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As financial markets move toward increased globalization, it becomes worth considering whether inherent differences in financial markets across different countries will diminish. For two countries more similar than different in terms of geography, location, government and culture, Canada and the USA remain strikingly different in terms of housing finance. Public policy objectives toward housing followed quite different paths over the past 70 years and fundamental differences in banking practices have led to considerably different outcomes in terms of mortgage finance instruments in the two countries. Examines some of the differences in policy and in competitive practices between Canada and the USA in an attempt to illuminate why differences in rates and terms across the two countries still exist. While a part of the difference remains due to legal constraints concerning the finance of the domestic housing sector, focuses on the economics and public policy choices that have led to the observed differences rather than on an analysis of the legal structure.

The purpose of this paper is to generalize the one‐factor mortgage‐backed securities (MBS)‐pricing model proposed by Kariya and Kobayashi to a three‐factor model. The authors describe prepayment behavior due to refinancing and rising housing prices by discrete‐time, no‐arbitrage pricing theory, making an association between prepayment behavior and cash flow patterns.

The structure, rationality and potential for practical use of our model is demonstrated by valuing an MBS via Monte Carlo simulation and then conducting a comparative static analysis.

The proposed model is found to be effective for analysing MBS cash flow patterns, making a decision for bond investments and risk management due to prepayment.

While the one‐factor valuation model Kariya and Kobayashi treated is a basic framework, the generalized model presented in this paper is much more effective for analysing MBS cash flow patterns, making a decision for bond investments and risk management due to prepayment.

The current crisis in the mortgage securitization industry highlights significant failures in our models of how markets work and our political will, organizational capability, and ideological desire to intervene in markets. This article shows that one of the main sources of failure has been the lack of a coherent understanding of how these markets came into existence, how tactics and strategies of the principal firms in these markets have evolved over time, and how we ended up with the economic collapse of the main firms. It seeks to provide some insight into these processes by compiling both historical and quantitative data on the emergence and spread of these tactics across the largest investment banks and their principal competitors from the mortgage origination industry. It ends by offering some policy proscriptions based on the analysis.

In October 2008, in the midst of a financial crisis, Anthony Keating, investment manager at the Boston private bank Billingsley, Blaylock, and Montgomery, was searching for an investment strategy to recommend to his high-net-worth clients. Traditional investments in the equity markets were being decimated, and Keating’s clients would be looking to him for ideas. Inspired by the success of Paulson and Co., Keating began to explore the possibility of entering a trade that would profit as homeowners defaulted on their mortgages. The more Keating learned about the trade, the more he realized that he needed to know about mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps. The case provides instructors with a chance to introduce these financial instruments, while at the same time providing lessons applicable to students interested in value investing or real estate finance.

After reading and analyzing the case, students will be able to:

• Explain how home mortgages are securitized into financial instruments that are traded in public markets

• Describe how credit default swaps can be used to speculate on the value of an underlying financial instrument

• Identify potential mispricing across related financial instruments

• Understand the potential risks and rewards of various financial investment strategies that look to capitalize on defaults on subprime mortgages

Explain how home mortgages are securitized into financial instruments that are traded in public markets

Describe how credit default swaps can be used to speculate on the value of an underlying financial instrument

Identify potential mispricing across related financial instruments

Understand the potential risks and rewards of various financial investment strategies that look to capitalize on defaults on subprime mortgages

This paper examines how the macroeconomic environment affects the determinants of prepayment of mortgage loans from October 2004 to February 2020. For more accurate analysis, the authors define the timing of prepayment not only before the loan maturity but also at the time when 50% or more of the loan principal is repaid. The results show that, during the global financial crisis as well as the recent period of low interest rates, macroeconomic variables such as interest rate spreads and housing prices have a different effect compared to the normal situation. Also, significant explanatory variables, such as debt to income (DTI) ratio, loan amount ratio and poor credit score, have different effects depending on the macroenvironment. On the other hand, in all periods, the possibility of prepayment increases as comprehensive loan to value (CLTV) increases, and the younger the age, the shorter the loan maturity. The results suggest that, in the case of ultralong (40 years) mortgage loans recently introduced to support young people purchasing houses, the prepayment risk can be, at least partially, migrated by offsetting the increase in prepayment by young people and the decrease in prepayment due to long loan maturity. In addition, this study confirms that the accelerated time failure model compared to the logit model and COX proportional risk model has the potential to be more appropriate as a prepayment model for individual borrower analysis in terms of the explanatory power.

There are striking similarities between publicly-held government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and investor-owned public utilities. Each firm enjoys large scale economies that give a significant competitive advantage over other companies, possesses a dominant market position that it may be able to exploit to earn profits above competitive levels, and has a strong incentive to enter new markets when the life cycle of its core markets constrain its ability to increase profits. The recent behavior of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac indicates that the government must impose more stringent economic regulation on those GSEs in order to be sure that they achieve their public purposes.

This paper investigates the link between equity and credit markets for the government‐sponsored mortgage institutions, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, during the period from January 2007 until December 2008. Before the financial crisis, investors perceived these real estate finance institutions as quasi state guaranteed.

By examining Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during 2007 and 2008, this study extends existing research on the link between equity and credit markets. The authors employ univariate time series regression and vector autoregressive models to analyze the comovements over time and the lead‐lag relationship for equity returns, CDS spread changes, and bond spread changes.

The results provide evidence for equity returns and credit spreads of CDS and bonds being inversely related and adjusting simultaneously. The relationship between equity and credit markets intensifies during periods of heightened risks. The link between equity returns and bond spread changes is more robust in an environment of slightly elevated risk, while the relationship between equity and CDS markets intensifies during times of extreme stress. It was also found that the link between equity and credit markets completely breaks down as government intervention in the form of regulatory changes and ultimately, conservatorship, materializes.

Investors active in equity and credit markets need to be aware of the relevance of the prevailing capital market regime and the role of external effects such as government support and bailout.

There is a growing body of empirical research employing event studies and regression analyses on the firm level to examine the link between equity and credit default swaps. Yet, to the authors' knowledge this relationship has not been explored specifically for quasi guaranteed institutions. However, given the growing number of at least partly state owned real estate finance institutions, this specific focus is important to understand future expected risk compensation of equity and credit investors. The paper ask what lessons are to be learnt from the current financial crisis about investor protection in quasi guaranteed financial institutions.

This paper seeks to examine the role that regulation and regulatory agencies played in the creating of the subprime mortgage market, and the subsequent crash of the mortgage market. The paper has two goals. First, it seeks to document the degree to which the US housing markets, and the US housing finance market, were regulated prior to the crash. Second, it seeks to show that regulatory bodies set policies which created both incentives and explicit requirements for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as depository institutions, to enter the subprime market.

The paper examines the regulatory environment of the subprime market. It uses regulatory filings and other documents as primary sources.

The popular perception that the subprime mortgage market arose because housing finance was largely unregulated is incorrect. In point of fact, the housing finance market was very heavily regulated. Indeed, the paper shows that the creation of the subprime market was a formal goal of the federal government, and that federal regulatory agencies explicitly required participation by the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs).

The paper's primary implication is that incentive conflicts within the US housing finance system significantly contributed to the mortgage crisis. These incentive conflicts were not just within private firms, but also extend to the GSEs and regulatory agencies. Regulatory agencies not only failed to anticipate the crisis; they actively encouraged the policies which created it. As a result, the primary focus of reform efforts should be on identifying and eliminating such conflicts.

This paper aims to review major changes on real estate markets in Europe and to analyse the impacts of such changes.

The paper provides an overview of the various equity real estate investment vehicles available to investors, with particular focus on the pros and cons of each type of vehicle. The paper also includes an analysis of the impacts of product innovation on real estate markets and on portfolio strategy.

The changes on real estate markets have led to considerable amounts of capital being allocated to the asset class. Portfolio strategies should be substantially more flexible.

As many of the new products have been created in bullish real estate markets, it is important to assess the impacts of a market downturn on portfolio performance.

A good understanding of available products with their pros and cons is necessary for a sound investment strategy.

The paper is one of the very few papers that discuss the major institutional changes that have occurred on European real estate markets.