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UK Government policy to address perceived market failure in commercial property leasing has largely been pursued through industry self‐regulation. Yet, it is proving difficult to assess whether self‐regulation on leasing has been a “success”, or even to determine how to evaluate this. The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for this and a clearer understanding of self‐regulation in commercial leasing.

A literature review suggests key criteria to explain the (in)effectiveness of self‐regulation. UK lease codes are analysed in the light of this literature, drawing on previous research carried out by the authors on the operation of these codes.

Lease codes appear to be failing as an effective system of self‐regulation. While there are influential market actors championing them, the fragmentation of the leasing process lessens this influence. The structures are not there to ensure implementation, monitor compliance and record views of affected stakeholders.

This work adds to the literature on self‐regulation in general, and provides an insight into its operation in a previously unexplored industry. Research is needed into the experience of other countries in regulating the property industry by voluntary means.

There are institutional limitations to self‐regulation within the property industry. This has implications for policy makers in considering the advantages and limitation of using a voluntary solution to achieve policy aims within the commercial leasing market.

This paper provides a first step in considering the lease codes in the wider context of industry self‐regulation and is relevant to policy makers and industry bodies.

The paper discusses the rationale for a widespread reliance on Codes of Conduct (CoC) in European crowdfunding through the lenses of economic theories of self-regulation. By analysing the institutional design of CoCs in crowdfunding, the paper illustrates the differences in their regulatory context, inclusiveness, monitoring and enforcement. It offers the first systematic overview of substantial rules of CoCs in crowdfunding.

A comparative case study of nine CoCs in Europe is used to illustrate differences in their institutional design and discern the economic purpose of the CoC.

The institutional design of different CoCs in Europe mainly supports voluntary theories of self-regulation. In particular, the theory of reputation commons has the most explanatory power. The substantial rules of CoC in different markets show the potential sources of market failure through the perspectives of platforms.

CoCs appear in various regulatory, cultural, and industry contexts of different countries. Some of the institutional design features of CoC might be a result of these characteristics.

Crowdfunding associations wishing to develop their own CoC may learn from a comparative overview of key provisions.

For governments in Europe, contemplating creating or revising bespoke crowdfunding regimes, the paper identifies areas where crowdfunding platforms perceive market failure.

This paper is the first systematic study of self-regulatory institutions in European crowdfunding. The paper employs a theoretical framework for the analysis of self-regulation in crowdfunding and provides a comparison of a regulatory context, inclusiveness, monitoring and enforcement of different CoCs in Europe.

The current study seeks to contribute to current self-regulation research by first exploring the association between the cost of self-regulation and firm self-regulation. The mediating role of association membership and firm slack is additionally explored.

Longitudinal analysis of firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the USA automobile industry from 1966 to 2012 has several important findings regarding the motivations for firm self-regulation.

The influence of industry associations and firm absorbed slack both contribute to firm self-regulation.

The current study begins to address the importance of firm characteristics in predicting self-regulation activities. The bulk of existing research has examined self-regulation at the industry level as an activity performed as a result of the adoption of formalized industry sanctioned standards of practice. This research contributes to such work by examining firm proactivity in the absence of such formal standards.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the regulation of advertising by considering market‐driven firms (those seeking to keep within the boundaries set by social and industry norms) and market drivers (those seeking to stretch boundaries to gain a competitive advantage). Thought is also given to the costs of regulation and tolerance to the social purse, and the benefits gained by compliance and violation.

The authors develop a conceptual argument for boundary stretching where market drivers are present in a marketplace dominated by market‐driven firms. The authors then apply a game theory model to examine the conditions, the firm responses, and Government responses. In doing so the authors investigate incentives for non‐compliant behavior in a self‐regulated market and show that a firm can achieve a market advantage by stretching advertising boundaries.

Results suggest that when government takes a “wait‐and‐see” approach of partial tolerance, then the market driver can become the focal point for the market‐driven, and a shift will take place in the regulatory boundary. If the government is the boundary shifter then social engineers are taking advantage of artificial boundaries they know will not be enforced, with implications for campaigns such as drink‐driving, smoking, and domestic violence. Also, the market driver will gain a competitive advantage by entering a market‐driven marketplace through boundary shifts, even after incurring an initial penalty.

The research demonstrates a need for research into marketing regulation to consider firm types, violation types, and tolerance levels. The study contributes to our understanding of marketer activity with two implications; first the firm is shifting the boundaries and redefining the market focal point as themselves, rather than violating the boundaries and setting themselves outside the rules. Second, depending on the level of tolerance that government has with the regulation of advertising, there is a cost to both the social purse and to market‐driven firms associated with boundary shifters.

A market driver, looking for growth opportunities, should try to enter markets dominated by market‐driven firms, and which have self‐regulation, while market driven firms should either look for regulatory protection or act collectively to wield power over third parties – for example forcing media outlets not to carry market driver advertising.

By introducing the concept of boundary stretching and allowing for market drivers and market driven firms, the authors show the effects of regulation (or tolerance) in a realistic setting and allow for the real‐world dynamics of a marketplace where new ideas create new focal points for social acceptance. This study also provides a clear illustration of the usefulness of game theory in marketing studies.

The current research aims to explore how the implementation of new regulatory forms contributes to firm self-regulation.

Longitudinal analysis of firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the US automobile industry from 1966–2012.

Examining firm-initiated product recalls for 15 manufacturers in the US automobile industry from 1966–2012 has several important findings regarding how the introduction of specific regulatory forms contributes to firm-initiated vehicle recalls. Firms are not likely to self-regulate in response to surveillance or standards-based regulation while information-based regulation results in a greater likelihood of firm self-regulation.

This result suggests that even at the product level; firms become increasingly motivated to self-regulate as regulators introduce information-based regulations.

New and advanced technologies enable firms to collect, use, disseminate, disclose, and sell Internet users’ personal information. This has raised privacy concerns. Self‐regulation is preferred by governments and industry. Unfortunately, the Internet is not well suited for a successful self‐regulation regime. Legislation is necessary to ensure the industry’s consistent and persistent commitment to fair information practices and compliance with them. This paper attempts to assist policy making by evaluating policy proposals, analysing conflicts, and identifying the best ways to deal with online privacy controversies in the light of social conditions and Internet characteristics.

This paper aims to examine the enforcement practices of the Investment Dealers Association of Canada (IDA) and argue that self-regulation simply does not work in the financial sector, as the sanctions available are neither applied with sufficient severity nor are the responsibilities for enforcement adequately divided between self-regulation, provincial securities commissions and the police.

The core compliance data for the study came from the IDA’s tribunal cases that were heard between 1984 and June 2008. The theoretical approach involves the invocation of classic articles by the likes of Stigler, Posner and Becker, the essence of whose conclusions is that institutions will act in their own best interests and cannot be expected to act in the public interest.

The findings show that over the period from 1984 to 2008, the severity of the sanctions increased consistently over the period. When penalty ceilings were increased, penalties increased. When in the latter phase of the period, public members (i.e. non-members of the industry) chaired the tribunals, penalties also increased.

Researchers can use the data to write a paper which asks “Why did the IDA tribunal penalties increase so consistently with time?” Future research could canvass various possible explanations, including the one presented in this paper, to focus sustained attention on the issue of self-regulation.

This study is the first to systematically examine the enforcement performance of the IDA.

This paper provides a perspective on the field of nonmarket strategy. It does not attempt to survey the literature but instead focuses on the substantive content of research in the field. The paper discusses the origins of the field and the roles of nonmarket strategy. The political economy framework is used and contrasted with the current form of the resource-based theory. The paper argues that research should focus on the firm level and argues that the strategy of self-regulation can be useful in reducing the likelihood of challenges from private and public politics. The political economy perspective is illustrated using three examples: (1) public politics: Uber, (2) private politics: Rainforest Action Network and Citigroup, and (3) integrated strategy and private and public politics: The Fast Food Campaign. The paper concludes with a discussion of research issues in theory, empirics, and normative assessment.

This paper aims to outline the historic development of advertising regulation that governs food advertising to children in Australia. Through reviewing primary and secondary literature, such as government reports and research, this paper examines the influence of various regulatory policies that limit children’s exposure to food and beverage marketing on practices across television (TV), branded websites and Facebook pages.

This paper reviews studies performed by the food industry and public health researchers and reviews of the evidence by government and non-government agencies from the early 19th century until the present day. Also included are several other research studies that evaluate the effects of self-regulation on Australian TV food advertising.

The government, public health and the food industry have attempted to respond to the rapid changes within the advertising, marketing and media industries by developing and reviewing advertising codes. However, self-regulation is failing to protect Australian children from exposure to unhealthy food advertising.

The findings could aid the food and beverage industry, and the self-regulatory system, to promote comprehensive and achievable solutions to the growing obesity rates in Australia by introducing new standards that keep pace with expanded forms of marketing communication.

This study adds to the research on the history of regulation of food advertising to children in Australia by offering insights into the government, public health and food industry’s attempts to respond to the rapid changes within the advertising, marketing and media industries by developing and reviewing advertising codes.

Examines how self‐regulation in advertising, within a framework of legislation, can help reverse the trends toward childhood obesity and excessive consumerism by protecting children from undesirable advertising practices. Outlines how this works in Europe: a code of advertising practice is created, based on the codes of the International Chamber of Commerce, and a self‐regulatory organisation (SRO) is formed to operate this, with the European Advertising Standards Alliance (EASA) providing a single voice for self‐regulation. Describes how SROs actually enforce the codes by giving advice, handling complaints, monitoring advertising in their markets, and referring serious cases of abuse to the appropriate legal authority. Assesses how well the system is working: the number of complaints being handled is small in proportion to the total number of advertisements, and those concerning food and children form a small portion of the total number of complaints, but there is room for improvement. Shows how the 2004 EASA Self‐Regulation Charter makes specific commitments to cover any gaps in existing coverage. Concludes with five ways that marketers can help effective self‐regulation: keep to the spirit of the codes, educate your staff, use SRO advice on copy and other aspects, review complaints and monitor results, and challenge incorrect claims.