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This paper aims to explore the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) tenure and the propensity to adopt the global reporting initiative (GRI) for corporate social responsibility reporting in Chinese firms.

This study used Chinese A-listed firms as sample during 2010–2020. Considering the binary nature of dependent variable, logistic regression model is applied. For robustness, lagged value of independent and control variables, additional control variables and two stage least square regression are used.

This paper finds that CEO tenure is negatively related to the adoption of GRI reporting standards. Furthermore, this paper finds that this association is less pronounced when CEOs are female and when CEOs have foreign experience. Furthermore, this paper finds that this association is not significant when CEOs are female and when CEOs have foreign experience. This paper also finds that the relationship between CEO tenure and GRI adoption is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises in China. The findings in this paper are robust after controlling for endogeneity.

The study results are important for understanding the development and implementation of GRI framework especially in China.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to deeply investigate how CEO tenure can affect adoption of GRI in Chinese firms.

The study aims to examine whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure does improve debt financing of listed firms with sustainable development agendas coupled with high chief executive officer (CEO) tenure in India.

Employing panel regression based on fixed effect and instrumental variable regression with fixed effect assumptions, the study examined data from the Bombay stock exchange from the period 2010 to 2019.

The study demonstrates that the disclosure of current exchange capital and moral capital cannot cause a firm to access short-term and long-term debt financing. However, lag investment in moral capital causes a positive effect on short-term debt financing. The second findings show that CEO tenure has a positive and statistically significant association with short-term debt financing and an insignificant association with long-term debt financing. The third findings show that the interaction of current CSR disclosure (moral and exchange capital) and CEO tenure is insignificant in affecting short-term and long-term debt finance. However, the interaction of lag CSR disclosure (moral and exchange capital) and CEO tenure positively affect short-term debt financing. The study addresses any endogeneity concerns arising from the CSR disclosure-debt financing association.

This study uses a single country to examine the inter-relationship between CEO tenure and debt financing and CSR measured by moral capital and exchange capital, thereby limiting the study's results for generalisation.

The observation is that moral capital investment and disclosure do not guarantee new entrants the chance to access debt financing, but subsequent and lag CSR disclosure ensures access.

No studies examine morality from CSR disclosure on debt financing. This study shows that decoupling CSR into exchange capital and moral capital in accessing debt financing presents new inputs for scholarly debate on CSR.

The authors investigate whether the different tenure phases of executives have a differential effect on audit pricing. Two alternate views – career concern and power – can explain the effect of executives’ tenure on audit pricing. This paper aims to determine, which viewpoint dominates in explaining the relationship between audit pricing and executive tenure phases.

Using a sample of 11,198 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2016, the authors adopt an ordinary least squares regression model to assess the impact of the middle and long phases of executives’ tenure on audit fees.

Audit fees are significantly lower when executives enter the middle and long phases of tenure. The reduction in audit fees is greatest as both chief executive officers and chief financial officers enter the long tenure phase. Although audit fees gradually decrease as executive tenure is extended, they start increasing two years before the end of executive tenure. Furthermore, the negative association between the executive tenure phase and audit fees is greater when the executive is appointed externally. Finally, the long phase of executive tenure also mitigates the positive relationship between audit fees and internal control weaknesses.

This study is based on US data. Future research may extend this study to other countries.

The findings are important to firms, practitioners and academicians, particularly, as the length of tenure of top executives has increased in recent years. By documenting that executives’ middle and long tenure phases reduce audit fees, the findings highlight the importance of maintaining executives in the firm. Finally, the findings have implications for investors, policymakers and auditors to identify companies with high audit risk.

This study is the first to document the impact of executives’ middle and long tenure phases on audit fees.

This paper aims to examine how compensation committees perceive audit quality as indicated by audit firm tenure. Using the contracting weight attached to earnings and cash flows in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation as proxy for the compensation committee’s perception of audit quality, the study examines whether compensation committees perceive performance metric informativeness as being affected by auditor tenure.

The paper regresses CEO cash compensation on accounting-based performance metrics and on interactions between auditor tenure and accounting-based performance metrics while controlling for other factors previously shown to affect CEO pay. Auditor tenure is measured using continuous and dichotomous variables.

Auditor tenure is associated with a reduced (positive) weight on earnings (operating cash flows), which suggests lower perceived audit quality as tenure lengthens consistent with the auditor closeness argument. This relation is asymmetric, i.e. the negative effect of longer auditor tenure on incentive contracting is more pronounced for positive earnings. The results are robust to using CEO total compensation as the compensation measure, as well as using level and change specifications.

The inability to control for audit partner tenure in assessing the effect of audit firm tenure on incentive contracting and the potential endogeneity between auditor tenure choice and incentive contracting are the main limitations of this study. Given the lack of information on US audit partner tenure, the study could not control for the audit partner tenure issue. However, the study has attempted to mitigate the endogeneity issue by using a Heckman selection model that includes in the first-stage a regression of auditor tenure on various firm, performance measure and CEO-related governance characteristics, based on existing models (Li et al., 2010).

Compensation committees view auditor tenure as an indicator of accounting quality in setting CEO pay. Further, long auditor tenure is perceived as detrimental to financial reporting integrity, particularly when earnings numbers suggest positive managerial performance and innovations.

This study provides empirical evidence that auditor tenure matters in setting executive pay. Further, this study shows evidence on the link between auditor tenure and audit quality from an internal user’s perspective. Prior studies have focused either on external users (investors, creditors) or on the preparer (using measures such as discretionary accruals or meet/beat analysts’ forecasts or forecast guidance).

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of board composition on capital structure of a firm.

The paper uses data from firms listed in Nairobi Securities Exchange covering the period 2004-2012. Fixed effect regression model was estimated to test the effect of board composition on capital structure and how chief executive officer (CEO) tenure moderates the relationship.

The paper finds that board composition has important implications on capital structure decisions. Specifically, director independence is positively related to leverage, whereas CEO duality and tenure have negative and significant effect on leverage. In addition, the interaction effect of CEO tenure indicates that when CEOs have long tenure, the power of independent directors to influence capital structure decisions diminishes. Further, the study found that under long CEO tenure, long-tenure boards use less leverage in their capital structure. As expected, dual CEO with long tenure uses less leverage.

The study uses data from an emerging market, contrary to previous studies using data from developed markets, to test the relationship between board composition and leverage. Second, the paper tests the moderating effect of CEO tenure on board composition – leverage relationship based on the idea that entrenched CEO may influence the decision-making ability of directors, particularly capital structure decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how board tenure affects the compensation of CEOs using a sample of 93 publicly traded US banks.

The paper proposes a CEO allegiance hypothesis whereby long‐term relationships with executives and other directors will shift allegiance from shareholders to executives vs a more traditional expertise hypothesis that predicts superior monitoring of executives by directors with longer tenure. A generalized least squares regression methodology is used to examine the relationship between CEO compensation and outside director tenure.

For the full sample, board tenure variables were found to be insignificant. However, when examining a subsample of firms with CEO tenure of greater than six years or more, the relationship between CEO pay and the median tenure of outside directors becomes positive, supporting a CEO allegiance hypothesis.

On a caveat, since this study relies on data for large bank holding companies over a short period of time, further research is needed to determine if the results carry over to a broader sample of firms and across time.

The results suggest that the independence of outside directors may be compromised when they serve for longer tenure periods together with the same CEO; an important consideration for better corporate governance.

The study provides a unique examination of outside director independence from the perspective of board tenure and the long‐term relationships with executives and other directors that may result in allegiance shifts away from shareholders and towards managers.

The paper aims to study the effect of tenure on the structure of CEO compensation. The relation between CEO compensation and CEO tenure provides a good testing bed for many effects: the managerial power effect, the portfolio consideration effect, the learning effect, and the career concern effect.

Tobit regressions were run of the percentage of equity‐based compensation on CEO tenure and the effect of tenure compared between inside CEOs and outside CEOs.

It was found that the percentage of equity‐based compensation increases during the early years of tenure for outside CEOs, and decreases during the later years of tenure for inside CEOs. Before they are tenured, outside CEOs have significantly higher and faster growing percentage of equity‐based compensation than inside CEOs. Furthermore, the portfolio consideration effect and the learning effect are the major effects in explaining the effect of tenure on the compensation structure.

The evidence that boards of directors take into account the CEOs’ holdings of equity incentives, the types of CEOs, and their years on tenure to adjust the structure of CEO compensation indicates that firms should, and do, try to optimize their CEO compensation structure on the basis of firm‐specific or CEO‐specific characteristics. It is suggested that there is no simple formulaic approach to governance reform.

The paper contributes to the literature by studying and explaining the different patterns of compensation structure over CEO tenure between inside CEOs and outside CEOs.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the characteristics of a CEO, that is, tenure and financial expertise, could affect the timeliness of an audit report.

Research data gathered from listed companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the four-year period 2013-2016.

The results obtained from model fittings indicated that there is only a negative and significant relationship between CEO financial expertise and natural logarithm of audit report lag and no significant relationship observed between the former and two other indices of timely audit report. Moreover, no significant relationship was found between the CEO tenure and other three indices of timely audit report.

This paper is the first study, which developed the literature of timely audit report using CEO tenure effect and financial expertise tests for timely audit reports in Iran.

As the primary decision makers, chief executive officers (CEOs) play pivotal roles in firm innovation. However, little is known regarding how CEOs influence the exploitation and exploration paradox. To advance theory and research, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the joint effects of CEO tenure and CEO–chair duality on a firm’s shifting emphasis between exploitative and exploratory innovation.

This paper takes the approach of a longitudinal sample of 81 US pharmaceutical firms.

As CEOs’ tenure advance, their firms’ percentage of exploitative innovation increases. Furthermore, non-duality (separation of board chair and CEO) further strengthens the positive relationship between CEO tenure and the percentage of exploitative innovation.

This study integrates upper echelons theory and behavioral agency theory to juxtapose the effects of CEOs on technological innovation. This study extends knowledge of strategic leadership and innovation by showing that CEOs influence the balance between exploitative and exploratory innovation. Furthermore, this study also contributes to the corporate governance literature by demonstrating that monitoring vigilance could inhibit capable CEOs from pursuing more exploratory innovation.

Boards of directors should allow CEOs to have greater discretion over innovation, and vigilant monitoring and control may force CEOs to focus less on exploration.

This is one of the few studies that explicitly investigate how CEO influences a firm’s emphasis on exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between female executives, chief executive officer (CEO) tenure and corporate cash holdings in the context of the developing Southeast Asian capital market (Indonesia).

The sample was screened from 231 publicly listed companies in the Indonesian Stock Exchange. The period of observation was 2011–2017. Two measures were applied for corporate cash holdings: the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to total assets and cash and cash equivalent to net assets. Three surrogate indicators were used for female executives: female CEO, the proportion of female members in the board of management and the number of female members in the board of management. CEO tenure is the length of time a CEO has been a member of the board of management. This study uses panel data regression analysis, including the fixed effect model with clustered standard errors.

The empirical evidence indicates that female executives and CEO tenure are positively and negatively associated with corporate cash holdings, respectively, and both are significantly related. Additional analysis using lagged independent variables remains consistent with the main analysis, suggesting that corporate cash holding becomes higher as a female presence in the board of management increases.

Empirical tests set in Indonesia suggest that female executives are more conservative and risk-averse, thereby holding more cash with a precautionary motive. The findings also imply that CEOs with long tenure focus on long-term performance such as increasing research and development investments or capital expenditure, thus holding less cash. Accordingly, policymakers and regulators should promote diversity issues proportionally and advance to the board level.

This study contributes to the field of executive and CEO studies by enriching the empirical findings in related topics. In addition, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is one of the first studies applying two measures of cash holdings in the setting of a developing Southeast Asian capital market (Indonesia).