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This article estimates the loan spread equation taking into account the endogenous matching between banks and firms in the loan market. To overcome the endogeneity problem, I supplement the loan spread equation with a two-sided matching model and estimate them jointly. Bayesian inference is feasible using a Gibbs sampling algorithm that performs Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations. I find that medium-sized banks and firms tend to be the most attractive partners, and that liquidity is also a consideration in choosing partners. Furthermore, banks with higher monitoring ability charge higher spreads, and firms that are more leveraged or less liquid are charged higher spreads.

The purpose of this study is to provide an econometric modeling of demand for bank credit and not only offer useful insights to the decision-makers in the public and private sector but also support researchers and analysts in recognizing the determinants of lending in a major dynamic economic context.

This study addresses the “supply-versus-demand-puzzle” by using a demand relationship and model loan demand as a function of interest rates and economic activity that may also capture supply effects. Loan demand modeled as a function of interest rates and economic activity not only represents a demand relationship but also captures supply effects. Using the generalized methods of moments estimation, the estimations are made robust to heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation of unknown form. GMM–Time series (HAC) option extends the robustness by using the weighting matrix that is robust to the contemporaneous correlation of unknown form to the autocorrelation of unknown form.

In a bank-dominated financial system like India, lending rates play a significant role in the transmission of monetary policy, as well as triggering and controlling loan demand and thereby exercising a pervasive effect on the output in the economy. The estimates indicate that the elasticity of loan demand is largely determined by the lending rate (0.6) and the economic activity (0.688). For one percentage point increase in capital ratio, the loan spread would rise by 31.4 basis points, which in turn would cause an increase of 18.8 basis points in loan demand assuming that risk-weighted assets are unchanged.

This is the first of its kind studying a banking system dominated emerging economy. Second, this study is based on a rich data set covering the period from 1979 to 2012, than other papers did, to capture the long-run association involving credit booms and busts and, thus, helps in avoiding the problem of estimation spanning the dominance of either boom or the bust alone. With a newer approach for quantification of the impacts of new regulatory standards, this study offers novel insights for the estimation of lending spreads.

Prior research suggests that given the legal environment in the U.S., smaller syndicates with fewer lead banks should represent “best practices” to promote efficient monitoring and ease of renegotiation. Such syndicates should be associated with lower loan spreads. Controlling for other influences on loan pricing, we conduct tests of this proposition drawing on data from DealScan, Compustat and Federal Reserve Call Reports for U.S. loans between 1988 and 1999. Consistent with our hypothesis, the number of lead lenders is shown to have a significant positive influence on loan yield spreads.

This paper contributes to the literature as follows. First, it examines if option and stock compensations raise creditor's risk, and which one is more important than the other. Second, it explores if CEO's compensation interacts with CEO overconfidence to raise creditor's risk. Third, it investigates how banks use different loan terms to alleviate their credit risk.

This study used advanced regression analysis and use of generalized methods of moment methodology.

The results show that option compensation is more important than stock compensation in raising credit risk; option compensation interacts with CEO overconfidence, giving rise to a much higher credit risk; and covenant usage is more important than other loan contract terms in mitigating credit risk given that covenant use could not be substituted away by using other loan contract terms such as increasing interest rate, reducing principal or shortening loan duration. This paper has practical implications for credit markets.

The main implication is that hand-collect data are available up to 2010.

It informs creditors the potential sources of loan risk emanating from option rather than stock incentives; it informs creditors that option incentive interacts with CEO overconfidence rendering the credit risk bigger than expected, and it informs creditors the importance of using covenants vis-à-vis other loan contract terms for mitigating compensation and overconfidence risk.

Banks are alerted to the risk due to the interaction between overconfidence and compensations, implying that overconfident managers remunerated with options compensations are more risky than overconfident managers who are not remunerated as such.

This paper is original: (1) The authors show that option compensation is more risky than stock compensation from viewpoint of creditors. This has not been assessed. (2) Interaction between managerial compensation and managerial overconfidence has not been assessed before. (3) Use of different loan contract terms to alleviate risk from overconfident managers (who are prone to over investment but who are innovative according to the literature) has not been evaluated.

This paper aims to analyze how banks transmit shocks that hit the debt market to their borrowers. Recent financial crisis demonstrated that the banking system can be a pathway for shock transmission.

Bank-level panel regressions.

This paper shows that when banks experience a shock to the cost of their bond financing, they pass a portion of their extra costs or savings to their corporate borrowers. While banks do not offer special protection from bond market shocks to their relationship borrowers, they also do not treat all of them equally. Relationship borrowers that are not bank-dependent are the least exposed to bond market shocks via their bank loans. In contrast, banks pass the highest portion of the increase in their cost of bond financing to their relationship borrowers that rely exclusively on banks for external funding.

These findings show that banks put more weight on the informational advantage they have over their relationship borrowers than on the prospects of future business with these borrowers. They also show a potential side effect of the recent proposals to require banks to use CoCos or other long-term funding.

The findings are timely, given the ongoing debates on the proposals to introduce bail-in programs and proposals to require banks to use CoCos or other long-term funding.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate universal banks as an important source of external funding and their effects on borrowing firms’ innovation outputs.

The authors employ regression analyses including a difference-in-difference approach and a two-sided matching method to ensure the robustness of the findings. The authors further explore some potential channels and boundary conditions for the main findings.

The authors find that borrowing from universal banks is negatively associated with the quantity of firm innovation, but not the quality of firm innovation. The authors document that borrowing firms reduce their R&D expenditures and rely more on external partners to produce innovation outputs after loan originations from universal banks. The negative relation between universal bank lending and the quantity of firm innovation is more prominent for unrelated innovation and for financially constrained firms.

The evidence reveals that universal banks may use their informational advantage and market power to limit their corporate borrowers’ investment in innovation activities.

The paper extends the line of research on the source of financing and firm innovation, and establishes a robust relationship between capital market and product market.

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of cross‐listing and cross‐listing location on the terms of the private debt of firms not located in the USA. Specifically, the paper examines the empirical relationship between three syndicated loan terms (pricing, maturity and amount) at loan initiation and the cross‐listed status of the borrower (cross‐listed in the USA, UK, through depository receipts or not at all), while (not) differentiating between the stage of economic development of the borrower's home country.

The three loan terms are modeled as a simultaneous system of equations and are estimated on a very extensive sample of 3,883 observations. The impact of endogeneity biases due to the sequential choices to and where to cross‐list are examined using the inverse Mill's ratios from a bivariate probit model.

All else held equal, foreign borrowers that are cross‐listed directly in the UK obtain loans with higher spreads, longer maturities and larger loan amounts if they are from economically developed countries. Borrowers from emerging economies pay lower spreads but receive shorter maturities on syndicated loans if cross‐listed in the UK. Cross‐listings in the USA are not associated with any significant differential impacts on the three loan terms.

This paper makes an important contribution to the cross‐listing and capital structure literatures by providing evidence that the net benefit from being cross‐listed for one debt component of the cost of capital (i.e. syndicated loans) depends on the listing destination and upon whether or not the borrower is from an emerging economy. The paper provides practical guidance to corporate financial officers on the benefits of international cross‐listing and the choice of cross‐listing venues on the terms of private debt issues.

The purpose of this paper is to model the components of credit risk in primary debt markets and evaluate changes in these factors in times of crisis.

The authors use a unique dataset consisting of nearly 163,000 new loans and bond issues in the USA and internationally during the period January 1992 through December 2005.

The authors find that credit spreads are related to market liquidity, best represented by total proceeds, ratings and the interaction between maturity and rating. The authors control for various crisis periods, including regional financial crises and find that spreads generally increased in response to the Asian Crisis with the international markets exhibiting the larger increases. There is mixed evidence of asymmetric effects of shocks. In the US loan markets, the adjustment factor reduces forecast variance (Θ1<0). In contrast, the adjustment factor is not significant for US bonds, possibly indicating a more rapid adjustment and greater efficiency in this market. The opposite effect is seen in the international loan and bond markets with Θ1>0, indicating a persistent increase in spread volatility.

The paper extends our understanding of the components of primary credit spreads and the interactions between primary debt markets during crisis periods.

Asymmetric information impedes the efficiency of financial intermediation by widening the gap between lending and deposit rates. The cost of information gathering is high and often translates into high borrowing costs. Consequently, high borrowing costs may make it hard for borrowers to repay loans and increase the volume of non-performing loans – a recipe for financial instability. This study first compares the application of the simple GARCH (1,1) and BGARCH (1,1,1) models in the estimation of macroeconomic volatility and finds that the latter is more suitable for this purpose. Moreover, the choice of BGARCH (1,1,1) over the simple GARCH (1,1) implies different outcomes for Granger causality tests. This finding implies that the BGARCH (1,1,1) model minimises loss of important information when estimating macroeconomic volatility in developing countries. Second, the study uses bootstrap panel Granger causality to test the hypothesis that there is a causal relationship between financial instability and the financial intermediation spread in Southern African Customs Union (SACU). The findings support this hypothesis and underscore the importance of implementing sound macroeconomic policies for high and stable growth as well as effective monetary policy to attain and maintain low and stable prices in order to narrow the financial intermediation spread in SACU. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

This study uses bootstrap panel Granger causality to test the hypothesis that there is a causal relationship between financial instability and the financial intermediation spread in SACU.

The findings support this hypothesis and underscore the importance of implementing sound macroeconomic policies for high and stable growth as well as effective monetary policy to attain and maintain low and stable prices in order to narrow the financial intermediation spread in SACU.

Application of panel bootstrap Granger causality test to test for a casual relationship between financial intermediation spread and financial stability in the context of SACU.