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This paper investigates the information dilemma in negotiations: if negotiators reveal information about their priorities and preferences, more efficient agreements may be reached but the shared information may be used strategically by the other negotiator, to the revealers' disadvantage. We present a theoretical model that focuses on the characteristics of the negotiators, the structure of the negotiation, and the available incentives; it predicts that experienced negotiators will out‐perform naive negotiators on distributive (competitive) tasks, especially when they have information about their counterpart's preferences and the incentives are high—unless the task is primarily integrative, in which case information will contribute to the negotiators maximizing joint gain. Two experiments (one small, one large) showed that the revelation of one's preferences was costly and that experienced negotialors outperformed their naive counterparts by a wide margin, particularly when the task and issues were distributive and incentives were large. Our results help to identify the underlying dynamics of the information dilemma and lead to a discussion of the connections between information and social dilemmas and the potential for avoiding inefficiencies.

This study uses Hall's (1976) theory of low/high context culture with theories of interpersonal adaptation (Gudykunst, 1985; Patterson, 1983) to test communication preferences, flexibility, and effectiveness in same‐ and mixed‐culture negotiation. Ninety‐three same‐culture low context (Israel, Germany, Sweden, and U.S.), 101 same‐culture high context (Hong Kong, Japan, Russia, Thailand), and 48 mixed‐culture mixed context (U.S.‐Japan, U.S.‐Hong Kong) dyads negotiated a 1 ½ hour simulation. Transcripts were content coded for direct and indirect integrative sequences and analyzed with hierarchical linear regression. Supporting the theory, results revealed more indirect integrative sequences in high context dyads and more direct integrative sequences in low context and mixed context dyads. Direct integrative sequences predicted joint gains for mixed context dyads.

This study aims to investigate when integrative tactics are more effective in generating higher joint outcomes in an integrative negotiation. The authors test whether, first, the moral identity of the negotiators and, second, the concurrent use of distributive tactics increase the effectiveness of integrative tactics on joint outcomes.

Two weeks prior to the experiment, moral identity was measured using SIMI. Participants were classified into three groups: high, medium, and low SIMI. Two participants from the same group played a modified version of the Towers Market negotiation exercise. Distributive and integrative tactics were measured.

Results show that negotiators with high moral identity achieve higher joint outcomes in an integrative negotiation by using integrative tactics more effectively. In addition, the positive effects of integrative tactics on joint outcomes increase as the two negotiators employ distributive tactics along with integrative tactics rather than integrative tactics alone.

Results support the firm‐flexibility rule and dual‐concern model of negotiation. In addition, the results of this study are consistent with the argument of the differentiation‐before‐integration principle.

Contradictory to the assumption that negotiators should not use distributive tactics to increase joint outcome, negotiators can increase joint outcome when they use distributive tactics along with integrative tactics. In addition, this study shows that negotiators with high morality do a better job in an integrative negotiation not because they adopt integrative tactics more frequently, but because they use them more effectively, especially when coupled with negotiators with a similar level of morality.

As one of the most important emerging markets, China presents the greatest challenge to companies that are planning to enter its market. The purpose of this study is to examine a critical process required for any successful market entry – negotiation – and explore the impact of individual perception on negotiation process within Chinese culture.

Specifically, the paper explores how negotiators' perception of the negotiation structure and the alternatives to the negotiated agreement would affect negotiation behaviors and outcomes in a Chinese context.

The results showed that the perception of an integrative potential for the negotiation situation predicted more integrative behaviors and the perception of better alternatives predicted more competitive behaviors during a negotiation simulation.

Implications are discussed on how to negotiate into China.

The purpose of this study is to test the universality of the behavioral theory of negotiation developed in the United States, particularly the integrative/distributive models, and to find negotiators' prototypes in international negotiations conducted in a Latin American country.

An open questionnaire was administered to a convenience sample of 104 resident foreigners (expatriates) who reported the negotiation patterns of Costa Ricans. The qualitative data were coded in 52 variables (inte-rater reliability Fleiss' Kappa K= 0.65). A total of ten variables were selected to measure distributive/integrative patterns of negotiations. Latent class analysis (LCA) uncovered the latent structure of negotiations.

(1) The distributive (70% found in the sample) and integrative (30%) negotiation models hold in this culture. (2) The incorporation of handling emotions and interpersonal orientation in the integrative model seem to be an important theoretical and practical trend.

(1) A larger sample size is needed to compare with data from other countries of the region and the world. (2) The use of emotions and interpersonal orientation in the integrative negotiation paradigm require further investigation. As practical implications, detailed negotiation advice is offered to Costa Ricans as well as to expatriates working there.

To identify negotiation patterns in an understudied region of the world, the distributive/integrative models of the behavioral theory of negotiations are a key focus with which to extend the literature. There are important elements of culture within the negotiation patterns, in line with trends of an evolving paradigm of integrative crosscultural negotiations.

Verificar la utilidad en un contexto latinoamericano de la teoría del comportamiento en las negociaciones, particularmente los modelos distributivo e integrativo. Identificar prototipos de negociadores latinoamericanos en un contexto intercultural.

Se recogió una muestra de conveniencia mediante un cuestionario cualitativo a 104 extranjeros que viven y negocian en Costa Rica, quienes identificaron la manera como les negocian los locales. Estas encuestas fueron codificadas para tener una base de datos cuantitativa (coeficiente entre-evaluadores Fleiss de Kappa = 0.65) de 52 variables. Se escogieron 10 variables asociadas a los modelos integrativo y distributivo de negociación. Se realizó un Análisis de Clases Latentes en los datos (LCA en inglés) para descubrir la estructura latente de las negociaciones.

(1) Los modelos de negociación distributivo (70% encontrado en la muestra) e integrativo (30%) tienen cabida en esta cultura. (2) El modelo integrativo de negociación está asociado al manejo de emociones y la orientación interpersonal, parte de una tendencia teórica y práctica en las negociaciones interculturales.

(1) Se requiere ampliar la muestra, y comparar con datos de otros países de la región y del mundo. (2) Orientar un estudio teórico sobre el manejo de emociones y la orientación interpersonal en el paradigma del modelo integrativo. Como implicaciones prácticas, se presentan consejos de negociación para los costarricenses, y también para los extranjeros que trabajan en el país.

Reconocer los patrones de negociación en una región poco estudiada. Los modelos distributivo e integrativo de la teoría del comportamiento en las negociaciones son una base para ampliar la literatura. Añadir el manejo de emociones y la orientación interpersonal al paradigmático modelo integrativo parece marcar una tendencia teórica y práctica de la negociación intercultural.

Previous research on negotiation skills has focused mostly on the negotiation itself and tactics used when bargaining, while little research has examined the process by which people become effective negotiators. The purpose of this paper is to develop an initial model from an intra-organizational perspective to outline the factors that contribute to the development of negotiation skills and behaviors by employees.

This conceptual paper relies on prior research and existing theory to focus on the types of developmental and learning experiences and processes that lead to the acquisition of three specific types of key negotiation skills and behaviors.

Distributive, integrative, and adaptable negotiation skills are developed most effectively via different learning and development activities, respectively. Additionally, unique individual difference and situational variables could contribute to particular negotiation behaviors, either directly or via an interaction with developmental experiences.

The paper proposes a model for future testing in which results can provide support for tailored/customized training and development of employee negotiation skills. Providing the correct people with the correct tools in the correct manner is always desirable by practitioners.

This proposed holistic model provides new insights, structure, and suggestions for more research on factors that lead to negotiation skill development and exhibition of effective negotiation behaviors. This paper goes beyond description of negotiation tactics and addresses the various negotiation contexts and the unique skills needed for each. Most importantly, the paper addresses how those skills are uniquely and most effectively developed.

This research proposes and evaluates hypotheses about patterns of communication in a multi‐party, multi‐issue negotiation. Data were from 36 four‐person groups. We found that the majority of groups initiated negotiations with a distributive phase and ended with an integrative phase—strong support for Morley and Stephenson's (1979) rational model of negotiation. We identified transitions between both strategic orientations (integration, distribution) and strategic functions (action, information), but found that the first transition was more likely to result in a change of orientation than of function and that negotiators were more likely to change either orientation or function (single transition) than to change both aspects of the negotiation simultaneously (double transition). Finally, we determined that negotiators used process and closure strategies to interrupt distributive phases and redirect negotiations to an integrative phase.

This paper examined negotiator behavior in a variable‐sum two‐party negotiation task and its impact on individual and joint negotiator out‐come. Specifically, we examined the role of negotiator opening offer, reciprocity and complementarity of the use of tactics, systematic progression of offers, and information sharing in a negotiation with integrative potential. Results indicated that initial offers affect final outcome differently across buyers and sellers. The buyer's initial offer was curvilinearly related to his or her final outcome in the form of an inverted‐U. The seller's initial offer was positive‐linearly related to seller's outcome. Second, negotiators reciprocated and complemented both distributive and integrative tactics. In addition, highly integrative dyads differed from less efficient dyads in their reciprocation of integrative behaviors and complementarity of distributive behaviors. Third, approximately forty percent of offers made represented systematic concessions, but the proportion of offers reflecting systematic concessions was not related to the efficiency of the joint outcome. Finally, while information sharing did appear to have a positive effect on the efficiency of agreements, differences in the amount of information provided did not affect the proportion of outcome claimed by each party.

Previous research on international negotiations has primarily examined cross‐cultural differences in behavioral styles. Supplementing this prior research, we focused on outcome in negotiations. The study examined relationships between culture and outcome in contract negotiations, and analyzed how negotiation behavior mediates between culture and outcome. Sixty Mexican and Norwegian subjects participated in a negotiation simulation with potentially integrative outcomes. The study included 12 Mexican dyads, 12 Norwegian dyads, and 6 cross‐cultural dyads. Two aspects of outcome: joint benefit and distribution of benefit between negotiators, and two aspects of process: progression of offers and verbal communication, were examined Results indicated an effect of culture on integrative results, but not on distribution of benefit. Process differences found were related to the progression of offers over time, and not to verbal communication. Managerial implications are discussed and directions for future research indicated.

Like conflict in general, budgetary conflict is perceived by conflicting parties as a zero-sum game or distributive: one party's gain is the other party's loss. We identify an organizational culture that promotes this view as “traditional.” We propose that changing certain elements of organizational culture is sufficient to produce more integrative, nonzero-sum outcomes. We call this changed organizational culture “empowering.” We propose and test the effects of an empowering organizational culture (EOC) in contrast to the traditional organizational culture (TOC). We hypothesize that an EOC would produce more integrative conflict resolution than the typical TOC. Based on our review of the literature, we identify two elements of the EOC that are essential in producing more integrative solutions to budgetary conflict. The two elements that we simultaneously manipulate are the superior's empowering style (or lack thereof) as reflected in encouragement to freely negotiate, and the superior's intervention process in failed negotiations (a process that encourages the search for integrative solutions and avoids imposed compromises that dampen the desire to negotiate). Using a laboratory experiment, 84 subjects forming 42 dyads negotiated the allocation of discretionary budgets face-to-face. The results of the experiment confirm our hypotheses that the EOC produces more integrative budget negotiation outcomes, greater convergence, and greater satisfaction with the outcome than TOC.