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This case describes management's sequential reevaluation of Marriott's debt capacity and the decision about how to invest this unused debt. Videotape #5556, “Strategic Leadership,” is designed for use with this case (see Videotape Bibliography).

This case is a relatively straightforward exercise in valuing a potential acquisition target. The case affords students an opportunity to use both discounted cash flow and multiples in their analyses. In addition, at the instructor's discretion, students can do a simple valuation of an option contract and analyze currency choice in a debt issue. The latter two objectives arise if the case is used as an examination. Case Exhibit 1 poses the relevant questions for student preparation.

The media consultant for the Reagan-Bush '84 campaign identifies his goal as stopping and reversing a strong decline in support for President Reagan. The case describes the results of some of the motivational research used, and introduces a framework for evaluating advertising strategies. The case also introduces the MECCAS framework for evaluating advertising copy and discusses theory-driven communication strategies.

Jane Barrow, CEO of Caprica Energy, must recommend to the board which of three potential “unconventional ” natural-gas development sites in different parts of the United States the company should pursue. The case takes place in January 2011, when the “low-hanging fruit ” of natural-gas production in the United States had essentially been picked. All three of the potential sites (shale, coalbed methane, and tight sands) would require hydraulic fracturing, a process of removing gas that was formerly considered inaccessible by injecting water and chemicals into the ground. Because of emerging concerns about the potential harm “fracking ” can do to drinking water, Barrow must not only analyze which site might be most profitable but also what the potential risks to the environment and area residents might be.

Suitable for MBA, EMBA, and executive education programs, this case uses the complexities of the oil industry to set the stage to unfold a stakeholder analysis on BP's growth and opportunity in the renewable energy sector. This public sourced case offers a discussion about the firm's overall strategy, post Gulf Oil spill, moving forward. The case describes how within a single decade, BP had emerged as one of the largest energy companies in the world. Within that scope, BP had an odd achievement: It had been building an alternative energy business and had gained a reputation as being an oil company with a regard for the environment. Then a series of preventable accidents, in the United States in particular, started to chip away at the firm's status. In a matter of five years, BP went from celebrating its most profitable period to finding itself selling assets while industry watchers wondered whether the company would survive after being responsible for the largest oil spill in the United States. Shortly following the Gulf oil spill, Robert Dudley, a legacy Amoco executive, was appointed to replace Tony Hayward, the beleaguered BP group chief executive and director. Besides the oil spill and ongoing cleanup, Dudley had slumping revenues (even before the Deepwater tragedy) and a huge rebuilding task ahead of him. Not only did he have a multinational energy company to run, but Robert Dudley had to rehabilitate the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem, compensate all who suffered loss as a result of the damage, and repair the firm's shabby reputation. Dudley needed to implement a sound long-term strategy. How would his former division—renewable energy and alternative activities—fit into his plans?

Richard Alpert, senior partner at Evergreen Investments, must decide which of his two best employees to promote to the position of managing VP. He had initially preferred Charlie Pace over Daniel Faraday, but that decision had become less clear-cut when Alpert inadvertently overheard an office conversation and learned that Pace was taking Adderall, a stimulant primarily prescribed for people suffering from attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Pace did not have ADHD and apparently obtained the medication by deceiving a physician. Alpert is faced with a number of questions, including whether it was fair to Faraday—or any other high-performing employee—to be passed over for promotion in favor of someone who illicitly boosted his performance with a substance he did not medically need.

In early 2014, recent Stanford University graduate Tyler Shultz was in a quandary. He had been working at Theranos, a blood-diagnostic company founded by Elizabeth Holmes, a Stanford-dropout wunderkind, for almost a year. Shultz had learned enough about the company to realize that its practices and the efficacy of its much-touted finger-prick blood-testing technology were questionable and that the company was going to great lengths to hide this fact from the public and from regulators.

Theranos and Holmes were Silicon Valley darlings, enjoying positive press and lavish attention from potential investors and technology titans alike. Just as companies like PayPal had revolutionized the stagnant payments industry and Uber had upended the for-hire transportation sector, Theranos had been positioned as the latest technology firm to substantially disrupt yet another mature sector: the medical laboratory business. By the start of 2014, the company had raised more than $400 million in funding, and had an estimated market valuation of $9 billion.

Shultz's situation was exacerbated by the fact that his grandfather, the highly respected former US Secretary of State George Shultz, was on the Theranos board and was one of Elizabeth Holmes's biggest supporters.

But Tyler Shultz worried about the customers he was convinced were receiving highly unreliable and often inaccurate blood-test results. With so much at stake, Shultz wondered how he should proceed. Should he raise his concerns with the firm's investors? Blow the whistle externally? Report to industry regulators? Go away quietly?

This case and its subsequent four brief follow-up cases are based largely on interviews with Tyler Shultz, and outline the dilemma he faced and the various steps he would take both to extricate himself from his unsavory position and let the public know the full extent of the deception at Theranos.

Five optional handouts are available to instructors to further discussion after the case has been debriefed. The handouts serve as additional decision points for the students if your class time permits.

A product manager at Apple examines the past, present, and future of the PC industry in September 2011 in the wake of Steve Jobs's resignation and HP's announcement that it was exiting the PC industry in favor of enterprise software solutions and consulting. The protagonist thinks through current forces in the PC industry, including market share trends, mobile computing, ultrabooks, and cloud computing services—as well as the position of the Mac in Apple's product portfolio—and is faced with making a decision about the future of the Mac.

The Case takes place at the headquarters of Genesee & Wyoming, Inc. (GWI), one of the leading short line railroads in the United States. The Case revolves around three executives - Mortimer B. Fuller III, Chairman and CEO, Mark Hastings, CFO and Treasurer, and Alan Harris, Senior Vice President and Chief Accounting Office - and the dilemma over whether to pursue international expansion.

GWI has generally pursued a strategy of diversification through acquisition. However, there are other approaches to diversification, including international expansion. With increasing deregulation and privatization of railroads around the world, GWI and its competitors must weigh the risks of internationalization with the rewards. GWI fears that a failure to move quickly might result in missed opportunities as competitors acquire railroads around the world.

An opportunity has recently arisen in Australia, where the government is selling Australian National Railway. GWI believes Australia might be a good initial foray into the international market given the similarities of the country and its railroad industry to the United States and its railroad industry. The Case asks the question, “Should GWI enter the bidding?”

In recent years Lehman Brothers, one of the five largest investment banks in the United States, had grown increasingly reliant on its fixed income trading and underwriting division, which served as the primary engine for its strong profit growth. The bank had also significantly increased its leverage over the same timeframe, going from a debt-to-equity ratio of 23.7x in 2003 to 35.2x in 2007. As leverage increased, the ongoing erosion of the mortgage-backed industry began to impact Lehman significantly and its stock price plummeted. Unfortunately, public outcry over taxpayer assumption of $29 billion in potential Bear losses made repeating such a move politically untenable. The surreal scene of potential buyers traipsing into an investment bank's headquarters over the weekend to consider various merger or spin-out scenarios repeated itself once again. This time, the Fed refused to back the failing bank's liabilities, attempting instead to play last-minute suitors Bank of America, HSBC, Nomura Securities, and Barclay's off each other, jawboning them by arguing that failing to step up to save Lehman would cause devastating counterparty runs on their own capital positions. The Fed's desperate attempts to arrange its second rescue of a major U.S. investment bank in six months failed when it refused to backstop losses from Lehman's toxic mortgage holdings. Complicating matters was Lehman's reliance on short-term repo loans to finance its balance sheet. Unfortunately, such loans required constant renewal by counterparties, who had grown increasingly nervous that Lehman would lose the ability to make good on its trades. With this sentiment swirling around Wall Street, Lehman was forced to announce the largest Chapter 11 filing in U.S. history, listing assets of $639 billion and liabilities of $768 billion. The second domino had fallen. It would not be the last.

This case covers the period from the sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan to the conversion into bank holding companies by Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, including the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America. The case explains the new global paradigm for the investment banking industry, including increased regulation, fewer competitors, lower leverage, reduced proprietary trading, and-potentially-reduced profits.