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The construction of megaprojects often involves substantial risks. While insurance plays an important role as a traditional risk transfer means, owners and insurance companies may still suffer huge losses during the risk management process. Therefore, considering the strong motivation of insurance companies to participate in the on-site risk management of megaprojects, this study aims to propose a collaborative incentive mechanism involving insurance companies, to optimize the risk management effect and reduce the risk of accidents in megaprojects.

Based on principal-agent theory, the research develops the static and dynamic incentive models for risk management in megaprojects, involving both the owner and insurance company. The study examines the primary factors influencing incentive efficiency. The results are numerically simulated with a validation case. Finally, the impact of parameter changes on the stakeholders' benefits is analyzed.

The results indicate that the dynamic incentive model is available to the achievement of a flexible mechanism to ensure the benefits of contractors while protecting the benefits of the owner and insurance company. Adjusting the incentive coefficients for owners and insurance companies within a specified range promotes the growth of benefits for all parties involved. The management cost and economic benefit allocation coefficients have a positive effect on the adjustment range of the incentive coefficient, which helps implement a more flexible dynamic incentive mechanism to motivate contractors to carry out risk management to reduce risk losses.

This study makes up for the absence of important stakeholders in risk management. Different from traditional megaproject risk management, this model uses insurance companies as bridges to break the island effect of risk management among multiple megaprojects. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by designing appropriate dynamic incentive mechanisms in megaproject risk management through insurance company participation, and provides practical implications to both owner and insurance company on incentive contract making, thus achieving better risk governance of megaprojects.

This paper examines the effect of board reforms on managerial risk-taking incentive provision in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) whose managers are undue risk-averse.

We use the staggered implementation of board reforms in Chinese central government-controlled state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) as an exogenous shock to board governance. We collect data on board reforms for a set of pilot CSOEs during the period 2005 to 2020 from the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) website by hand. We use a generalized difference-in-difference (DID) design to test the effect of staggered board reform adoption on managerial risk-taking incentive provision.

We find a positive relationship between board reforms and risk-taking inventive provision, i.e. pay-performance sensitivity, promotion-performance sensitivity and performance target difficulty. The documented relationship is stronger when the value of risk-taking is higher. We also find that board reforms lead to greater risky but value-enhancing investments and that managerial risk-taking incentive provision acts as an important channel through which board reforms improve value-enhancing risk-taking.

Our findings suggest that board reforms that improve board governance are effective in addressing risk-related agency conflicts in emerging markets. The findings also highlight the importance of managerial risk-taking incentive provision in inducing risky but value-enhancing investments.

The role played by corporate governance mechanisms on corporate deleveraging policies has not been clarified. Empirical evidence is confined to developed economies, even with conflicting and inconclusive results. This paper aims to examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms, such as ownership structure, board composition and CEO dominance, in explaining corporate deleveraging policies.

Using a sample of listed Pakistani firms between 2010 and 2022, this study resorts to binary response models to examine the effects of governance mechanisms on firms’ decision to go debt-free.

A greater ownership concentration, institutional ownership and family ownership increase the propensity for zero leverage. Board gender diversity decreases the propensity for deleveraging policies, which seems to indicate that the presence of females reinforces the monitoring function of the board. Finally, lower managerial ownership or CEO dominance decreases the propensity toward zero leverage (interest convergence hypothesis), but higher managerial ownership or CEO dominance increases the propensity toward zero leverage (managerial entrenchment hypothesis).

Risk-averse managers who prefer to control a firm using little or no debt will find it easier to implement these financing policies in firms with greater ownership concentration and where institutional holders have a substantial stake. For shareholders, this study suggests that investing in firms with females on board reduces the risk of corporate deleveraging policies being adopted for entrenched reasons.

The presence of females on board seems to decrease the propensity of managers to adopt opportunistic actions and may also contribute to enhancing human welfare and society in developing countries.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study considering the effect of board diversity on zero leverage. Another singularity is that this study exhibits a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and corporate deleveraging policy.

This study aims to facilitate the development of a better understanding of how controlling shareholders respond to the mandatory system of corporate governance rating (CGR) for all firms listed on Taiwanese stock markets and the incentives of controllers to apply corporate governance best practices.

Using CGR data for all Taiwanese listed firms from 2014 to 2020, this study examines whether controlling shareholders determine a firm’s CGR.

Single-family-controlled firms have the lowest CGRs, and management-controlled firms have the highest ratings. Blockholder-controlled firms are more likely to have top 20% ratings than single-family-controlled firms and bottom 20% ratings than single-family and management-controlled firms. All three categories of firms have unfavorable (favorable) ratings because of substitute governance effects (signaling effects).

Management-controlled firms, in which agency problems refer to principal-agent conflicts, are more likely to have good ratings than single-family controlled firms, in which agency problems refer to principal-principal conflicts. Blockholder-controlled firms have extreme ratings, suggesting that multiple large shareholders develop corporate governance practices consistent with their best interests to increase firm value or expropriate wealth. Low cash flow rights and high control-ownership divergence lead firms to adopt additional governance arrangement(s) to make shareholders trust firms with capital and signal to shareholders that they can trust them with their capital.

Critical infrastructure (CI) sectors and their resilience are vital for societies to function. In many countries, vital societal functions (VSFs) and CIs depend on inter-organizational and international supply chains (SCs) which combine public and private actors with often competing interests and unclear responsibilities that create discontents. While collaborative supply chain risk management (SCRM) can increase the robustness and resilience of VSF&CIs, their inherent characteristics complicate SCRM. To understand this, supply chain risk governance (SCRG) has conceptually been introduced, suggesting collaborative mechanisms that facilitate inter-organizational SCRM. The purpose of this study is to elaborate on and substantiate the theoretical and practical relevance of an existing SCRG framework, by empirically exploring governance of collaborative SCRM and suggesting future research.

An abductive case study was performed in a VSF&CI, the Swedish food system, to contextualize top-level governance of collaborative SCRM and elaborate on the conceptual SCRG framework. Archival data supplemented expert interviews with public and private actors representing direct and indirect SC actors.

Current discourse and interventions in the Swedish food system’s SCRM confirmed discontent in governance and the importance of SCRG mechanisms and supported further conceptualization, e.g. of legal mechanisms vs economic incentives, the importance of government inquiries and the understanding of the influence of indirect public SC actors.

Considering the geographical scope of the study, transferability is limited but invites comparisons with both other countries and the SCRG of other VSF&CIs. Proposed research avenues guide future conceptualization and contextualization of SCRG.

The framework can support CI actors to jointly find and reduce discontents related to inter-organizational SCRM and support policymakers to increase public–private collaboration.

The novelty lies in empirically studying SCRG in critical infrastructures by combining SCRM and risk governance lenses.

This article aims to answer two research questions that remain controversial in the accounting and corporate governance literature: (1) how corporate disclosure is related to board monitoring and (2) how this link is affected by the institutional environment and firm-level governance.

The study is based on S&P data on corporate disclosure by Russian companies collected over 2002–2010 and supplemented by information from the SKRIN database. The dataset covers 125 non-financial companies, with 559 observations in total. We use three indicators of board monitoring: the percentage of non-executive directors, a dummy for two-tier boards, and a dummy for an audit committee. The firm’s governance is proxied by a dummy for single class stock, while the institutional environment is proxied by a dummy for ADRs/GDRs. We apply conventional methods of panel data analysis with several robustness checks, including the random- and fixed-effects models, 2SLS that addresses the potential endogeneity of board composition, alternative definitions of the dependent variable, and an extended list of controls.

We find a positive (complementary) relationship between the amount of disclosure and the proxies for board monitoring employed. This complementary relationship turns out to be the strongest among companies that have better internal governance but face a weaker institutional environment. There is little evidence of such complementarity under strong institutions.

The findings may be of interest to investors and policymakers. As to the former, the results warn of firms that provide limited disclosure in the presence of strong corporate governance arrangements, such as independent boards, as these factors are not substitutes for each other. As to the latter, the results support comprehensive policies aimed at simultaneous improvements in both board governance and corporate disclosure in weak institutional settings.

This paper uses a unique setting and rich, partly proprietary data to extend the existing literature on the relationship between corporate disclosure and board monitoring, with an emphasis on the moderating role of the institutional environment and firm-level governance. It is also one of the very few studies of corporate disclosure in Russia, an important emerging economy of the early 2000s.

This paper aims to examine the effect of executive compensation incentives, specifically CEO inside debt holdings, on the choice of industry specialist auditor.

High inside debt holdings are expected to constrain excessive managerial risk-taking and align the interests of managers and outside debtholders. The authors hypothesize that reduced debtholders’ expropriation concerns will decrease the demand for high audit quality, measured by industry specialization. The authors investigate a sample of US firms from 2006 to 2018 using OLS regression and use CEO relative leverage to proxy for CEO inside debt holdings. The authors conduct an additional two-stage least squares regression analysis to address potential endogeneity issues.

The paper finds that firms with higher levels of CEO inside debt tend not to appoint an auditor with industry specialization. This result is consistent with the notion that inside debt mitigates agency conflicts between managers and debtholders, reducing the demand for high-quality audits as a monitoring mechanism. The paper also finds that among firms which are excessively leveraged, those with higher levels of CEO inside debt tend to appoint an industry specialist auditor.

The findings contribute to the literature on agency cost and auditor choice by demonstrating that CEO inside debt has both substitutive and complementary effects on demand for industry specialist auditors.

The paper aims at studying the effect of management practices on the extensive and intensive export margins of Egyptian manufacturing firms.

The study relies on the 2020/2021 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey (EIFBS) which comprises 2,383 manufacturing firms representing small, medium, and large sized firms located in different regions of Egypt: Urban Governorates, Lower Egypt, and Upper Egypt. It constructs an overall management z score for each firm to estimate its effect on a firm’s probability of exporting and value of exports using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions.

Results indicate that good management is associated with a higher probability of firm exporting as well as higher export revenues conditional on exporting, robust to controlling for the level of domestic sales. These effects do not differ by firm ownership or type of sector, but rather by firm size, with managerial competence raising the probability of exporting more for large-sized firms. Additionally, good management is associated with higher firm productivity, innovation and worker training propensities which gives evidence that it is both an efficiency and a quality enhancer. Moreover, monitoring and targeting practices have significant positive effects on both margins, while incentives are only significant for the extensive margin.

Firms that aim at enhancing their export prospects and revenues should devote resources to review and upgrade their management systems to boost their product quality and production efficiency. Policy-wise, the government should create a competitive market environment that is open to both domestic and foreign firms’ entry to stimulate the adoption of better management practices.

The paper is the first to explore the link between firm management practices and export outcomes for a MENA country (Egypt). It makes use of a recent survey, the 2020/2021 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey (EIFBS). The findings shed light on the importance of different management components (monitoring, targeting and incentives) in driving a manufacturing firm’s export performance.

The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on earnings management (EM) within the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries. In addition, the impact of firm’s political connections (PCs) on EM is investigated, as well as whether it moderates the relationship between CG and EM.

Fixed-effects model is used on a sample of non-financial firms across the GCC countries to test the hypotheses. Moreover, a two-stage least squares method and a propensity score matching procedure are used to mitigate potential reverse causality and sample selection bias.

This study reveals that CG mechanisms such as board size and board independence are negatively associated with EM, while CEO duality is positively association with EM. In addition, this study shows that institutional ownership and blockholders do not influence EM. Furthermore, PCs are shown to play a moderating role in the relationship between CG and EM. The results of this study are robust to endogeneity testing and to alternative measures of CG.

Because of a lack of data, the authors do not consider additional CG attributes such as tenure, education and age of board members. Future research could explore the impact of these attributes when data becomes available.

This study provides valuable insights for government officials, policymakers, standard-setters, regulators and corporations by presenting new evidence on the relationship among CG, PCs and EM. Moreover, this study underscores that, in the absence of a strong institutional infrastructure and investor protection, relying solely on strong CG and Islamic values and GCC culture may have a limited impact on effective monitoring of opportunistic managerial behaviors.

This study contributes to existing literature with a specific focus on the unique political, legal, institutional, social and cultural setting of the GCC region. Moreover, this study provides new insights that PCs serve as a governance mechanism in mitigating EM because relatively little attention has been given to the impact of PCs in improving accounting outcomes, especially in the context of the GCC region where Islamic ethical norms often shape business practices.

This study aims to examine how capital structure influences earnings management for firms in the Saudi market, which is influenced by an Islamic environment that discourages excessive borrowing.

This study uses a data set that covers the period from 2013 to 2020 for firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) and uses panel data regression models to test the impact of capital structure on earnings management.

The empirical results reveal that earnings manipulation is less common among firms that have less debt, which implies that firms in the Saudi market face high scrutiny to maintain lower leverage to meet the investment requirements of stakeholders based on religious status, which in turn reduces information asymmetry and constrains opportunistic behaviour in managing earnings.

This study provides insights for regulators, investors, and managers on the role of religion in shaping capital structure and monitoring financial reporting practices. This study recognises that firms’ decision-making can be explained by non-economic motives, such as religion, which can serve as a less costly external mechanism to alleviate agency costs compared to other economic motives.

This study contributes to the literature by exploring how capital structure and earnings management relate to a distinctive and unique Islamic context that remains largely unexamined. This context allows us to investigate this issue by examining how the Islamic environment, which is not driven by economic or legal reasons, affects managers’ choices of capital structure and earnings management. This study reveals how a strong religious setting can shape firms’ choices regarding capital structure and financial reporting practices.