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Merchants and manufacturers have it in their power to minimise in some degree the extent to which we are becoming indebted to foreign countries in respect of the large excess of imports over exports, by obtaining, as far as possible, their imported supplies of food products and raw materials for industries from countries within the Empire. Take, for example, meat and cheese. The prevailing high prices are no doubt encouraging the home production of these commodities. Nevertheless a large quantity must necessarily be imported. In 1914 meat to the value of 62 million pounds was imported, and cheese to the value of 8 million pounds. Of the imports of meat 26 per cent. came from within the Empire, and of cheese 82 per cent. Clearly it is better under existing circumstances that we should buy meat from Australia and New Zealand than from Argentina, and cheese from Canada and New Zealand rather than from Holland and the United States. Many other examples may be mentioned of products which can equally as well be obtained within the Empire as from foreign countries, such as maize from South Africa, where a large increase of production is expected this year; oats from Canada rather than from Argentina and the United States; barley from Canada; peas from New Zealand; butter from Australia and New Zealand; canned salmon, of which 2½ million pounds' worth was imported in 1914, from Canada rather than from the United States; apples from Canada and Australia; wine from Australia; tea from India and Ceylon rather than from China and Java; cocoa from the Gold Coast and the West Indies; copra from Malaya, India and Australia; rubber from Malaya and Ceylon; fibres from New Zealand, Mauritius, Ceylon, etc.; wood pulp from Canada and Newfoundland; wool from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the Falkland Islands rather than from Argentina, Chile and other foreign sources; tanning materials from India, Natal, Australia and British East Africa; dyewoods from the West Indies; timber from Canada; hardwoods from India, West Africa, the West Indies and Australia; copper and copper ore from Australia and South Africa; tin and tin ore from Malaya, Nigeria, South Africa and Australia; manganese from India; plumbago from Ceylon; hides from India, Africa and Australia, and so forth. It has been stated that the result of the war may ultimately depend largely on financial strength. In that case the country which is to the greatest extent self‐supporting as regards supplies of the necessaries of life and materials for the manufacture of munitions of war will be in a position to carry on the longest. Undoubtedly the British Empire contains within itself the power to produce all such materials, and the Dominions, Colonies and Dependencies are in fact already supplying a large proportion of the food products and raw materials for industries, which are imported into the United Kingdom. There are a few notable exceptions, e.g., for our supplies of cotton and sugar we have always been largely dependent on foreign countries, but Uganda and the Soudan are capable of producing in the future very large quantities of cotton of the quality required by Lancashire spinners, and sugar production in our Colonies could, with proper encouragement, be expanded so as to meet the whole of the requirements of the Mother Country. If the British capital and energy which have in the past gone every year to the development of enterprises in foreign countries had been devoted for a tew years exclusively to exploiting the resources of the Dominions and Colonies, the British Empire would, by this time, have become practically self‐supporting, and the bulk of our imported foodstuffs and raw products required for our manufacturing industries would now be obtained from within the Empire and paid for by increased quantities of our own manufactures. It may be hoped that one of the lessons which we shall learn from the war will be definitely to encourage the development of the vast resources of our overseas Empire. — The Chamber of Commerce Journal.

This issue is a selected bibliography covering the subject of leadership.

Dr. EASTWOOD'S report to the Local Government Board on this subject is of special interest to the people of this country at the present time in view of the steps that are being taken with the object of checking the spread of tuberculosis, and the undoubted connections that exist between that and other diseases, and the sources and character of the milk supply. In this country little attention has hitherto been paid to the condition of cows or cowsheds, except perhaps in rare instances where the former were obviously diseased, or the latter constituted a public nuisance; while the connection between milk supply and disease has scarcely been recognised by the Legislature and by public authorities, and has been entirely ignored by the general public. For some years past the health authorities in the United States, as well as those of some other countries, have been making very serious efforts to eradicate tuberculosis from dairy herds, if that be possible. The way in which some of the various States and Cities of the Union are attempting to do this is of importance and interest to us for various reasons. Their problems are very much the same as ours. The success or failure of milk regulations in the United States may, therefore, be taken as an indication of the probable success or failure of ours. Such methods are, therefore, valuable as broadly suggesting those which we may usefully adopt or avoid. The United States also send us a large proportion of our oversea meat supply, and any question relating to the general health of dairy herds cannot be dissociated from one affecting the general health of animals that are slaughtered for their meat. It may also be remarked that such questions relate not only to the meat supply from the States, but also to the great cattle ranches of the Southern American continent, in which British and American capital is becoming increasingly employed. The Americans are nothing if not practical. They are almost proverbially unhampered by tradition. They are quick to adopt what may prove to be new remedies for old evils. While the independent control exercised by each State of the Union over its own internal affairs results in the attempted solution of any general problem being presented in almost as many forms.

Sane and civilised people, capable of thinking clearly, now recognise that if the peace of the world is to be secured, and that if another and even greater cataclysm is to be prevented, the Huns and their accomplices must be crushed, and crushed so completely that their recovery of the power to do evil shall be rendered utterly impossible. The persons who are “Pro‐German” for reasons at present best known to themselves, and the peace‐at‐any‐price cranks, may be left out of consideration except in so far as the advisability of placing the former under lock and key and the latter in lunatic asylums demands attention. A premature and inconclusive peace which would make it possible for our abominable enemies to rise again and threaten civilised mankind is unthinkable, and the Allied Powers must of necessity carry on the war until the Thugs of Europe have bitten the dust and have been compelled to sue for peace without terms or conditions. When the “Central Powers” have been forced to their knees, and the Allied armies of occupation have made them taste the bitterness and humiliation of invasion, the surviving criminals will be placed at the bar to receive the sentence of their judges, while the populations who have approved and applauded their hideous acts must also have adequate punishment meted out to them. What form is that punishment to take? The long and ghastly account has got to be read out and settled—so far as it can be settled in this world. What is to be the settlement?

The Annual General Meeting of the Pure Food and Health Society of Great Britain was held at 20, Hanover Square, W., on February 27, the President, Sir PHILIP SASSOON, Bart, M.P., in the chair. The Secretary, Mr. A. E. MOORE, read the following report of the Executive Committee:—

At a meeting of the Council of the Royal Borough of Kensington on June 5th Councillor A. J. RICE‐OXLEY, M.D., Chairman of the Public Health Committee, brought up a report as follows:—

This paper attempts to understand how the interaction of natural disasters and human behaviour during wartime led to famines in three regions under imperial control around the Indian Ocean. The socio-economic structure of these regions had been increasingly differentiated over the period of imperial rule, with large proportions of their populations relying on agricultural labour for their subsistence.

Before the war, food crises in each of the regions had been met by the private importation of grain from national or overseas surplus regions: the grain had been made available through a range of systems, the most complex of which was the Bengal Famine Code in which the able-bodied had to work before receiving money to buy food in the market.

During the Second World War, the loss of control of normal sources of imported grain, the destruction of shipping in the Indian Ocean (by both sides) and the military demands on internal transport systems prevented the use of traditional famine responses when natural events affected grain supply in each of the regions. These circumstances drew the governments into attempts to control their own grain markets.

The food crises raised complex ethical and practical issues for the governments charged with their solution. The most significant of these was that the British Government could have attempted to ship wheat to Bengal but, having lost naval control of the Indian Ocean in 1942 and needing warships in the Atlantic and Mediterranean in 1943 chose to ignore the needs of the people of Bengal, focussing instead on winning the war.

In each of the regions governments allowed/encouraged the balkanisation of the grain supply – at times down to the sub-district level – which at times served to produce waste and corruption, and opened the way for black markets as various groups (inside and outside government ranks) manipulated the local supply.

People were affected in different ways by the changes brought about by the war: some benefitted if their role was important to the war-effort; others suffered. The effect of this was multiplied by the way each government ‘solved’ its financial problems by – in essence – printing money.

Because of the natural events of the period, there would have been food crises in these regions without World War II, but decisions made in the light of wartime exigencies and opportunities turned crises into famines, causing the loss of millions of lives.

Literature on face‐to‐face intercultural business communication (IBC) suggests that language, culture, business culture, and interpersonal context variables lead to misunderstandings, but these predictors have not been studied with regard to e‐mail communication. This exploratory study identifies variables that cause e‐mail miscommunication, reduce work accomplishment, and harm business relationships. We conducted a survey to capture the effect of common predictors and asked respondents to share the most commonly employed strategies when communication problems arose. We offer a multi‐dimensional model for further research.

At the seventeenth ordinary meeting of the Royal Society of Arts, on Wednesday, April 17, 1912, DR. RUDOLF MESSEL, President of the Society of Chemical Industry, in the chair, a paper on “Municipal Chemistry” was read by MR. J. H. COSTE, F.I.C. The following résumé of the points of interest to readers of the BRITISH FOOD JOURNAL is published by kind permission of the author and of the Royal Society of Arts:—