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This chapter investigates how regional start-up rates in the knowledge-intensive services and high-tech industries are influenced by knowledge spillovers from both universities and firm-based R&D activities. Integrating insights from economic geography and organizational ecology into the literature on entrepreneurship, we develop a theoretical framework which captures how both supply- and demand-side factors mold the regional bedrock for start-ups in knowledge-intensive industries. Using multilevel data of all knowledge-intensive start-ups across 286 Swedish municipalities between 1994 and 2002 we demonstrate how characteristics of the economic and political milieu within each region influence the ratio of firm births. We find that knowledge spillovers from universities and firm-based R&D strongly affect the start-up rates for both high-tech firms and knowledge-intensive services firms. Further, the start-up rate of knowledge-intensive service firms is tied more strongly to the supply of university educated individuals and the political regulatory regime within the municipality than start-ups in high-tech industries. This suggests that knowledge-intensive service-start-ups are more susceptible to both demand-side and supply-side context than is the case for high-tech start-ups in general. Our study contributes to the growing stream of research that explains entrepreneurial activity as shaped by contextual factors, most notably academic institutions, such as universities that contribute to knowledge-intensive start-ups.

The global strategies of high-tech start-ups fall into two types. One is characteristic of knowledge-based firms; the other is characteristic of knowledge-intensive firms. We present two propositions related to timing of globalization and resource acquisition for each type and examine four case studies from the region around Cambridge University in the United Kingdom.

Knowledge-based start-ups target global markets from the very beginning, aiming at rapid market penetration. From the start they are highly globalized in acquiring core technology and financial and human resources.

In contrast, knowledge-intensive start-ups start in local markets and initially restrict acquisition of core technology and financial and human resources to those markets. Only at a later stage, when the local business is solidly established, do they gradually expand their businesses to global markets.

The founder of paperbackswap.com, Bobby Swarthout, developed the idea for his venture while he was a college student. As a student on a limited budget, he had become tired of paying high prices for textbooks. So he developed and launched an online textbook swapping service. Along with a small group of students, he managed to assemble a group of 12 colleges and universities across the United States to participate in textbook swapping. However, after a few months, very few students had used the site. By listening to the potential customers who chose not to participate, Bobby found out that there were too many easy substitutes for the swapping service (e.g. bookstore returns, half.com, efollett, etc.). These alternatives offered either greater convenience or cash in return for used books (especially appealing to students who did not pay for their books themselves), or other appealing features. However, Mr. Swarthout believed in his concept and also listened to the ‘voice-of-the-consumer’ (VOC) and moved his business idea into different consumer/product space: that of paperback books. Along with a few lead users attracted to his original idea, he refined the original idea, gathered resources (an angel who invested in the business) and added technological capabilities. One year later he launched paperbackswap.com. From inception, the firm embraced the VOC as the key tool in driving product development and improvement efforts. For paperbackswap.com listening to the VOC has become part of a closed-loop system where inputs from consumers are analysed and product improvements developed in response and where the loop is closed by listening to how consumers respond to product changes.

In recent years, decision-making regarding business growth has attracted the attention of many researchers. Also, considering the importance of scale in startups for their survival and the development of economies, investigating the scalability of startups in emerging markets that are booming, can be useful. Scaling for international business has taken on a new meaning: they must be leaders in both emerging as well as advanced markets; they must be responsive to customers in both departments, which require tremendous innovation and agility; they have to build the competency needed in designing, developing, and marketing the opposite for advanced world markets; and they need to demonstrate rapid decision-making, innovation, and opportunism in delivery to the cost-sensitive underdeveloped markets. As a result, decision-making about the scale of start-ups at the international level plays an important role. The internationalisation of start-up activities is an extremely important and attractive topic among researchers, entrepreneurs, and practitioners. But there is very little research and also projects on the internationalisation of start-up venture activities, particularly after the gain of scaling and exponential growth.

In Chapter 2, providing a contextual introduction to the issue of university spin-offs, Hogan and Quan Zhou seek to construct a better definition of what the term ‘spin-off’ should consist. After a wide-ranging review of previous attempts to define and classify aspects of the spin-off process, the authors offer their own ‘three-point’ checklist which seeks to clarify and define the ‘spin-off’ process. In conclusion, their paper seeks to assess the advantages and drawbacks of the system they recommend. This initial paper in this section is welcome since it illustrates that not only do academics differ over how to assist the ‘spin-off’ process, but they also often do not agree on how this process is to be defined.

Beyond the widely acknowledged importance of new business, the role of young exporting high-tech business in Israel and many other small economies is seen as vital for economic growth. Israel is small and geographically isolated from the main markets, suffers from security difficulties, but fosters a culture, which promotes knowledge rich new technologies. Thus, new ventures with leading edge technologies and prospects of high growth and profitability offer a means to achieve the national goal of economical independence. Internationally however, the high-technology sector has recently suffered badly from the bursting of the dot.com bubble and the crash of the Nasdaq.

This chapter examines the processes of entrepreneurial network and capital formation at a university-based incubator. Incubators could help overcome start-up firms to gain access to entrepreneurial networks and credibility with external stakeholders, by supporting the entrepreneurial processes including the acquisition of variety of capitals and resources. However, the actual evidence on the effectiveness of incubators as a policy tool for business support has been rather contested. This chapter makes a contribution to the entrepreneurship literature by addressing the underlying processes of incubation as a key factor critical to achieve accelerated firm growth at the university-based technology incubator. Drawing on interviews and survey of start-up firms at a university-based incubator, co-evolution of business models with capital mobilisation and re-combination of resources is illustrated. The chapter concludes by arguing that more detailed processes and trajectories of ‘soft starter’ business model would contribute to the understanding and development of policy support for entrepreneurial processes.

The existence of adequate financial capital at start-up as well as during the lifetime of a firm is considered to be vital not only for its survival but also for its effective trading and growth, as it can act as a buffer against unforeseen difficulties (Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994; Chandler & Hanks, 1998; Venkataraman & Van de Ven, 1998; Cassar, 2004). Inadequate or inappropriate capital structure is often the most common reason for a large proportion of small business failures (Chaganti, DeCarolis, & Deeds, 1995).

The high-growth potential has long been the dominant view on RBSUs among researchers and policy makers. Several researchers indicate that RBSUs, once they have reached a certain critical mass, exhibit faster average employment growth rates than non-high-tech starters (Mustar, 1995; Licht & Nerlinger, 1998; Storey & Tether, 1998; Delapierre, Madeuf, & Savoy, 1998; Autio & Parhankangas, 1998). However, in recent years several researchers showed that the idea of fast growth does not hold for most RBSUs. Rickne and Jacobsson (1999) found that the vast majority of new technology-based firms (NTBFs) remained very small. Also Autio and Yli-Renko (1998) reported that most NTBFs in Finland did not grow at all. Similar findings were reported in France (Mustar, 1997), Italy (Chiesa & Piccaluga, 2000) and in Cambridge, UK (Segal Quince Wicksteed, 2000). Delappiere et al. (1998) further argue that high-tech firms that concentrate on R&D and work primarily as research subcontractors for large groups show little employment growth. In contrast, firms that deal with turning technology into new uses tend to grow and create employment as they develop their manufacturing and marketing capabilities. Clearly, there is still much discussion and uncertainty regarding the growth potential of RBSUs.

Over many years people have tried to understand the entrepreneurial process (e.g., Hayek, 1945; Kirzner, 1973; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Schumpeter, 1934). Van der Veen and Wakkee (2004) reviewed the literature and introduced the role of the entrepreneur and the environment in this process. An environment can have two roles: as a stimulus for opportunity (Burt, 1992; Gaglio, 1997; Shane, 2000; Vesper, 1989), and as a resource for pursuing that opportunity (Brush, Greene, & Hart, 2001). The view emerging from the research by Shane and Venkataraman (2000) and Van der Veen and Wakkee (2004), is that the entrepreneurial process is not merely a series of decisions, but more a sequence of events the entrepreneur goes through as a result of the environment and previous actions taken.