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Article
Publication date: 25 September 2009

Maria Rosa Borges

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the stock price adjustment after a dividend distribution, allowing for different types of investors and market imperfections…

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Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the stock price adjustment after a dividend distribution, allowing for different types of investors and market imperfections, including taxes and transaction costs.

Design/methodology/approach

An arbitrage model is developed to determine the possible equilibria for the stock price adjustment, after a dividend distribution. The approach is theoretical, providing general results.

Findings

The model shows that, in the presence of different types of investors, a unique equilibrium only exists in the absence of transaction costs. The allowance for market imperfections, such as taxes and transactions costs, implies that there is not a unique equilibrium for the level of stock price adjustment following a dividend distribution event, but rather there is much possible equilibrium. It is showed that the observation of abnormal trading volume around the dividend event may give us some insights on the identification of which investors are present in the market.

Practical implications

On future studies of the stock price adjustment after dividend distributions, it should be taken into account that there is no unique equilibrium.

Originality/value

The main contribution of this paper is to show that the existence of taxes and transaction costs precludes the determination of a unique equilibrium point for the stock price adjustment after a dividend distribution.

Details

Journal of Economic Studies, vol. 36 no. 5
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0144-3585

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Article
Publication date: 8 May 2017

Kyung Soon Kim, Jinwoo Park and Yun W. Park

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether there is any difference across individual investors, domestic and foreign institutional investors in trading volume…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether there is any difference across individual investors, domestic and foreign institutional investors in trading volume responses to analyst reports. The authors also examine the determinants of trading volume responses using firm as well as forecast characteristics.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors use trading data from the Korean equity market. The authors divide investors into three classes of investors; namely, individual investors, domestic institutional investors, and foreign institutional investors. The authors then examine whether the trading responses to analyst reports vary across investor types, and how firm characteristics and characteristics of analyst reports influence the trading activities on the release dates across investor types.

Findings

Individual investors are the most responsive investor group, being responsive to analyst reports on small, neglected firms with large inside ownership as well as to analyst reports with optimistic forecasts. Domestic institutional investors are responsive to reports on neglected firms with high return volatility while foreign institutional investors show least responses.

Originality/value

There are few studies that investigate whether the trading responses to analyst reports vary across investor types and how firm characteristics and characteristics of analyst reports influence the trading activities on the release dates across investor types. Taking advantage of the trading volume data for the three main investor types in the Korean stock market, the authors study the trading volume responses for each investor type and make comparisons across investor types.

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. 43 no. 5
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

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Book part
Publication date: 3 May 2016

Benjamin A. T. Graham, Noel P. Johnston and Allison F. Kingsley

Political risk is a complex phenomenon. This complexity has incentivized scholars to take a piecemeal approach to understanding it. Nearly all scholarship has targeted a…

Abstract

Political risk is a complex phenomenon. This complexity has incentivized scholars to take a piecemeal approach to understanding it. Nearly all scholarship has targeted a single type of political risk (expropriation) and, within this risk, a single type of firm (MNCs) and a single type of strategic mechanism through which that risk may be mitigated (entry mode). Yet “political risk” is actually a collection of multiple distinct risks that affect the full spectrum of foreign firms, and these firms vary widely in their capabilities for resisting and evading these risks. We offer a unified theoretical model that can simultaneously analyze: the three main types of political risk (war, expropriation, and transfer restrictions); the universe of private foreign investors (direct investors, portfolio equity investors, portfolio debt investors, and commercial banks); heterogeneity in government constraints; and the three most relevant strategic capabilities (information, exit, and resistance). We leverage the variance among foreign investors to identify effective firm strategies to manage political risk. By employing a simultaneous and unified model of political risk, we also find counterintuitive insights on the way governments trade off between risks and how investors use other investors as risk shields.

Details

Strategy Beyond Markets
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78635-019-0

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Book part
Publication date: 16 September 2017

Ramana Nanda and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf

Past work has shown that failure tolerance by principals has the potential to stimulate innovation, but has not examined how this affects which projects principals will…

Abstract

Past work has shown that failure tolerance by principals has the potential to stimulate innovation, but has not examined how this affects which projects principals will start. We demonstrate that failure tolerance has an equilibrium price – in terms of an investor’s required share of equity – that increases in the level of radical innovation. Financiers with investment strategies that tolerate early failure will endogenously choose to fund less radical innovations, while the most radical innovations (for whom the price of failure tolerance is too high) can only be started by investors who are not failure tolerant. Since policies to stimulate innovation must often be set before specific investments in innovative projects are made, this creates a trade-off between a policy that encourages experimentation ex post and the one that funds experimental projects ex ante. In equilibrium, it is possible that all competing financiers choose to offer failure tolerant contracts to attract entrepreneurs, leaving no capital to fund the most radical, experimental projects in the economy. The impact of different innovation policies can help to explain who finances radical innovations, and when and where radical innovation occurs.

Details

Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Platforms
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78743-080-8

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Article
Publication date: 1 March 2003

Timothy D. Cairney

This paper examines the effect of institutional investors on the trading volume reaction to management forecasts of annual earnings. Based on a sample of forecasting firms…

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of institutional investors on the trading volume reaction to management forecasts of annual earnings. Based on a sample of forecasting firms between 1990 and 1992, institutional investors are examined as heterogeneous types, rather than as a single group as done in prior research. The findings contribute to the growing literature on institutional investor types in two ways: (1) institutional categories differ in their trading patterns, and (2) if the categories are classified into active and inactive types, then greater trading by active institution‐types signals greater investor‐level information asymmetries and greater trading by inactive institution‐types signals lower investor‐level information asymmetries. Overall, the results suggest that increased firm voluntary disclosures, as encouraged by the SEC and the AICPA, may be differentially informative to different types of investors.

Details

Review of Accounting and Finance, vol. 2 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1475-7702

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Article
Publication date: 17 July 2019

Rupali Misra, Sumita Srivastava and Devinder Kumar Banwet

In spite of an intuitive appeal regarding association between personality and investment efficacy, there is a dearth of empirical support for the effects of theoretically…

Abstract

Purpose

In spite of an intuitive appeal regarding association between personality and investment efficacy, there is a dearth of empirical support for the effects of theoretically meaningful personality difference on intuitive and analytical ability, which further explains investment efficacy. The current study aims to explore this link using multi-method analysis.

Design/methodology/approach

In Study 1, the experimental protocol captures intuitive responses of naïve investors in four different investment horizons and maps the findings with personality constituents of the Big Five (Costa and McCrae, 1992), while in Study 2, survey of active investors seeks their preference for intuition or deliberation (PID, Betsch, 2004) in decision-making, along with measuring their investment efficacy and analysing the results on the basis their personality Type A vs Type B.

Findings

Subjects with lower extraversion tend to have superior forecasting accuracy for gold and dollar, while those with lower neuroticism have tendency of superior forecasting for dollar and Nifty index in mid-term investment. Further, in Study 2, the results indicate superior intuitive ability, analytical ability and investment efficacy of Type B investors.

Originality/value

The study is unique in two ways. One, it explores the role of personality in ambidextrous decision-making framework, where rationality and intuition iteratively operate in a parallel, yet synchronous, fashion. Two, the study attempts to examine the role of personality in the unique socio-cultural context of an emerging economy such as India with Eastern religious traditions, having strong implications on the personal characteristics of the decision agents.

Details

Qualitative Research in Financial Markets, vol. 12 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1755-4179

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Article
Publication date: 7 December 2015

Chih-Hsiang Chang, Hsu-Huei Huang, Ying-Chih Chang and Tsai-Yin Lin

– The purpose of this paper is to investigate how stock characteristics influence investor trading behavior and psychological pitfalls.

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1569

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how stock characteristics influence investor trading behavior and psychological pitfalls.

Design/methodology/approach

This study employs the methods of Solt and Statman (1989) and Kumar (2009) to examine investor trading activities.

Findings

Good companies do not usually have good stocks, while lottery-type stocks show better price performance than other stocks. Due to the representativeness and affect heuristics, the stocks of good companies are frequently transacted, while the low-priced stocks are infrequently transacted. Moreover, investors may display the gambler’s fallacy in the trade of stocks of good companies and the overconfidence and self-attribution bias in the trade of lottery-type stocks.

Research limitations/implications

Investors trading lottery-type stocks demonstrate greater maturity than those that trade stocks of good companies; however, psychological pitfalls still dominate investor trading behavior.

Practical implications

The representativeness heuristic of “stocks of good companies are good stocks” results in the inclusion of stocks of good companies in a portfolio and poorer price performance, whereas the inclusion of lottery-type stocks in a portfolio brings higher returns within a short period of time.

Originality/value

Compared to earlier studies that focussed on the price performance of stocks of good companies and investor trading behavior in relation to lottery-type stocks, this study aims to investigate the influence of stock characteristics on price performance, trading activities, and psychological pitfalls.

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. 41 no. 12
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

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Article
Publication date: 1 January 2013

Lisa M. Victoravich, Pisun Xu and Huiqi Gan

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between institutional investor ownership and the compensation of executives at US banks during the financial crisis period.

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2083

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between institutional investor ownership and the compensation of executives at US banks during the financial crisis period.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper uses a linear regression model to examine the association between institutional ownership and the level of executive compensation at US banks.

Findings

Institutional investors influence executive compensation at banks with the impact being most pronounced for the CEO. Ownership by the top five investors is associated with greater total compensation. Active investors have the strongest impact on executive compensation as evidenced by a positive association between active ownership and both equity compensation and total compensation. As well, active ownership is negatively associated with bonus compensation. The paper also finds that passive and grey investors influence compensation but to a less significant extent than active investors.

Research limitations/implications

The results suggest that the monitoring role of active and passive institutional investors is different in the banking industry. As well, institutional investors were likely a driving factor in shaping the compensation packages of the top executive team during the financial crisis period.

Practical implications

Stakeholders at banks should be aware that not all types of institutional investors act as effective monitors over issues such as controlling the amount of executive compensation paid to the highest paid executive, the CEO. Prospective investors should consider the type of institutional investor that owns large blocks of equity when making an investment decision. Namely, the interests of existing institutional investors may differ from their own interests.

Originality/value

This paper provides a new perspective on the monitoring roles played by different types of institutional investors. Furthermore, it provides a more comprehensive analysis by investigating the role of institutional investors in shaping the compensation packages of CEOs and other top executives including chief financial officers (CFOs) who play a vital role in risk management at banks.

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Article
Publication date: 25 July 2019

Chwee Ming Tee

The purpose of this paper is to examine the investment preference of various types of institutional investors in Malaysia, and its influence on firm valuation, operating…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine the investment preference of various types of institutional investors in Malaysia, and its influence on firm valuation, operating performance and capital expenditure.

Design/methodology/approach

This study employs ordinary least squares model to examine: investment preference according to different types of institutional investors; the association between various types of institutional investors and firm valuation; the association between various types of institutional investors and firm performance; and the association between various types of institutional investors and capital expenditure.

Findings

The result shows that different types of institutional investors exhibit different investment preference. From the domiciles perspective, local institutional investors (LII) are found to be associated with higher Tobin’s Q, ROA and net profit margin. When viewed from business relationship perspective, “pressure-resistant” institutional investors (PRII) are positively associated with Tobin’s Q, ROA and net profit margin. Both LII and PRII are also associated with higher capital expenditure.

Originality/value

This study reveals the investment preferences of various types of institutional investors in an emerging market economy. The results show that institutional monitoring is associated with higher firm valuation, higher firm performance and higher capital expenditure. However, the effect is largely driven by local and PRII, particularly government-controlled institutional funds. These evidence suggest that different firm outcomes between emerging and advanced economy can be explained by variation in institutional setting.

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Article
Publication date: 22 September 2020

Patrick Velte and Jörn Obermann

This paper aims to analyse whether and how different types of institutional investors influence shareholder proposal initiations, say-on-pay (SOP) votes and management…

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to analyse whether and how different types of institutional investors influence shareholder proposal initiations, say-on-pay (SOP) votes and management compensation from a sustainability perspective.

Design/methodology/approach

Based on the principal-agent theory, the authors conduct a structured literature review and evaluate 40 empirical-quantitative studies on that topic.

Findings

The traditional assumption of homogeneity within institutional investors, which is in line with the principal–agent theory, has to be questioned. Only special types of investors (e.g. with long-term and non-financial orientations and active institutions) run an intensive monitoring strategy, and thus initiate shareholder proposals, discipline managers by higher SOP dissents and prevent excessive management compensation.

Research limitations/implications

A detailed analysis of institutional investor types is needed in future empirical analyses. In view of the current debate on climate change policy, future research could analyse in more detail the impact of institutional investor types on proxy voting, SOP and (sustainable) management compensation.

Practical implications

With regard to the increased shareholder activism and regulations on SOP and management compensation since the 2007/2008 financial crisis, firms should be aware of the monitoring role of institutional investors and should analyse their specific ownership nature (time- and content-driven and as well as range of activity).

Originality/value

To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first literature review with a clear focus on institutional investor range and nature, shareholder proposal initiation, SOP and management compensation (reporting) from a sustainability viewpoint. The authors explain the main variables that have been included in research, stress the limitations of this work and offer useful recommendations for future research studies.

Details

Journal of Global Responsibility, vol. 12 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 2041-2568

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