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This article examines income tax progression as a mechanism for achieving the intertemporal adjustments of earnings profiles. With a rising income profile, the preference for progression arises from the market (borrowing) rate of interest exceeding the rate at which the government borrows. For a given tax burden, each individual is found to prefer a marginal tax rate of unity, with the threshold set as high as possible. With a common tax structure, the conditions under which all individuals prefer progression is examined.

The U.S. government mandates taxpayers remit taxes through a "pay as you go" system. Research indicates employees continue to overpay interim taxes, despite the inefficiencies of this form of forced savings. Theory holds that a rational individual would choose the minimum amount of withholdings prescribed by the tax code. We adopted Kahneman-Tversky (1979) prospect theory to show that, under reasonable conditions, individuals will continue to choose excessive withholdings. This paper is not an attempt to statistically justify prospect theory however; we argue that withholdings increase when the income tax rate increases and when beforetax income increases. Our model extends the income tax withholding literature by modeling a framework to determine an optimal withholding decision for taxpayers.

Prior tax compliance research has largely ignored low-income individual taxpayers, as they have historically been viewed as having an immaterial impact on Federal tax revenues. However, the earned income tax credit (EITC) program has altered the Federal tax revenue landscape in this regard. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigated the magnitude of EITC tax overpayments for tax year 1999 and concluded that between 27 and 31% of EITC filings were overstated, resulting in over-payments of between $8.5 and $9.9 billion (IRS, 2002). These excessive payments represented about 0.5% of total Federal revenues and 2.8% of the total tax gap. Thus, to the extent that low-income individual taxpayers intentionally under-report their incomes in order to receive higher EITC’s, the Federal budget is noticeably affected.

This study extends and complements extant tax research by examining the compliance intentions of low-income individual taxpayers. Relying on the theory of planned behavior, we examine the extent to which perceived tax equity (vertical, horizontal and exchange), normative expectations, and legal sanctions affect tax compliance intentions. Consistent with the hypotheses, the results indicate a significant positive relationship between compliance intentions and: (1) equity perceptions of the tax system; (2) normative expectations of compliance; and (3) penalty magnitude. Additionally, the findings suggest two-way interactions between penalty magnitude and exchange equity, and penalty magnitude and normative expectations. Research results reported herein hold important policy implications related to the Federal government’s efforts to reduce tax cheating and increase compliance among low-income individual taxpayers.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between tax arrears and socio-psychological demographic factors on individual taxpayers as well as macroeconomic factors in Malaysia.

In this study, using proprietary data from Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia on individual income tax returns for the year of 2004 through 2012, the authors run a panel data fixed effect model analysis to examine the impact of socio-psychological demographic factors such as age, gender, marital status, income level, occupational sector, place of residence of individual tax payers as well macroeconomic factors such as real GDP, inflation and economic growth on tax arrears in Malaysia.

We find that, by and large, older male taxpayers in big towns, with high incomes, tend to accumulate tax arrears. Tax arrears are also significantly affected by real GDP, but not by marital status or occupational sector.

To the best of our knowledge, this is one the few studies that uses individual tax returns data to study determinants of tax arrears.

We adopt a standard distributional impact methodology, based on Atkinson's cost of inequality approach, to estimate the degree of implicit redistribution created through public funding of health insurance in Canada. The first stage of the exercise is to determine the public health insurance benefits received by families of various age and composition and to add these to measured after-tax incomes. In our base case, which uses the Atkinson Mean Logarithmic Deviation as inequality index, we find that accounting for public health insurance benefits implies a reduction in inequality equivalent to 2.4% of per capita income. We then model the implications of moving to a hypothetical fully privatized system while proportionately refunding to individuals the tax revenues saved in doing so. This would give rise to a further 2.4% equivalent per capita income reduction resulting from increased inequality in the distribution of after-tax income. Thus, for this scenario, moving from public financing of health insurance in Canada to a fully privatized system implies an overall increase in inequality equivalent to a loss of 4.8% of per capita income. This corresponds to an increase of about 25% in existing inequality. Not surprisingly, the impact of publicly financed health insurance in reducing inequality is strongest for the elderly.

An important concern of economic policy analysis is how income taxes affect labor supply since this is crucial in assessing the efficiency costs of taxation and designing labor income taxation. The focus in the literature has been mostly to study the responses of high earners and women. The authors contribute to this literature by focusing more on how middle earners respond to financial incentives and whether the responses are different between men and women.

The authors exploit substantial expansions in the level of individual income exempt from taxation and taxed at a lower marginal tax rate while the schedule of marginal tax rates remained the same. The authors adopt an empirical framework that is similar to Bosch and van der Klaauw (2012) and condition on the effects of other factors, such as inflows of foreign workers that may have affected the wages, participation and working hours of native males and females. The authors also conduct various sensitivity analyses to examine the robustness of the estimates.

The authors find robust evidence that the tax reforms increased the wages of medium and high educated married males and females significantly. They also had a positive impact on work participation that was more substantial for married women, especially the medium educated. The authors estimate significant positive own wage labor supply elasticities that are small and about the same for men and women when the authors condition on the labor outcome effects of inflows of EU and non-EU foreign workers, which changed the skill distribution of the economy and had a more significant impact on female labor outcomes. Smaller wage labor supply elasticities indicate lower disincentive effects and deadweight losses from the imposition of taxes and have implications on the design of optimal taxation of men and women.

Previous investigations of the labor supply responses of both men and women to a given policy change have been identified mostly by exploiting changes in joint income taxation and marginal tax rates. The authors exploit substantial expansions in the level of individual income exempt from taxation and taxed at a lower marginal tax rate while the schedule of marginal tax rates remained the same. The income effects of these reforms could be limited since the reduced marginal tax rates apply to only part of the income.

Argues the case for reform of US tax codes from a feminist viewpoint. “The household” and “the individual” are falsely distinguished in the tradition of taxing only adult male breadwinners ‐women being engulfed in “the household”. Describes recent analysis of human identity in terms of separation and connection. Suggests tax structure be based on persons‐in‐relation: an individual earner plus his or her dependants.

This chapter examines how public attitudes and judgments about tax fairness reflect distributive justice rules about proportionality/contributions, needs, and equality; fairness issues that influence voluntary tax compliance (Hofmann, Hoelzl, & Kirchler, 2008; Spicer & Lundstedt, 1976). Most public polls and some prior research indicate the general public considers progressive income tax rates as fairer than flat tax rates, a reflection of the Needs rule of distributive justice theory; our 1,138 participants respond similarly. However, two-thirds of our politically representative sample of the American public actually assign “fair shares” of income taxes consistently with fairness-as-proportionality above an exempt amount of income, consistent with the Contributions rule of Equity Theory. We argue experimental assignments of fair shares of income taxes can best be understood as a combination of the Needs rule, applied by exempting incomes below the poverty line from income taxation (via current standard deductions) and taxing incomes above this exempt amount at a single tax rate (i.e., a flat-rate tax) consistent with the Proportionality/Contributions rule. Viewed in combination, these two distributive justice rules explain the tax fairness judgments of 89% of our sample and indicate surprising general agreement about what constitutes a fair share of income taxes that should be paid by US citizens from the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile of the income distribution. The joint application of these fairness rules indicates how seemingly competing, partisan distributive justice concerns can inform our understanding of social attitudes about tax fairness across income classes.