of law, regulatory quality and control of corruption.

This paper can explain why high levels of cronyism are witnessed in many countries of the world, including the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The region shares many institutional factors with Egypt. Governments in the MENA region have various sources of power with regard to their dependent private sectors added to the general poor performance in various governance indicators in the region.

The deep analysis conducted in this paper for the causes of Cronyism in Egypt has not been done elsewhere. This is also true for the whole MENA region. The introduced theoretical model is the first trial of this sort and should be important for future works on this topic in the MENA region and developing countries.