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When entrepreneurs create new ventures, they struggle with making consequential decisions under severe restrictions such as tight deadlines, limited resources, and lack of information. Making challenging decisions inherently requires creativity as entrepreneurs improvise and work around the limitations they face. Under these conditions, entrepreneurs resort to their heuristics and biases instead of rational decision models. Entrepreneurs employ – sometimes for better and sometimes for worse – a myriad of rule-setting heuristics and experience-based biases to navigate the difficult path between novelty and utility. In this chapter, the authors answer Shepherd, Williams, and Patzelt’s (2015) call for research into how entrepreneurs leverage heuristics and biases in decision-making and the benefits they gain as a result. The authors explore how entrepreneurs introduce heuristics and biases at different stages of their decision-making process using a qualitative study of 21 new ventures. The results attest to entrepreneurs’ ingenuity and creativity in managing complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty.

This chapter enters the debate of knowing if the financial regulations should be overhauled in the continuity of behavioural finance developments. The lack of precision in the behavioural finance conclusions could lead to misleading new financial regulations adoption. Furthermore, through an analysis of the literature, we show that behavioural finance hypothesis building converges to the neoclassical one's, which contradicts the idea to overhaul financial regulations. We also highlight the fact that universal heuristics and biases contribute to the financial regulations revision proposal. Finally, we analyse some of the propositions put forward by advocates of behavioural finance and the limits thereof.

Introduction – Markowitz (1952) argues that individuals act rationally in their financial decisions. In contrast, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) claim that the psychological characteristics of people significantly affect financial decisions. In making these decisions, factors such as age, gender, and educational status may have an impact.

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to determine whether financial literacy has an impact on individuals’ cognitive biases related to financial investments.

Methodology – A sample of 444 individuals were surveyed.

Findings – In the results of study (1) it was determined that financial literacy leads to differences in cognitive biases; and (2) cognitive biases of individuals who do not receive finance education are different from individuals who receive finance education and professionals in the business world. The findings indicate that the increase in the level of financial literacy of individuals will reduce the cognitive biases and heuristics, and therefore will have a positive effect on the investor behavior in financial markets.

Evidence suggests habitual entrepreneurs (i.e. those with prior business ownership experience) are a widespread phenomenon. Appreciation of the existence of multiple entrepreneurial acts gives rise to the need to examine differences between habitual and novice entrepreneurs (i.e. those with no prior business experience as a founder, inheritor or purchaser of a business). This paper synthesizes human capital and cognitive perspectives to highlight behavioral differences between habitual and novice entrepreneurs. Issues relating to opportunity identification and information search, opportunity exploitation and learning are discussed. Avenues for future research are highlighted.

Following Philip Selznick’s lead in using pragmatist social science to understand issues of public concern we conducted a study of failed innovation in the commercial construction industry (CCI). We find that social heuristics – collectively constructed and maintained interpretive decision-making frames – significantly shape economic and non-economic decision-making practices. Social heuristics are the outcome of industry-based “institutionalization processes” and are widely held and commonly relied on in CCI to reduce uncertainty endemic to decision-making; they provide actors with both a priori and ex post facto justifications for economic decisions that appear socially rational to industry co-participants. In the CCI – a project-centered production network – social heuristics as shared institutions sustain network-based social order but in so doing discourage novel technologies and impede innovation. Social heuristics are actor-level constructs that reflect macro-level institutional arrangements and networked production relations. The concept of social heuristics offers the promise of developing a genuinely social theory of individual economic choice and action that is historically informed, contextually situated, and neither psychologically nor structurally reductionist.

It has long been recognised that humans draw from a large pool of processing aids to help manage the everyday challenges of life. It is not uncommon to observe individuals adopting simplifying strategies when faced with ever increasing amounts of information to process, and especially for decisions where the chosen outcome will have a very marginal impact on their well-being. The transactions costs associated with processing all new information often exceed the benefits from such a comprehensive review. The accumulating life experiences of individuals are also often brought to bear as reference points to assist in selectively evaluating information placed in front of them. These features of human processing and cognition are not new to the broad literature on judgment and decision-making, where heuristics are offered up as deliberative analytic procedures intentionally designed to simplify choice. What is surprising is the limited recognition of heuristics that individuals use to process the attributes in stated choice experiments. In this paper we present a case for a utility-based framework within which some appealing processing strategies are embedded (without the aid of supplementary self-stated intentions), as well as models conditioned on self-stated intentions represented as single items of process advice, and illustrate the implications on willingness to pay for travel time savings of embedding each heuristic in the choice process. Given the controversy surrounding the reliability of self-stated intentions, we introduce a framework in which mixtures of process advice embedded within a belief function might be used in future empirical studies to condition choice, as a way of increasingly judging the strength of the evidence.

The concept of risk is often approached as if it is self-defining. Yet placing an event or activity in the category of “risk” is a categorization with consequences. Framing normatively complex problems like immigration, terrorism, or monetary crisis as risks that require regulating suggests that certain cognitive tools are best suited for analyzing them. It suggests that the problems are measurable or quantifiable, that they lend themselves to utilitarian calculus, and that they have ascertainably correct solutions that require no value judgments. This article employs emotion theory to illustrate the difficulties with approaching normatively complex areas of governmental policy through the framework of risk regulation. It argues that interdisciplinary inquiry into the role of emotion in human behavior sheds light on how risks are assessed, prioritized, and ameliorated, on how the category of risk is constructed, and on how that categorization affects the cognitive tools and approaches we bring to normatively complex problems. The article begins with a brief discussion of behavioral law and economics, which styles itself a corrective to law and economics, but which replicates its fatal flaw: its unrealistic view of human behavior. Next it turns to two more specific problems with the standard notion of risk formulation. First, the standard notion reads out the essential role of emotion in deliberation about risk regulation and overvalues top-down expert knowledge. Second, it reads out the heuristics that erase patterns and maintain the status quo. Finally, the article will focus on two illustrative case studies, the Chicago heat wave of 1995, and Hurricane Katrina.