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To minimize customer churn, many service providers offer consumers the option of automatic contract renewal at the end of a contract period. Such agreements are known as rollover service contracts (RSCs). This research quantifies the effect of RSCs and other related factors, such as incentives, on consumers' service choice decisions.

The study adopts choice-based conjoint analysis to assess the effect of RSCs on consumers' choices and to determine whether effect size varies when selecting a cell phone network or gym/leisure club provider, which represent lower-priced utilitarian and higher-priced hedonic services.

It was found that RSCs produce negative perceptions and intended behaviors for the majority of consumers across different product types. Nevertheless, as explained by social exchange theory, many individuals may be persuaded to enter into a RSC on the basis of reciprocity if they are offered an incentive such as a price discount or free product add-on.

In the marketing domain, this is the first comprehensive study to quantify the role of contract type among a range of other factors in consumers' decision-making when selecting a service. The authors' results offer context-specific implications for service marketers. First, RSCs are perceived more negatively in high-priced hedonistic categories, especially among those with lower incomes. Second, price discounts are more effective than product add-ons for motivating hedonic purchases, while product add-ons work better with utilitarian services.

In this study, a dynamic contracting model is developed between a venture capitalist (VC) and an entrepreneur (EN) to explore the influence of asymmetric beliefs regarding output-relevant parameters, agency conflicts and complementarity on the VC's posterior beliefs through the EN's unobservable effort choices to influence the optimal dynamic contract.

The authors construct the contracting model by incorporating the VC's effort, which is ignored in most studies. Using backward induction and a discrete-time approximation approach, the authors solve the continuous-time contract design problem, which evolves into a nonlinear ordinary differential equation (ODE).

The optimal equity share that the VC provides to the EN decreases over time. In accordance with the empirical evidence, the EN's optimistic beliefs regarding the project's profitability positively affect its equity share. However, the interactions between the optimal equity share, project risk and both partners' degrees of risk aversion are not monotonic. Moreover, the authors find that the optimal equity share increases with the degree of complementarity, which indicates that the EN is willing to cooperate with the VC. This study’s results also show that the optimal equity shares at each time are interdependent if the VC is risk-averse and independent if the VC is risk-neutral.

In conclusion, the authors highlight two potential directions for future research. First, the authors only considered a single VC, whereas in practice, a risk project may be carried out by multiple VCs, and it is interesting to discuss how the degree of complementarity affects the number of VCs that ENs contract. Second, the authors may introduce jumps and consider more general multivariate stochastic volatility models for output dynamics and analyze the characteristics of the optimal contracts. Third, further research can deal with other forms of discretionary output functions concerning complementarity, such as Cobb–Douglas and constant elasticity of substitution (See Varian, 1992).

The results of this study have several implications. First, it offers a novel approach to designing dynamic contracts that are specific and easy to operate. To improve the complicated venture investment situation and abate conflict between contractual parties, this study plays a good reference role. Second, the synergy effect proposed in this study provides a theoretical explanation for the executive compensation puzzle in economics, in which managers are often “rewarded for luck” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Wu et al., 2018). This result indicates a realistic perspective on financing and establishing cooperative relationships, which enhances the efficiency of venture investment. Third, from an empirical standpoint, one can apply this framework to study research and development (R&D) problems.

First, the authors introduce asymmetric beliefs and Bayesian learning to study the dynamic contract design problem and discuss their effects on equity share. Second, the authors incorporate the VC's effort into the contracting problem, and analyze the synergistic effect of effort complementarity on the optimal dynamic contract.

Studies showed that digital technology applications in the construction industry are low, especially in many developing nations. Construction incentivisation (CI) is one of the long-standing principles adopted to enhance project performance. There is a paucity of studies concerning CI to improve digital technology applications. Thus, this research investigated the relevance and perceived hindrances that may hinder the implementation of CI from promoting digital technologies and proffer ways to improve digital technology applications in the construction sector.

In Nigeria’s context, this research is exploratory. Twenty-four semi-structured virtual interviews were conducted in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria, with knowledgeable participants that indicated interest and were interviewed. The engaged interviewees were drawn from government agencies, academicians in construction consultancy, Internet and communication technology experts, construction contracting firms and construction consulting firms. The collected data were coded and analysed through a thematic method.

Digitalisation of the industry via CI may face some hindrances. The perceived issues that may hinder CI implementation were classified into most severe, severe and fairly severe in Nigeria’s construction industry context. Findings proffer feasible policy solutions that can mitigate these issues and improve digital technology applications in the industry via the CI.

This study covered the relevance and perceived issues that may hinder the implementation of the CI to improve digital technology applications in the industry. Also, the study proffers policy solutions to enhance digital technology applications in the industry via the CI concept.

Findings from this research will support and offer a valuable understanding of the relevance of the “incentivisation concept” to improve digital technology applications in the Nigerian-built environment. Other developing countries with low applications of digital technology in construction may consider the suggested policy solutions from this research. Also, this study will stir policymakers and construction practitioners to support policies tailored towards improving digital technology applications in construction.

This research contributes by exploring the effectiveness of the CI concept and informing construction practitioners and policymakers on how to improve digital technology applications in the Nigerian construction industry.

Green technology innovation is the organic combination of green development and innovation driven. It is also a powerful guarantee for shaping sustainable competitive advantages of manufacturing enterprises. To explore what kind of executive incentive contracts can truly stimulate green technology innovation, this study aims to distinguish the equity incentive and reputation incentive, upon their contractual elements characteristics and green governance effects, and then put forward suggestions for green technology innovation accordingly.

This study establishes an evaluation model and uses empirical methods to test. Concretely, using data from A-share listed manufacturing companies for the period from 2007 to 2020, this study compares and analyzes the impact of equity and reputation incentive on green technology innovation and explores the relationship between internal green business behavior and external green in depth.

This study finds that reputation incentives focus on long-term and non-utilitarian orientation, which can promote green technology innovation in enterprises. While equity incentives, linked to performance indicators, have a inhibitory effect on green technology innovation. Internal and external institutional factors such as energy conservation measures, the “three wastes” management system, and environmental recognition play the regulatory role in the relationship between incentive contracts and green technology innovation.

Those findings validate and expand the efficient contracting hypothesis and the rent extraction hypothesis from the perspective of green technology innovation and provide useful implications for the design of green governance systems in manufacturing enterprises.

The present study investigates the impact of accounting comparability on chief executive officer (CEO) incentive plans and the moderating role of board independence for companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

The information about 177 companies in 2014–2021 was examined. In this study, equity-based compensation and cash-based compensation were used as the CEO incentive plans. The equity-based compensation was calculated through the ownership of the CEO shares.

The results suggest that the higher accounting comparability increases not only CEO equity-based compensation, but also cash-based compensation. Board independence also strengthens the relationship between accounting comparability and CEO compensation. Hypothesis testing based on robustness checks confirmed these results.

The paper is pioneering, to the authors' knowledge, in identifying how board independence moderates the impact of accounting comparability on CEO compensation. The findings provide insights into economic consequences to the firm related to accounting comparability and board monitoring. The results have important practical implications for international investors to evaluate accounting comparability, corporate governance mechanisms and CEO incentives.

The purpose of this study to improve the efficiency of customer acquisition and retention through the design of salary information disclosure mechanism.

This study develops a stylized game-theoretic model of delegating customer acquisition and retention, focusing on how firms choose delegation and wage information disclosure strategy.

The results confirm the necessity for enterprises to disclose salary information. When sales agents are risk neutral, firms should choose multi-agent (MA) delegation and disclose their wages. However, when agents are risk averse, firms may disclose the wages of acquisition agents or both agents in MA delegation, depending on the uncertainty of the retention market.

This paper contributes to the literature on delegation of customer acquisition and retention and demonstrates that salary disclosure can be used as a supplement to the incentive mechanism.

Given the serious question raised by the subprime of the 2008 global financial crisis over the rising practices of excessive rewarding of executives in the USA and European firms, the executive pay-performance nexus has emerged as a popular topic of debate in the contemporary corporate finance research. Conducted mostly on the Anglo-Saxon contexts, research outcomes have been inconclusive and dichotomous. Considering this backdrop, this study aims to investigate the endogenous relationship between executive compensation and risk taking in the context of the USA.

Using a large sample of non-financial firms from 2010 to 2020 based on panel data and two-stage least square regression. In this study, the riskier corporate decision is measured as book leverage and ratio of R&D expense to total assets. Chief executive officers’ (CEO) experience and age are used as instrumental variables, and these are expected to influence compensation incentives and, hence, affect firm riskiness indirectly. Firm size, return on assets and CEO turnover are reported to affect compensation and corporate decisions, therefore, included as control variables. Given that higher executive compensation is related to riskier corporate decision in firms, this study incorporates total wealth (i.e. accumulated equity related compensation) as an additional proxy of compensation, and this selection is justifiable by the perfect contracting notion of the agency theory.

The results of this study show a significant positive and increasing nexus among compensation and riskier corporate decisions. Besides, the compensation level proxied through the percentage of each form of compensation in total compensation is very important as greater equity and greater salary diminishes risk taking.

The outcomes of this study have useful implications for firm stakeholders and policymakers.

The level of pay measured by the percentage of each type of compensation in total compensation is of utmost importance as it can increase or decrease risk taking in corporate decisions.

This historical example of the creation of the arms industry in the Connecticut River Valley in the 1800s provides new insights into the value of government venture capital (GVC) and government demand in creating a new industry. Since current theoretical explanations of the best uses of governmental venture capital are still under development, there is considerable need for further theory development to explain and predict the creation of an industry and especially those industries where failures in private capital supply necessitates governmental involvement in new firm creation. The purpose of this paper is to provide an in depth historical review of how the arms industry evolved spurred by GVC and government created demand.

This study uses abductive inference as the best way to build and test emerging theories and advancing theoretical explanations of the best uses of GVC and governmental demand to achieve socially required outcomes.

By observing this specific historical example in detail, the authors add to the understanding of value creation caused by governmental venture capital funding of existing theory. A major contribution of this paper is to advance theory based on detailed observation.

The relatively limited research literature and theory development on governmental venture capital funding and the critical success factors in startups are enriched by this abductive investigation of the creation of the historically important arms industry and its spillover into creating the specialized machine industry.

The green building (GB) market is maturing after years of practice; therefore, incentives for promoting GB should be adapted to reflect the market transformation. Adapting incentives can positively influence stakeholders' motives, which in turn change stakeholders' behavioural intention towards GBs. Hence, this study aims to examine the parameters influencing the decision to adopt GB and to ascertain how incentive mechanisms promote the uptake of GB in South Africa.

Using a scoping literature review and a sequential mixed research method, primary data were acquired from GB experts in four South African provinces. In analysing the quantitative data, the factors were ranked hierarchically using the mean ranking technique and factor analysis was computed to identify the underlying GB incentives. The qualitative data were analysed using content analysis.

The results indicate that incentive payment from a utility energy efficiency programme, rebates and discounts relating to environmentally friendly materials and products and providing grants to homeowners and developers to go towards certification were the most essential monetary incentives for promoting GB. In the category of non-monetary incentives, recognition of consultant team members and developers and free marketing/good publicity were the most important incentives. The incentive mechanisms were subsequently categorised as “Economic incentives” and “Reward scheme and technical support”.

This study was confined to four metropolitan areas in South Africa. Nevertheless, the outcomes have practical implications for GB projects in general and may serve as a good reference for other provinces in South Africa.

The findings of the study are a valuable resource for stakeholders such as the government, municipal assemblies, professional bodies and the Green Building Council of South Africa (GBCSA) in developing effective incentive mechanisms to promote GB adoption. This study adds to the body of knowledge relevant to GB incentivisation in South Africa.

This study aims to validate the link between production manipulation and a firm’s performance variability (fundamentals and stock returns). It explores whether executives' risk-taking incentives encourage production deviations around the normal level during uncertainty.

Utilizing panel data of manufacturing firms from Compustat over three decades, the study investigates production management practices during economic uncertainty. The Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU) is employed as a key metric. The empirical strategy involves documenting the effect of economic uncertainty on overproduction and underproduction, examining the role of executive compensation and assessing the impact on risk.

The research finds that risk-taking incentives increase over/underproduction, particularly amplifying the extent of underproduction during uncertainty. Production deviation rises, indicating that firms take greater risk by engaging in abnormal business operations. The study’s results are robust against various econometric methods, emphasizing the influence of risk-taking incentives on corporate production decisions.

While providing valuable insights, the study acknowledges inherent limitations, including factors influencing production decisions beyond risk-taking incentives. Further research could explore additional determinants for a comprehensive understanding.

The findings highlight the potential dark side of executive compensation that motivates suboptimal risk-taking decisions, impacting risk, cost of capital and firm performance. Policymakers and compensation committees can use these insights to design efficient systems that mitigate moral hazard problems associated with productivity changes.

The study emphasizes the broader social implications of production manipulation under uncertainty. It prompts discussions on the ethical considerations of managerial opportunism, its potential consequences for stakeholders and market dynamics.

This study contributes to the literature by examining the role of economic uncertainty on production manipulation and the influence of risk-taking incentives. It extends the earnings management literature by considering real activity manipulation and emphasizing the importance of decomposing production deviation into positive and negative values.