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Culture is a central concept broadly studied in social anthropology and sociology. It has been gaining increasing attention in economics, appearing in research on labor market discrimination, identity, gender, and social preferences. Most experimental economics research on culture studies cross-national or cross-ethnic differences in economic behavior. In contrast, we explain laboratory behavior using two cultural dimensions adopted from a prominent general cultural framework in contemporary social anthropology: group commitment and grid control. Groupness measures the extent to which individual identity is incorporated into group or collective identity; gridness measures the extent to which social and political prescriptions intrinsically influence individual behavior. Grid-group characteristics are measured for each individual using selected items from the World Values Survey. We hypothesize that these attributes allow us to systematically predict behavior in a way that discriminates among multiple forms of social preferences using a simple, parsimonious deductive model. The theoretical predictions are further tested in the economics laboratory by applying them to the dictator, ultimatum, and trust games. We find that these predictions are confirmed overall for most experimental games, although the strength of empirical support varies across games. We conclude that grid-group cultural theory is a viable predictor of people’s economic behavior, then discuss potential limitations of the current approach and ways to improve it.

In this article, we survey experiments that are directly related to monetary policy and central banking. We argue that experiments can also be used as a tool for central bankers for bench testing policy measures or rules. We distinguish experiments that analyze the reasons for non-neutrality of monetary policy, experiments in which subjects play the role of central bankers, experiments that analyze the role of central bank communication and its implications, experiments on the optimal implementation of monetary policy, and experiments relevant for monetary policy responses to financial crises. Finally, we mention open issues and raise new avenues for future research.

This paper aims to investigate whether the effects of children's current learning are related to their learning efficiency and behavior when they are exposed to two different gaming media.

In this paper the authors used a quasi-experimental design to determine whether game-based learning can be improved by using mobile devices equipped with augmented reality (AR).

The control group using the card game was careful to find the correct answer, with the intention of “obtaining the maximum score with the highest rate of correctness,” whereas the experimental group using the AR board game played aggressively by “obtaining the maximum score with the highest number.”

Although integrating an AR board game into the curriculum is an effective approach, the need to implement such a game in response to different learning attitudes and behaviors of students should be addressed.

Depending on the learning situation, different teaching methods and aids can be used to help students effectively learn. The recommendations based on this experiment can broaden the teaching field and allow for a wider range of experimental studies.

Learning behavior was observed, and user attention was interpreted using MindWave Mobile.

The results of standard lab experiments have long been questioned because of the convenience samples of subjects they typically employ and the abstract nature of the lab settings. These two characteristics of experimental economics, it is argued, are the key factors that endanger the external validity of experiments.

Researchers have tried to address these issues by bringing the lab to non-traditional subjects including participants in remote locations, and/or by moving the setting of experiments closer to reality by using real goods and/or settings that are not stripped of context.

While field experiments might help experimental economists to increase the external validity of their investigations, these potential benefits might come at costs that can be considerable. Specifically, going into the field can dramatically increase the demands on, and challenges to, experimental control. This is particularly true for experiments in small-scale societies in remote locations on which I focus in this article.

Recent experiments show that feedback transmission can mitigate opportunistic behavior in repeated social dilemmas. Two nonexcludable explanations have been investigated: strategic signaling and nonmonetary sanctioning. This literature builds on the intuition that under both partner matching (where the same groups of players interact many times) and stranger matching (where groups change continuously), feedback may work as a nonmonetary sanctioning device, but only the former also allows for strategic signaling. Empirical evidence on the two explanations is mixed. Moreover, the usual design may give rise to confounding matching protocol effects.

My experiment provides a novel empirical testbed for different channels by which feedback – costless disapproval points – may affect behavior in a repeated public goods game. In particular, it is based on a random matching scheme that neutralizes the confounding effects of different matching protocols on behavior.

The transmission of feedback is found to foster prosocial behavior. The data favor the nonmonetary sanctioning explanation rather than the signaling hypothesis.

This study provides a novel set of evidence that (i) communication may mitigate selfishness in social dilemmas and (ii) the source of this phenomenon may be linked to the emotional reaction that communication evokes in humans.

We investigated the effect of religion on generosity, interpersonal trust, and cooperation by using games developed by experimental economists (Dictator, Trust, and Public Goods). In these experiments, individuals were paired or grouped with unknown strangers to test the degree to which religion promotes prosocial behavior. We evaluated group- and individual-level effects of religion on prosocial behavior across the three games. Although playing the games in a religious setting showed no overall difference as compared to a secular setting, we did find a weak association between some individual-level dimensions of religiosity and behavior in some of the games. The weak association between religion and behavior is consistent with theory and empirical studies using similar measures – the anonymous pairing and grouping of the economic games may moderate individual-level effects of religion. Our research is a strong complement to the empirical literature because the three studies involved a large and diverse sample and used sensitive instruments that have been found to reliably measure prosocial behavior.

We review the existing laboratory experimental studies on corruption that have generated results with clear policy implications. We present and discuss experimental findings on the role that both monetary incentives and nonmonetary motivations may play in corruption decision-making, and, hence, in the fight against corruption.

Digital gaming has become one of the largest entertainment sectors worldwide, increasingly turning the medium into an attractive vehicle for the communication of advertising messages. As a result, the incorporation of products or brands in digital games or in-game advertising (IGA) is expected to grow steadily over the course of the following years. However, much work is still needed to determine and optimize the effectiveness of IGA. The goal of the chapter is to advance IGA effectiveness research by investigating the influence of three aspects of the context in which a game is played and the player’s involvement in response to this context on brand awareness.

To this purpose, three experiments were set up. The first experiment (between-subjects, N = 121) investigated the impact of the social setting in which a game is played, the second experiment (within-subjects, N = 31) examined the effect of the game controls that are used, and the third experiment (between-subjects, N = 62) analyzed the influence of the game story.

The findings of the experiments show that the game context can significantly influence the way in which people recall and recognize brands that are included within its environment and that examining the player’s involvement in response to this context can provide useful information regarding the processes underlying this effect.

These findings contribute to the knowledge of when, how, and in which games advertising can be incorporated in order to achieve games’ full potential as an advertising medium.

The objective of the study is to evaluate the impact of social affinity on the strategic choices made by economic agents using the framework of Ultimatum Game. Conventional theory underpinning the Ultimatum Game predicts the complete absence of altruistic behaviour wherein the agents are expected to maximise individual monetary payoffs of the agents. The authors' experimental findings disprove this assumption of purely self-interested behaviour of the agents as proposed by orthodox neo-classical utility maximisation model.

The final outcome of the Ultimatum Game is mutually dependent on the agent's strategic choices, i.e. the proposer's altruistic concern towards the responder and their expectation of altruistic concern by the responder. In this study, the authors evaluate the participant's strategic choice under three levels of partner selection arrangements – (1) stranger, (2) face-to-face interface with a peer and (3) friend.

From the experimental results, the authors found that the proposers reflected greater degree of altruism towards proposers' partners and also expected greater degree of altruism to be reciprocated by proposers' partners. The proposers were voluntarily willing to offer fair share to proposers' socially close partners and also increasingly expected that the proposers would be willing to accept unfair offers.

The study stresses that the ignorance of the human capacity for altruism runs the serious risk of legitimising narrow-minded selfishness and failure in recognising the capacity for public spiritedness which can distort the range and choice of optimum policy prescriptions. This requires policy makers to adopt a more holistic and less-pessimistic view of human nature.

The authors study offers a novel experimental framework that provides insights on how increase in social affinity can influence both altruistic behaviour and altruistic expectations of the participants, highlighting the inadequacy of the neo-classical maximisation hypothesis predicated on all agents.

The peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/IJSE-07-2022-0481.