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Ronald Coase's landmark 1937 article, “The Nature of the Firm,” framed the study of organizational economics for decades. Coase asked three fundamental questions: Why do firms exist? What determines their boundaries? How should firms be organized internally? To answer the first question, Coase famously appealed to “the costs of using the price mechanism,” what we now call transaction costs or contracting costs, a concept that blossomed in the 1970s and 1980s into an elaborate theory of why firms exist (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1985; Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Grossman & Hart, 1986). The second question has generated a huge literature in industrial economics, strategy, corporate finance, and organization theory. “Why,” as Coase (1937, pp. 393–394) put it, “does the entrepreneur not organize one less transaction or one more?” In Williamson's (1996, p. 150) words, “Why can't a large firm do everything that a collection of small firms can do and more?” As Coase recognized in 1937, the transaction-cost advantages of internal organization are not unlimited, and firms have a finite “optimum” size and shape. Describing these limits in detail has proved challenging, however.¹

Financial contagion refers to the propagation of shocks that can generate widespread failures. The authors apply a financial contagion model proposed by Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) to a cross-shareholding network of firms in Ecuador. The authors use a novel dataset to study the potential channels for contagion. Although diversification is not high, results reveal enough conditions for a contagion event to occur. However, the low level of integration attenuates the effects of shocks. The authors run simulations affecting a particular firm at the time, and find that two firms coming from the finance and trade industry cause the highest contagion. In addition, when an entire industry receives a shock, trade and manufacturing industries contagion more companies than the rest. Finally, the model can assist policymakers to monitor the market and evaluate the fragility of the network in different scenarios.

My first book was published in 1979 while I was a visiting professor at the Graduate School of Business at Columbia University. However, the book, International Diversification and the Multinational Enterprise, consisted of materials prepared from my doctoral dissertation of 1974 at Simon Fraser University and a set of articles prepared subsequently while I was in my first job as a professor at the University of Winnipeg in Canada.

Economic sanctions imposed by the EU and United States on Russia have brought significant changes into Russian foreign economic policy, in particular leading to deepening cooperation with Asian countries and China in particular. The present contribution aims to shed light on the influence of sanctions on Russian multinational enterprises (MNEs) internationalization toward China using the example of energy and information and communication technology (ICT) industries.

The chapter builds on case study analysis. The choice of sectors allows us to highlight the recent strategic trends in the internationalization of oil and gas industry, dominated by state-owned multinationals, and in ICT by privately owned companies.

Our results provide empirical data for understanding the influence of sanctions on MNEs from the country being under the sanctions. In the case of Russian oil and gas industry and ICTs, research indicates that the shift toward China was not initiated primarily by the sanctions. In both cases, expansion to Asian markets was correlated with business interests in the Chinese market. However, changes in geopolitical and macroeconomic business environment accelerated Russian MNE’s pivot to China, for the purposes of attracting capital and reaching new markets in context of deteriorating relations with western partners. The cases demonstrate a moderating role of the industry in the context of sanctions, helping compensate for the slowdown of economic relations with traditional partners.

The novelty of the chapter is to delineate the consequences of sanctions on MNEs from the country being under sanctions. In this way, it illustrates the role of geopolitical environment in intensifying internationalization of Russian MNEs toward China.

To assess the impact of TCE on the field of strategy, we first quantified the distribution of TCE-related research articles across all disciplines and fields. Specifically, we identified every article that appeared in a journal included in the Institute for Scientific Information's (ISI's) Web of Knowledge between 1975 and 2008 and that included among its keywords some variation of “transaction costs.” We then removed those articles for which this term clearly did not refer to transaction costs of the Coasean kind (primarily articles in finance and computing, for which “transaction cost” has a different meaning). Finally, we categorized each journal according to its discipline or field. Granted, this requires some judgment, but we attempted to be objective in our categorizations.¹ As Table 1 shows, articles that are self-described as part of the TCE research stream have appeared more frequently in strategy journals than in the journals of any other discipline or field. We interpret this as evidence of TCE's impact on strategy, and of the importance of the strategy field to TCE.

The contrast of multilevel and comparative research may seem counterintuitive at first. After all, one might argue that comparative research on organizations by necessity spans several levels of analysis (Rokkan, 1966). Yet, multilevel and comparative research on organizations present rather distinct traditions in organization studies, each with its own epistemological assumptions and associated methods. Accordingly, an approach that aims to incorporate both multilevel and comparative ideas needs to start with taking inventory of these prior literatures to situate itself. In the following, we thus turn to the literatures on multilevel and comparative research as different traditions with surprisingly little overlap.

This study suggests two new diversification strategies, i.e., tourism-related and tourism-unrelated diversifications which are specifically applicable to the hotel firms. This study aims to investigate which diversification strategy has better benefits toward firm performance. This study includes a complete set of public listed firms of the hotel industry from four Asian countries, namely, Hong Kong, Singapore, China, and Malaysia, covering from years 2001 to 2012. Revealing the advantage and disadvantage of both diversification strategies, the empirical evidence regarding its influences on hotel firm performance are investigated in this study. This study finds a nonlinear relationship between degree of diversification and firm performance. Confronting with the volatile earnings when crises strike tourism sector, this study further shows how the crises affect the relationship between tourism-related/unrelated diversification strategy and hotel firm performance.

Corporate diversification is a strategy that enables corporations to expand their core business into other businesses. In Malaysia, corporate diversification continues to represent a fundamental organizational structure. Some two-thirds of Malaysian firms are diversified. However, when compared to developed countries such as the US and the UK, we find that firms are moving toward non-diversification. The study is based on the population framework consisting of all of the public limited companies (PLCs) listed on the Bursa Malaysia stock exchange from 2007 to 2012. A dynamic panel model system generalized method of moments (GMM) was used to analyze the diversification and firm’s performance theories.

The empirical findings demonstrated that diversification is better than non-diversification firms for the curvilinear relationship between diversification and firm’s performance (ROA and Tobin-Q) when using the entropy index and relatedness is taken into consideration. The research further concluded that related and unrelated diversification also has a positive relationship with performance, but diversification must be the dominant (focused) and cannot be too broad in nature. Diversification that is too broad may cause a positive relationship to turn in to a negative relationship toward performance in both related and unrelated instances of diversification.