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Shows that there is a Granger causality relationship between house prices and mortgage flows in Hong Kong where there is a deposit‐rate ceiling and linked exchange rate. While the demand for housing units is distorted by mortgage constraint, any changes of housing demand or house prices will have a feedback on mortgage lending, and thus tend to iron out the housing demand to a level consistent with the short‐run availability of financing. The results strongly suggest that house prices in Hong Kong tend to lead the mortgage flows, not vice versa. Sudden unexpected changes in housing demand may not affect aggregate mortgage availability within a short period of time. However, as an increase in housing demand makes more permanent contributions to house prices, the higher housing prices will be increasingly translated into higher mortgage flows in the long run.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the total number of mortgage default occurrence possibilities and monetary damage amounts to the sampled properties due to the excessive flooding caused by natural disasters. Mortgage default loss assessments due to natural catastrophic events are of great interest to lenders, insurance firms, forensic engineering professionals, inspecting agencies and the federal and state government planning officials and risk-mitigating teams.

In this study, a stochastic methodology is used to address the risk of mortgage default losses and the homeowners’ investment returns, given: damage severity levels of hurricane floods and the mortgage types and arrangements on selected properties. Nine different houses, with various mortgage arrangements, located in different flood damage zones were investigated three years after Hurricane Katrina. To quantify the flood damage risk values which are compared with exceeding damage probabilities, the Poisson’s distribution is used through performing random variable analysis walks for each property during each house’s mortgage life cycle.

Henceforth, through introduction and constructing the “Zonal Damage Matrix” for the investigated houses, the total number of mortgage default occurrence possibilities and monetary damage amounts to the properties are calculated for each exceeding flood. Thereafter, the homeowners’ net equity values and the investment returns are estimated for risk identification and evaluation purposes.

For each of the sampled houses, the probability of mortgage defaults and the homeowners’ net equity values are estimated using Poisson’s distribution based on 60,000 randomly generated numbers to construct ten different hazard-related default scenarios for each property over the 30-year mortgage life cycle. The investment returns are therefore estimated for risk identification and evaluation purposes.

Suggests that a form of modified variable rate mortgage (VRM) should be the type of mortgage that is most attractive to the majority of owner‐occupiers in New Zealand. VRMs are shown to be lenders′ choice of mortgage because their traditional reliance on retail deposits and other forms of short‐term finance necessitates that their assets be of similar duration. In exchange for unilateral rate‐setting powers, lenders compensate borrowers (to a degree) with relatively low administration costs. Though it appears that the range of mortgage products available in New Zealand is now too narrow, this is beginning to be rectified by new products that offer more conservative borrowers the ability to reduce risk. Finally, analysis of historic mortgage margins indicates that there are differences between lenders. Solely on the basis of rate‐setting practice, though no lender appears to have been able to charge significantly higher margins than all of the other lenders, one institution has offered significantly lower margins.

Looks at the problem of endowment assurances that do not meet their targets to repay residential mortgages. By analysing the present value of payments under different inflation and interest‐rate regimes, we conclude that the perceived problems with endowment policies may simply be a manifestation of “money illusion”. Nevertheless, there could be frictional problems and other problems arising from the use of endowment assurances to repay mortgages which we identify but do not analyse in detail. The failure of such a major method of repaying mortgages to perform in line with expectations will have implications for the residential housing market.

The precise relationships between neoliberalization, financialization, and rising risk are still being debated in the literature. This paper examines, and challenges, the Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) developed by Hyman Minsky and his adherents. In this perspective, the level of financial risk builds over time as participants orient their behavior in relation to assessments of past levels of risk performance, leading them to overly optimistic valuation estimates and increasingly risky behavior with each subsequent cycle. However, there are problems with this approach, and many questions remain, including how participants modify their exposure to risk over time, how risk is scaled, and who benefits from changes in exposure to risk. This paper examines such questions and proposes an alternate perspective on financial instability and risk, in light of the history of risk management within Canada’s housing finance sector. The rise of financialization in Canada has been accompanied by shifts in the sectoral and scalar locus of risk within the housing sector, from the federal state, to lower levels of government, third-sector organizations, and finally, private households. In each case, the transfer of risk has occurred as participants in each stage sought to reduce their own risk exposure in light of realistic and even pessimistic (not optimistic) expectations deriving from past exposure, contradicting basic assumptions of Minsky’s FIH. This is the process that has driven the neoliberalization of housing finance in Canada, characterized by the socialization of lender risk while households increasingly take on the financial and social risks relating to shelter.

We use normal accident theory to analyze the financial sector, especially that part of the financial sector that processed home mortgages, and the mortgage meltdown. We maintain that the financial sector was highly complex and tightly coupled in the years leading up to the mortgage meltdown. And we argue that the meltdown exhibited characteristics of a system or normal accident; the result of a component failure (unusually high mortgage defaults) that, in the context of unique conditions (which included low interest rates and government policy encouraging home loans to less credit-worthy households), resulted in complex and tightly coupled interactions that financial elites and government officials were ill-equipped to control. We also consider the role that agency and wrongdoing played in the design of the financial system and the unfolding of the mortgage meltdown. We conclude that a fundamental restructuring of the financial system, so as to reduce complexity and coupling, is required to avert future similar financial debacles. But we also conclude that such a restructuring faces significant obstacles, given the interests of powerful actors and the difficulties of labeling those responsible for the meltdown as wrongdoers.

In recessions, depository institutions accounted for most declines in mortgage flows. Recently, they partially offset their withdrawals from primary markets with accumulations of mortgage-backed securities. Increases in direct flows into agency and private pools also countered the declining flows elsewhere. As the less-procyclical secondary mortgage markets grew and matured, they increasingly stabilized mortgage flows. During periods of international financial crises or of domestic economic stress, GSEs may have been particularly effective in stabilizing mortgage markets and moderating business cycles.

The concept of state-corporate crime developed during the late 1980s and early 1990s in a series of papers authored by Michalowski and Kramer (Kramer, 1990; Kramer & Michalowski, 1990; Michalowski & Kramer, 1987). They specifically define state-corporate crime as:Illegal or socially injurious actions that result from a mutually reinforcing interaction between (1) policies and/or practices in pursuit of goals of one or more institutions of political governance and (2) policies and/or practices in pursuit of goals of one or more institutions of economic production and distribution. (Michalowski & Kramer, 2006a, 2006b, p. 15)

This chapter examines how deregulatory fiscal policies undermined federal legislation intended to reduce racial and economic inequality through measures that included wider access to home loans among minority populations. We focus specifically on structural tensions that existed between fostering the goals of economic and racial equality within a political structure that also serves the needs of finance capitalism. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), typically considered a triggering point for the financial meltdown by conservative commentators, was passed to address racial and economic inequalities, yet financial deregulation and the growth of the subprime mortgage industry ended up completely subverting these goals. The unprecedented growth and evolution of the subprime mortgage industry that occurred largely outside of the law's reach helped minorities and other economically disadvantaged groups enter into the housing market. However, a crime-facilitative environment brought on by inadequate regulation resulted in a significant degree of fraud by lenders. While this expanded homeownership among minorities, it eventually pushed them into default and brought chaos to the entire U.S. economy. This chapter details how the collapse of the subprime industry disproportionately impacted minority populations, and exposes how deregulatory policies subverted the effectiveness and reach of the FHA and CRA. The history of the CRA provides a clear example of the contradictory tensions within the U.S. legal system that espouses equality yet ultimately fails those it was designed to help as a consequence of unfettered capitalism.