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This paper investigates the information dilemma in negotiations: if negotiators reveal information about their priorities and preferences, more efficient agreements may be reached but the shared information may be used strategically by the other negotiator, to the revealers' disadvantage. We present a theoretical model that focuses on the characteristics of the negotiators, the structure of the negotiation, and the available incentives; it predicts that experienced negotiators will out‐perform naive negotiators on distributive (competitive) tasks, especially when they have information about their counterpart's preferences and the incentives are high—unless the task is primarily integrative, in which case information will contribute to the negotiators maximizing joint gain. Two experiments (one small, one large) showed that the revelation of one's preferences was costly and that experienced negotialors outperformed their naive counterparts by a wide margin, particularly when the task and issues were distributive and incentives were large. Our results help to identify the underlying dynamics of the information dilemma and lead to a discussion of the connections between information and social dilemmas and the potential for avoiding inefficiencies.

This paper investigates the impact of some of the underlying dynamics of volunteering choices in organizational contexts, focusing on individual, group, and organizational level causes. Three scenario‐based experiments manipulate individuals' standing within their organization (i.e., whether they are doing well or poorly) in combination with variables such as the expected efficacy of one's team and positive or negative organizational performance. In comparison to other recent volunteering studies, all three current experiments focused on an explicit organizational context and found much stronger intentions to volunteer, particularly when a person's standing was good. The combination of poor standing with expectations of poor performance by one's group or one's organization led to reductions in these otherwise strong intentions to volunteer. The results also show that feelings of obligation, expectations of extrinsic rewards, and identifying with one's organization are all significantly related to volunteering choices.

The authors examine the impact of CEO generalist experience on firm performance. Using 522 listed firms in Indonesia for the period 2010–2018, the authors find that the generalist CEO is negatively associated with firm performance. Generalist CEOs tend to experience ambiguity in adjustments in the new environment. In order to decrease the impact of a generalist CEO, our empirical evidence finds that CEO tenure does not significantly moderate the association between the two. This is because generalist CEOs with longer tenure tend to avoid changing strategies, and therefore the negative impact of CEO generalist is not altered. The results of this study provide suggestions for the firm in the developing country to appoint a CEO with generalist experience.

Researchers have proposed a variety of models to depict, explain, and understand ethical decision-making processes. Rest (1986) proposed a four-stage, individually oriented model, in which a person who makes a moral decision must (1) recognize the moral issue, (2) make a moral judgment, (3) establish moral intent, and (4) make moral decisions. Similarly, Ferrell, Gresham, and Fraedrich (1989) developed a five-stage model that included awareness, cognitions, evaluations, determination, and actions. Finally, Trevino (1986) proposed a slightly different model that begins with the recognition of an ethical dilemma and proceeds to a cognition stage in which individuals make moral judgments that further affect their ethical or unethical decisions (see Jones, 1991, for a review).

Purpose – This chapter proposes a theoretical framework – the Conflict Templates Model – that depicts how people conceptualize their outcome interdependence in conflict and negotiation situations. We focus on perceptions of outcome interdependence in dyadic conflicts, with a particular emphasis on intergroup interactions.

Approach – Integrating ideas and concepts from game theory with social psychological principles, we propose that: (a) people's mental representations of interdependence are predictably constrained to a small set of mixed-motive games; (b) different motivational goals often lead group members to endorse different games to describe the same intergroup conflict; and (c) these interdependence perceptions influence parties' strategic behavior, and ultimately, their outcomes.

Findings – We review empirical evidence that provides initial support for each of these propositions and discuss future directions for research on the mental representation of conflict and negotiation.

Originality/value – We generate a number of novel predictions concerning the mental representation of conflict. We also discuss how identifying disputants' mental representations can help conflict managers devise effective strategies for managing and resolving conflicts.

Given the dramatic changes taking place in society, the economy, and technology, 21st-century organizations need to engage in new, more spontaneous, and more innovative ways of managing. I investigate why an increasing number of companies are including artists and artistic processes in their approaches to strategic and day-to-day management and leadership.