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1 – 10 of 48Shuwen Guo, Junwu Wang and Huaping Xiong
Construction projects have become increasingly long, complex and costly with waste and inefficiencies and often fail to achieve the desired results. Integrated project delivery…
Abstract
Purpose
Construction projects have become increasingly long, complex and costly with waste and inefficiencies and often fail to achieve the desired results. Integrated project delivery (IPD) is believed to change these problems. A reasonable and fair profit distribution mechanism is a critical factor for ensuring the success of the IPD projects. This study aims to investigate the strategies of all participants in the profit distribution of an IPD project with respect to the factor of the effort level.
Design/methodology/approach
This study describes the influence of owners and participants on profit distribution due to their respective efforts in the IPD project alliance. The influence of effort level on profit distribution is discussed based on the Holmstrom-Milgrom model of asymmetric information game theory and principal-agent theory, combined with incentive compatibility (IC) constraints and individual rationality (IR) constraints.
Findings
The results show that the optimal level of effort by each participant optimizes the profit distribution of an IPD project. At the same time, in the revenue incentive contract, the effort level of the participants is positively correlated with the profit distribution, proportional to their contribution coefficient and inversely proportional to the square of the cost of their creative activities in terms of effort. Each party of an IPD project can adopt a series of measures to improve their own effort level and choose the optimal level of effort based on the profit distribution, while satisfying their own utility maximization.
Originality/value
This study introduces the Holmstrom-Milgrom model in the principal-agent theory to explore the influence of the effort level on profit distribution in IPD projects. The quantitative model can contribute to establish a fair and efficient profit distribution scheme for the IPD projects.
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The literature on post-completion reviews (PCRs) either does not deal with the tying of PCRs to extrinsic rewards or provides scant theoretical reasoning or empirical analysis to…
Abstract
The literature on post-completion reviews (PCRs) either does not deal with the tying of PCRs to extrinsic rewards or provides scant theoretical reasoning or empirical analysis to back up its recommendations.
Based on research from psychology and empirical studies, the present chapter proposes that several effects of a PCR, which must be deemed rather dysfunctional, will increase when extrinsic rewards are linked to such a review. At the same time some possibly functional effects, however, are likely to remain constant. The propositions, therefore, call the usefulness of tying PCRs to rewards into question and call for further investigation.
Joshua Graff Zivin, Lisa B. Kahn and Matthew Neidell
In this chapter, we examine the impact of pay-for-performance incentives on learning-by-doing. We exploit personnel data on fruit pickers paid under two distinct compensation…
Abstract
In this chapter, we examine the impact of pay-for-performance incentives on learning-by-doing. We exploit personnel data on fruit pickers paid under two distinct compensation contracts: a standard piece rate plan and one with an extra one-time bonus tied to output. Under the latter, we observe bunching of performance just above the bonus threshold, suggesting workers distort their behavior in response to the discrete bonus. Such bunching behavior increases as workers gain experience. At the same time, the bonus contract induces considerable learning-by-doing for workers throughout the productivity distribution who presumably hope to one day hit the target, and these improvements significantly outweigh the losses to the firm from the bunching. In contrast, under the standard piece rate contract, we find minimal evidence of bunching and only small performance improvements at the bottom of the productivity distribution. Our results suggest that contract design can help foster learning on the job, underscoring the importance of dynamic considerations in principle-agent models.
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Jia Jia Chang, Zhi Jun Hu and Changxiu Liu
In this study, a dynamic contracting model is developed between a venture capitalist (VC) and an entrepreneur (EN) to explore the influence of asymmetric beliefs regarding…
Abstract
Purpose
In this study, a dynamic contracting model is developed between a venture capitalist (VC) and an entrepreneur (EN) to explore the influence of asymmetric beliefs regarding output-relevant parameters, agency conflicts and complementarity on the VC's posterior beliefs through the EN's unobservable effort choices to influence the optimal dynamic contract.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors construct the contracting model by incorporating the VC's effort, which is ignored in most studies. Using backward induction and a discrete-time approximation approach, the authors solve the continuous-time contract design problem, which evolves into a nonlinear ordinary differential equation (ODE).
Findings
The optimal equity share that the VC provides to the EN decreases over time. In accordance with the empirical evidence, the EN's optimistic beliefs regarding the project's profitability positively affect its equity share. However, the interactions between the optimal equity share, project risk and both partners' degrees of risk aversion are not monotonic. Moreover, the authors find that the optimal equity share increases with the degree of complementarity, which indicates that the EN is willing to cooperate with the VC. This study’s results also show that the optimal equity shares at each time are interdependent if the VC is risk-averse and independent if the VC is risk-neutral.
Research limitations/implications
In conclusion, the authors highlight two potential directions for future research. First, the authors only considered a single VC, whereas in practice, a risk project may be carried out by multiple VCs, and it is interesting to discuss how the degree of complementarity affects the number of VCs that ENs contract. Second, the authors may introduce jumps and consider more general multivariate stochastic volatility models for output dynamics and analyze the characteristics of the optimal contracts. Third, further research can deal with other forms of discretionary output functions concerning complementarity, such as Cobb–Douglas and constant elasticity of substitution (See Varian, 1992).
Social implications
The results of this study have several implications. First, it offers a novel approach to designing dynamic contracts that are specific and easy to operate. To improve the complicated venture investment situation and abate conflict between contractual parties, this study plays a good reference role. Second, the synergy effect proposed in this study provides a theoretical explanation for the executive compensation puzzle in economics, in which managers are often “rewarded for luck” (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Wu et al., 2018). This result indicates a realistic perspective on financing and establishing cooperative relationships, which enhances the efficiency of venture investment. Third, from an empirical standpoint, one can apply this framework to study research and development (R&D) problems.
Originality/value
First, the authors introduce asymmetric beliefs and Bayesian learning to study the dynamic contract design problem and discuss their effects on equity share. Second, the authors incorporate the VC's effort into the contracting problem, and analyze the synergistic effect of effort complementarity on the optimal dynamic contract.
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This paper aims to examine the roles of both aggregate and specific commission rates to control the sales force in relationship marketing with a customer portfolio.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to examine the roles of both aggregate and specific commission rates to control the sales force in relationship marketing with a customer portfolio.
Design/methodology/approach
Drawn on the concept of customer lifetime value and agency theory, the author calculated both specific and aggregate sales force commission rates in a relationship marketing perspective. Contrary to the prior researchers, the author assumes that, at any period, both the gross margins and retention rate of each customer are a stochastic function of the salesperson’s effort.
Findings
The results indicated that when there is symmetric information between a sales manager and salesperson, both aggregate and specific commissions can be used to monitor the sales force. Under asymmetric information, however, each type of commission rate can only be used under certain conditions. In addition, conditions in which the aggregate commission is equivalent to the specific commission for each customer were derived.
Research limitations/implications
Hypothetical data were used to explain the model. It would be more appropriate to use real data to see its managerial relevance.
Originality/value
In the author’s knowledge, this study is the first that specifically links scholastic customer’s retention and salesperson commission rate to monitor salesperson effort in relationship marketing. It is also the first that shows in which conditions aggregate and specific commission rates are equal for a salesperson’s customer portfolio management.
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Weiting Wang, Yi Liao and Jiacan Li
The purpose of this study to improve the efficiency of customer acquisition and retention through the design of salary information disclosure mechanism.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study to improve the efficiency of customer acquisition and retention through the design of salary information disclosure mechanism.
Design/methodology/approach
This study develops a stylized game-theoretic model of delegating customer acquisition and retention, focusing on how firms choose delegation and wage information disclosure strategy.
Findings
The results confirm the necessity for enterprises to disclose salary information. When sales agents are risk neutral, firms should choose multi-agent (MA) delegation and disclose their wages. However, when agents are risk averse, firms may disclose the wages of acquisition agents or both agents in MA delegation, depending on the uncertainty of the retention market.
Originality/value
This paper contributes to the literature on delegation of customer acquisition and retention and demonstrates that salary disclosure can be used as a supplement to the incentive mechanism.
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Domingo Verano‐Tacoronte and Santiago Melián‐González
The purpose of this research is to study the relationship between the HR control system and organizational results, examining the moderating effect of uncertainty and HR risk…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this research is to study the relationship between the HR control system and organizational results, examining the moderating effect of uncertainty and HR risk behavior.
Design/methodology/approach
The study analyzes the relationship between HR control systems and organizational results introducing two major moderating variables as, uncertainty and risk behavior. The data used for this study comes from questionnaire responses by sales and human resource managers of 108 Spanish firms.
Findings
The empirical results show that these moderating variables have an influence on the success of the control system, but it can be stated that the control system has an independent impact on the organizational and sales force performance.
Research limitations/implications
Small sample size and cross sectional study, and the use of subjective measures of company and HR performance are the main limitations of the work.
Practical implications
To make correct decisions about HR control systems, managers should assess their environment and the composition of the workforce. There is not a control system that is good for all situations.
Originality/value of paper
An analysis was made of an important non‐executive employee group, as the sales force is, and addressed the important issue of control and performance while the literature is focused on management control systems. The study does not limit the performance measures only to company variables, displaying customer satisfaction and human resource performance factors.
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S. Mahdi Hosseinian and David G. Carmichael
Target cost contracts are commonly used to share the monetary outcome of work or a project. However, discussion is ongoing, as to what constitutes optimal sharing. The purpose of…
Abstract
Purpose
Target cost contracts are commonly used to share the monetary outcome of work or a project. However, discussion is ongoing, as to what constitutes optimal sharing. The purpose of this paper is to examine optimal sharing and derives a result for defined risk assumptions on the owner (risk neutral) and contractor (risk-averse ranging to risk neutral).
Design/methodology/approach
The derivation is based on solving a constrained maximization problem using ideas from principal-agent theory. Practitioners were engaged in a designed exercise in order to validate the approach and propositions. The influence of the contractor's level of risk aversion, the cost uncertainty and the contractor's effort effectiveness are examined.
Findings
The paper shows that, at the optimum, the sharing ratio between contractor and owner needs to reduce and the fixed fee needs to increase when the contractor becomes more risk-averse, the level of the cost uncertainty increases, or the effectiveness of the contractor effort decreases.
Practical implications
The paper's findings provide practitioners with a useful benchmark for outcome sharing in target contracts.
Originality/value
Existing work on outcome sharing in target contracts is limited to being qualitative and anecdotal in nature. This paper extends existing knowledge by providing a quantitative treatment of optimal sharing.
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S. Mahdi Hosseinian and David G. Carmichael
The purpose of this paper is to address a shortfall in the literature dealing with optimal sharing arrangements. In construction projects, where the owner is concerned about…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to address a shortfall in the literature dealing with optimal sharing arrangements. In construction projects, where the owner is concerned about multiple project outcomes (cost, time, quality, […]), there exist no guidelines in the literature on what a sharing arrangement should be between the owner and the contractor. This paper gives that arrangement, under defined risk assumptions on the contractor (risk averse ranging to risk neutral) and the owner (risk neutral). The sharing aligns the contractor's interests with those of the owner.
Design/methodology/approach
The results are based on solving a constrained maximisation problem involving the expected utilities of both the owner and contractor. Construction practitioners were interviewed in a designed experiment to validate the results.
Findings
It is demonstrated that, at the optimum, the proportions of outcomes sharing to the contractor should be higher for outcomes with lower effort cost and a lower level of uncertainty, and by increasing the correlation between outcomes, the fixed component of the contractor’s fee should increase and the proportions to the contractor should decrease.
Research limitations/implications
The theoretical results assume that the contractor is risk-averse ranging to risk-neutral, and that the owner is risk-neutral. The theory is supported through conducting an empirical study based on interviewing a sample of practitioners working for medium-sized contractors, and hence the support is limited to similar situations, until further data are assembled.
Practical implications
By providing a broader understanding of sharing arrangements within contracts, a contribution is made to the current practice of contracts management. The results may be used in the design of contracts, or as benchmarks, by which contracts designed differently, may be compared.
Originality/value
The results address a shortfall in the literature and are an original solution to establishing an optimal multiple-outcome sharing arrangement.
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Marco A. Barrenechea-Méndez, Pedro Ortín-Ángel and Eduardo C. Rodes-Mayor
This chapter provides further evidence on the role of uncertainty and job complexity in pay-for-performance and autonomy decisions. It proposes an encompassing econometric…
Abstract
This chapter provides further evidence on the role of uncertainty and job complexity in pay-for-performance and autonomy decisions. It proposes an encompassing econometric approach in order to explain the differences in previous outcomes that may be due to differing methodological approaches. The main stylized fact is that autonomy and pay-for-performance are positively associated. Additionally, autonomy is positively related to job complexity and uncertainty suggesting that the relationship between these latter variables and pay-for-performance could be through autonomy. After controlling for autonomy, the positive relationship between pay-for-performance and job complexity disappears, while that between pay-for-performance and uncertainty becomes more negative.
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