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The purpose of this paper is to show that subordinated debt regulatory proposals assume that transactions in the secondary market of subordinated debt can attenuate moral hazard on the part of management if secondary market prices are informative signals of the risk of the institution. Owing to the proprietary nature of dealer prices and the liquidity of secondary transactions, the practical value of information provided by subordinated debt issues in isolation is questionable.

A multivariate dynamic risk signal is proposed that combines fluctuations in equity prices, subordinated debt and senior debt yields. The signal is constructed as a coincident indicator that is based in a time series model of yield fluctuations and equity returns. The extracted signal monitors idiosyncratic risk of the intermediary because yields and equity returns are filtered from market conditions. It is also predictable because it is possible to construct a leading indicator based almost entirely on spreads to Treasury.

The signal for the Bank of America and Banker's Trust is implemented. For Bank of America, the signal points mainly to two events of uprising risk: January 2000 when the bank disclosed large losses in its bond and interest‐rate swaps portfolios; and November 2000 when it wrote off $1.1 billion for bad loans. For Banker's Trust, the signal points to October/November 1995 after the filing of federal racketeering charges against Banker's Trust; and October 1998 when the bank suffered substantial losses from its investments in emerging markets.

The signal is a complementary instrument for regulators and investors to monitor and assess in real time the risk profile of the financial institution.

While subordinated debt can be used to increase market discipline on banks by playing a corporate governance role in the presence of a federal safety net that encourages risk taking, it also has implications for banks’ loan sales. Using two measures of banks’ loan sales activity, we find greater proportions of subordinated debt increase the likelihood that banks engage in loan sales activity, and are associated with greater proportions of loan sales. Our results have implications about banks’ lending efficiency as well as their transparency and disclosure policies that could play a role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.

A major theme in the literature on bank regulation is that greater reliance on market forces can mitigate the moral hazard problem inherent in government sponsored deposit insurance. Specific proposals to impose greater market discipline on banks include minimum requirements on (1) uninsured subordinated debt financing (either fixed-term or with option-type features), and (2) private coinsurance on deposits. Both proposals amount to delegating the responsibility for bank regulation to various private sector claimholders. The results suggest that such delegation (with or without claims that include option-type features) may be ineffective in lowering bank risk, at least within the present regulatory and institutional framework. Alternative mechanisms exist that can mitigate the moral hazard problem; however, it may be necessary for the regulator/deposit insurer to be an integral part of the solution.

This chapter extends Panyagometh and Roberts (2008) by taking into account differences in costs of closure among countries and the effects of subordinated debt on moral hazard problems. Our results show that a mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSDP) can be used with contingent purchase and assumption policy to further reduce probability of future bank failure if the high level of uninsured debt can improve the effectiveness of monitoring. While a MSDP might be appropriate for some developed countries with effective informational and supervisory environments and developed financial markets, such as the U.S., extending a MSDP into developing countries is questionable.

The paper examines the relationship between subordinated debt yield spreads of Japanese banks and bank-specific risk in the Japanese bond market. Subordinated debt issued by banking organizations may enhance the market discipline of banking organizations. In order to give a theoretical explanation for this, the paper develops models that describe how yield spreads of subordinated debt may be related to bank-specific risks and systematic risks. Although the sample size of this study is not large enough to draw an undisputed conclusion, the models tested here find no clear evidence of a positive relationship between subordinated debt premiums and bank-specific risks in the Japanese market. These findings for the Japanese market suggest that in the current environment of the Japanese financial system, issuing subordinated debt is unlikely to improve the prudential supervision of banks with market forces as suggested in the newly proposed Basel Accords.

This study develops a multi-period structural model to value bank subordinated debt (subdebt) under different regulatory policies. The model provides a complete framework for analyzing how various factors, such as credit and interest rate risks, bank characteristics, and regulatory policies, affect subdebt prices and yield spreads. It finds that the implementation of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) will raise subdebt prices and lower subdebt spreads, while capital forbearance will have the opposite effects. Also, subdebt spreads are less sensitive to bank risk when PCA is imposed than when capital forbearance occurs. The results of the paper suggest that enhancing market discipline through giving subdebt investors more rights to force timely reorganization of weak banks will reduce the subdebt spreads required by investors.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of basel accord on the Bangladeshi bank performance including Islamic banks and the role of subordinated debt (sub-debt) as basel regulatory capital (BRC).

The authors conducted the empirical investigation by adopting a quantitative approach and using the secondary data available in the annual reports of the sample banks between 2009 and 2018. This paper develops an econometric model to compare and analyze the regression result under two states of capital-to-risk adjusted assets ratio (CRAR) with sub-debt and CRAR without sub-debt. This paper analyzes the impact of sub-debt in the largest Islamic bank for the year 2007 as a case study for endorsing the findings.

This paper finds that CRAR has positive alignments with return on equity (ROE) and cash dividend when sub-debt is considered as Tier 2 capital. This paper observes that the huge bad loan write-off supports to downsize the asset size thus temporarily enhance the return on assets (ROA). In a nutshell, sub-debt gives banks an ill incentive to disburse steady cash dividends instead of injecting genuine equity capital, encouraging them to take more credit risk. In fact, more private commercial banks (PCBs) issued huge sub-debts between 2009 and 2018 under a unique arrangement, which the authors termed as the “sub-debt trap.”

This paper draws policy implications for the banking regulator to identify and rectify a systemic problem of the “sub-debt trap” which hinders the regulatory purpose from the implementation of basel accord II and III. A limitation of this study is the authors shed analytical light on Bangladeshi banks, i.e. it a single country analysis which may not be generalized to other developing countries except matching with a similar context.

The paper contributes to accumulating empirical studies on the effectiveness of basel accord implementation in developing countries. In most of the developing countries, where institutional loopholes are a major concern, the research provides evidence that how weak institutional settings are largely responsible for harvesting the potential benefit from micro-prudential regulation such as the basel accord. To shed analytical light on developing country context, the study document that sub-debt has been instrumentalized to maintain minimum capital ratio and banks managers tends more focus on improving ROE instead of ROA. The findings of the study are supportive to other developing countries where sub-debt considered as BRC and issued through private placement. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, it is the first attempt to cast doubt on the impact of sub-debt as a BRC, given the uniqueness of the Bangladeshi banking industry, on the PCBs including Islamic banks.

Recent research has examined the effect of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, more commonly known as the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLB), on the market value of U.S. commercial banks, life insurers, property-liability insurers, thrifts, finance companies, and securities firms. This study fills a gap in our understanding of the Act by measuring the price and trading volume effects of the GLB on U.S.-listed foreign banks. A primary contribution of this study is to examine the role, if any, of two corporate governance perspectives, the stakeholder (code law), and shareholder (common law) models, in a cross-sectional analysis of foreign bank market reaction to the GLB.

Using a generalized least squares (GLS) portfolio approach, Corrado's rank statistic, and confirmed by the traditional market model approach, we find significant negative share price reactions to certain legislative announcements surrounding the passage of the GLB. Trading volume reactions corroborate the significant share price responses. In general, our results indicate that investors in foreign banks reacted negatively to key legislative action. In a cross-sectional analysis, younger, higher-risk foreign banks with less concentrated ownership and more subordinated debt from countries with higher quality accounting standards appear to have more positive (or less negative) share price reactions.

In fraudulent conveyance cases, plaintiffs allege that by entering into a complex leverage transaction, such as an LBO, a firm’s former owners ensured its subsequent collapse. Proving that the transaction rendered the firm insolvent may allow debtors (or their proxies) to claw back transfers made to former shareholders and others as part of the transaction.

Courts have recently questioned the robustness of the solvency evidence traditionally provided in such cases, claiming that traditional expert analyses (e.g., a discounted flow analysis) may suffer from hindsight (and other forms of) bias, and thus not reflect an accurate view of the firm’s insolvency prospects at the time of the challenged transfers. To address the issue, courts have recently suggested that experts should consider market evidence, such as the firm’s stock, bond, or credit default swap prices at the time of the challenged transaction. We review market-evidence-based approaches for determination of solvency in fraudulent conveyance cases.

We compare different methods of solvency determination that rely on market data. We discuss the pros and cons of these methods and illustrate the use of credit default swap spreads with a numerical example. Finally, we highlight the limitations of these methods.

If securities trade in efficient markets in which security prices quickly impound all available information, then such security prices provide an objective assessment of investors’ views of the firm’s future insolvency prospects at the time of challenged transfer, given contemporaneously available information. As we explain, using market data to analyze fraudulent conveyance claims or assess a firm’s solvency prospects is not as straightforward as some courts argue. To do so, an expert must first pick a particular credit risk model from a host of choices which links the market evidence (or security price) to the likelihood of future default. Then, to implement his chosen model, the expert must estimate various parameter input values at the time of the alleged fraudulent transfer. In this connection, it is important to note that each credit risk model rests on particular assumptions, and there are typically several ways in which a model’s key parameters may be empirically estimated. Such choices critically affect any conclusion about a firm’s future default prospects as of the date of an alleged fraudulent conveyance.

Simply using market evidence does not necessarily eliminate the question of bias in any analysis. The reliability of a plaintiff’s claims regarding fraudulent conveyance will depend on the reasonableness of the analysis used to tie the observed market evidence at the time of the alleged fraudulent transfer to default prospects of the firm.

There is a large body of literature in financial economics that examines the relationship between market data and the prospects of a firm’s future default. However, there is surprisingly little research tying that literature to the analysis of fraudulent conveyance claims. Our paper, in part, attempts to do so. We show that while market-based methods use the information contained in market prices, this information must be supplemented with assumptions and the conclusions of these methods critically depend on the assumption made.