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After the financial collapse, the Icelandic Parliament set up a Special Investigation Commission to explain the causes of the events. A working group on ethics evaluated the explanations of the commission from a moral perspective and placed its analyses in the wider social context. This chapter delineates the approach and the main findings of these investigations. The author argues that the main lessons to be learned are about the need to strengthen democratic structures and professional practices in business, politics and administration. The implications of this structural approach for assessing the responsibility for the collapse are discussed in the light of I.M. Young’s social connection model. While the parliamentary reports were well received, three events hindered Icelanders in learning the reports’ main lessons. In addition to a volcanic eruption immediately after the publication of the report, two major political debates led the reconstruction work astray. The first was about the case of the former prime minister and the second was the fierce Icesave dispute about whether Icelanders should share the financial burden with the citizens of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands who lost their savings in the Icesave accounts. This issue dominated Icelandic public discourse for three years and diverted political attention from the message of the parliamentary reports – namely, that the main explanatory factors for the financial collapse were weak governance and flawed practices within Iceland. As a consequence, the political sector has lagged behind other social sectors in efforts to learn lessons from the financial collapse.

During the banking crisis of October 2008, Iceland became the first developed country in decades to seek the assistance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Iceland’s IMF programme provided a measure of stability at a time of intense turbulence. The IMF’s credibility was helpful during this period of collapse not just of the banks but also of the public trust towards almost all Icelandic institutions. Importantly, the IMF implicitly supported Iceland’s policy of letting institutional creditors of the banks rather than Icelandic taxpayers bear the costs of their collapse; this provided credibility for the policy and limited repercussions. In a reversal of previous IMF policy, capital controls were imposed. The controls helped stabilise the exchange rate, and inflation subsided. The controls also helped recovery after the crisis by shielding the economy from international financial shocks. The direct fiscal cost of the Icelandic crisis was very high, but the considerable and painful fiscal tightening that was a part of the programme was needed to avoid a sovereign debt crisis. This helped in regaining trust from international markets. Mistakes were made in the design and implementation of the IMF programme, but overall, we judge that its contribution was positive. The programme provided one of the elements for restoring trust in Iceland when it was most needed, both domestically and internationally, during the depth of the crisis in 2009–2010.

This analysis attempts a comparative specification of certain aspects of the country studies contained in this volume. The point of departure is the banking crises of the early 1990s (deep in Finland, Norway and Sweden, mini-crisis in Denmark and absent in Iceland) and the contrast to Iceland's financial meltdown in 2007/2008 (no crisis in the three, a new mini-crisis in Denmark). Detailed process tracing of the Icelandic crisis is provided. The case account is then used to shed light on the different roles of neoliberalism, economics expert knowledge and populist right-wing party formation in the five Nordic political economies.

The enormous financial losses during the economic crash in Iceland led to widespread anxieties, coupled with a deep sense of shared national disaster and moral collapse (Bernburg, 2015; Ólafsson, 2014). The strong sense of betrayal indicates how economic processes are not only about economic prosperity, but are embedded also in wider societal discourses and a sense of national identity (Schwegler, 2009). We use perspectives from anthropology and cultural economics to ask how the lack of trust by the Icelandic population after the crash signals both a different way of visualising Iceland’s role within an increasingly global world and a changing sense of Icelanders as national subjects standing unified against foreigners. Iceland’s neo-liberalisation inserted the country into global institutions and processes with the faith that these processes would automatically be beneficial to Iceland. Furthermore, the sense of some kind of a unified Icelandic subject was manifested in the image of the ‘Business Viking’, which was seen as embodying the interest of the Icelandic nation as a whole. Following the economic crash, the betrayal of trust involved disrupting the idea of the ‘oneness’ of Iceland and thus, the sharp distinction between ‘us’ Icelanders and ‘those’ foreigners. In our discussion, we trace different ways of conceptualising this sense of Icelanders as a unified entity, asking what this notion means in terms of trust. Our research shows how the sense of ‘unified Icelanders’ was instrumental in creating the feeling of trust, and how it is possible to manipulate and appropriate that trust.

Following the collapse of the banking system in October 2008, the Icelandic authorities attempted to restore confidence in the country’s institutions, improve their functioning and gradually improve the country’s credit rating. The authorities took ownership of an International Monetary Fund-sponsored economic programme that managed to turn the macroeconomic development around when, following a trough in the summer of 2010, an economic expansion started that has continued ever since. They applied for membership in the European Union in order to show their commitment to be part of the international economic community and to have a lender of last resort in the European Central Bank in future crises. The causes of the collapse were investigated and many bankers were prosecuted. Finally, financial regulations were made stricter and the structures of the Central Bank and the supervisory authority were changed for the better. The net effect was to lower the credit default swap rate on the government’s debt, gain access to capital markets and make the Iceland story one of resurrection rather than only hubris and collapse.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an account of the financial crisis in Western Europe, primarily from a country‐level and banking sector perspective, from 2007 to the spring of 2009. It aims to detail measures enacted by governments and central banks to deal with impaired bank assets, recapitalize or otherwise resolve troubled banks, and inject liquidity into the banking system. It also aims to examine reform proposals aimed at creating a more secure and stable financial system.

The paper draws on factual material and analysis that is presented in central bank reports, other banking sector surveys and reports, media reports, and analysis by leading academics and practitioners sourced from published articles and books, working papers and blogs.

Recent firefighting measures to purchase impaired assets, recapitalize troubled banks, and inject liquidity have commanded widespread support, despite moral hazard concerns surrounding publicly funded bank bailouts. However, the roadmap to recovery remains uncertain. There is concern that significant volumes of impaired assets have been retained on many Western European bank balance sheets. Under the regulatory framework that is being shaped in response to the crisis, banks are expected to become leaner, more strongly capitalized and less highly leveraged, and to develop improved risk management practices.

This paper is written for a broad audience to provide a descriptive summary of the financial crisis in Western Europe, a survey of the debate concerning the implications for bank regulation and an extensive bibliography that will serve as a valuable resource for banking academics and practitioners.

The purpose of this paper is to report and comment on the High Court ruling on Icelandic bank's challenge to HM Treasury's use of emergency powers during 2008.

The paper outlines the facts surrounding the case and comments on the decision.

The High Court disagreed that the claimant's view of events accorded with the way the treasury in fact acted.

This appeal shows how two very differently motivated, yet equally well‐intentioned, regulatory regimes can come into conflict.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the extreme case of the Icelandic banking crisis in relation to critical governance issues at governmental, industry and civil society levels.

This is a case study of the Icelandic banking collapse in 2008.

The examination of governance failures within the Icelandic banking system reveals that government institutions need to find a balance between entrepreneurial growth, risk exposure and sustainable societal development. A euphoric attitude of laissez‐faire, where risk issues and issues of balanced development are largely ignored, creates challenges for sustainable banking. The findings suggest that achieving the necessary balance requires stressing governance issues on three levels; at the government level; at the industry level; and at the civil society level.

The paper illustrates why some of the corporate governance challenges facing sustainable banking should be addressed at multiple levels. Government should strive for realistic information and evaluation of societal risks; government should implement adequate regulatory frameworks; the finance industry itself should have effective self‐regulatory procedures and mechanisms; and, from a civil society point of view, the public at large should have realistic expectations and be adequately alerted as to the potential risks of governance failure.

The paper examines interactions between governance failures at different levels and has important implications for governance and policy makers, particularly those faced with re‐structuring national financial industries.