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Policy makers are applying market-inspired competition and financial incentives to drive efficiency in healthcare. However, a lack of knowledge exists about the process whereby incentives are filtered through organizations to influence staff motivation, and the key role of managers is often overlooked. The purpose of this paper is to explore the strategies managers use as intermediaries between financial incentives and the individual motivation of staff. The authors use empirical data from a local case in Swedish specialized care.

The authors conducted an exploratory qualitative case study of a patient-choice reform, including financial incentives, in specialized orthopedics in Sweden. In total, 17 interviews were conducted with professionals in managerial positions, representing six healthcare providers. A hypo-deductive, thematic approach was used to analyze the data.

The results show that managers applied alignment strategies to make the incentive model motivating for staff. The managers’ strategies are characterized by attempts to align external rewards with professional values based on their contextual and practical knowledge. Managers occasionally overruled the financial logic of the model to safeguard patient needs and expressed an interest in having a closer dialogue with policy makers about improvements.

Externally imposed incentives do not automatically motivate healthcare staff. Managers in healthcare play key roles as intermediaries by aligning external rewards with professional values. Managers’ multiple perspectives on healthcare practices and professional culture can also be utilized to improve policy and as a source of knowledge in partnership with policy makers.

A qualitative study can help in understanding the unpolluted perspectives of key stakeholders involved in the vaccination practices and can explore vital factors that could influence vaccination-related behaviors and their utilization. This study aims to document the perceptions of caretakers, community members and healthcare service providers related to childhood vaccination practices in slums under the national immunization program (NIP) of India.

This was a qualitative community-based cross-sectional study. Focus group discussions with caretakers, community members and healthcare service providers were used to build a holistic, detailed description and analysis of the factors associated with childhood vaccination practices within its real-world context.

Lack of awareness, fear of adverse events following immunization, inappropriate timing of vaccination sessions, loss of daily earnings, migration, lack of good behavior of health staffs, shortage of logistics and vaccines, limited resources and infrastructures and high expectations of beneficiaries were some of the vital barriers impacting vaccination practices in slums.

Though this study provides significant good information on the indicators that can be considered to improve the vaccination practices in any slum settings, it has is also a limitations too due to its setting. Therefore, one needs to be cautious while generalizing these results to other settings like rural. In addition, Though we believe that these strategies could be useful in any setting, it is also important to tailor these observations them as per the need of the society and the population. Also, this is a self-reported qualitative study and therefore the perspectives reported in this study need to be taken with caution. Further, low vaccination, poor awareness, compromised healthcare services, high expectations could be considered as a stigma/fear among the responders and therefore there is always a chance of underreporting. Thus, it would be important in future to conduct a study involving a broader group of people in society and to establish factors associated with the vaccination coverage. that can help in improvement of vaccination.

Initiatives such as regular interactions at different levels, effective communication including reminders, behavior interventions, the continued supply of vaccines and logistics, additional resources for the vaccination program, incentives and recognition, extended sessions and people-friendly healthcare delivery system could be helpful to strengthen the routine vaccination practices in slums.

This study aimed to analyze the role of community health workers (CHWs) called accredited social health activists (ASHAs) in improving maternal health outcomes in the rural community of Punjab, India. The study also examined the expectations of these workers from the community and identified the problems faced by them in carrying out their roles.

Using multistage sampling, a total of 28 villages were selected from seven districts of Punjab, and from these selected villages, a total of 57 ASHAs working as the interface between the rural community and the public health system and 420 women who had delivered a baby were interviewed.

Desire to earn money was the most prominent reason for joining the community work program, but ASHAs felt overburdened and underpaid compared to their work commitments. Not only was the incentive paid to these workers was insufficient and irregular but they also suffered at the hands of medical staff at public hospitals.

While exploring the problems experienced by the CHWs, this study recommends opting for a mix of monetary and nonmonetary incentives for acknowledging the work of CHWs. The study is the first of its kind for the state of Punjab battling with a worsening maternal mortality rate (MMR).

There is considerable heterogeneity between primary care systems that have evolved in individual national cultural environments. Models of Child Health Appraised (MOCHA) studied how the transfer of models or their individual components can be achieved across nations, using examples of combinations of settings, functions, target groups and tracer conditions. There are many factors that determine the feasibility of successful transfer of these from one setting to another, which must be recognised and taken into account. These include the environment of the care system, national policy-making and contextual means of directing population behaviour – in the form of penalties and incentives, which cannot be assessed or expected to work by means of rational actions alone. MOCHA developed a list of criteria to assess transferability, summarised in a population characteristics, intervention content, environment and transfer (PIET-T) process. To explore the process and means of transferability, we obtained consensus statements from the researchers on optimum model scenarios and conducted a survey of stakeholders, professionals and users of children’s primary care services that involved three specific health topics: vaccination coverage in infants, monitoring of a chronic or complex condition and early recognition of mental health problems. The results give insight into features of transferability – such as the availability and the use of guidelines and formal procedures; the barriers and facilitators of implementation and similarities and differences between model practices and the existing model of child primary care in the country. We found that successful transfer of an optimal model is impossible without tailoring the model to a specific country setting. It is vital to be aware of the sensitivity of the population and environmental characteristics of a country before starting to change the system of primary care.

Attempts to transform health systems have in many countries involved starting to pay healthcare providers through a DRG system, but that has involved managerial workarounds. Managerial workarounds have seldom been analysed. This paper does so by extending and modifying existing knowledge of the causes and character of clinical and IT workarounds, to produce a conceptualisation of the managerial workaround. It further develops and revises this conceptualisation by comparing the practical management, at both provider and purchaser levels, of hospital DRG payment systems in England, Germany and Italy.

We make a qualitative test of our initial assumptions about the antecedents, character and consequences of managerial workarounds by comparing them with a systematic comparison of case studies of the DRG hospital payment systems in England, Germany and Italy. The data collection through key informant interviews (N = 154), analysis of policy documents (N = 111) and an action learning set, began in 2010–12, with additional data collection from key informants and administrative documents continuing in 2018–19 to supplement and update our findings.

Managers in all three countries developed very similar workarounds to contain healthcare costs to payers. To weaken DRG incentives to increase hospital activity, managers agreed to lower DRG payments for episodes of care above an agreed case-load ‘ceiling' and reduced payments by less than the full DRG amounts when activity fell below an agreed ‘floor' volume.

Empirically this study is limited to three OECD health systems, but since our findings come from both Bismarckian (social-insurance) and Beveridge (tax-financed) systems, they are likely to be more widely applicable. In many countries, DRGs coexist with non-DRG or pre-DRG systems, so these findings may also reflect a specific, perhaps transient, stage in DRG-system development. Probably there are also other kinds of managerial workaround, yet to be researched. Doing so would doubtlessly refine and nuance the conceptualisation of the ‘managerial workaround’ still further.

In the case of DRGs, the managerial workarounds were instances of ‘constructive deviance' which enabled payers to reduce the adverse financial consequences, for them, arising from DRG incentives. The understanding of apparent failures or part-failures to transform a health system can be made more nuanced, balanced and diagnostic by using the concept of the ‘managerial workaround'.

Managerial workarounds also appear outside the health sector, so the present analysis of managerial workarounds may also have application to understanding attempts to transform such sectors as education, social care and environmental protection.

So far as we are aware, no other study presents and tests the concept of a ‘managerial workaround'. Pervasive, non-trivial managerial workarounds may be symptoms of mismatched policy objectives, or that existing health system structures cannot realise current policy objectives; but the workarounds themselves may also contain solutions to these problems.

Investing in prevention could be of great benefit to public health. Especially for people with health risks, such as overweight, depressive symptoms, low social-economic status or people who experience loneliness or a sedentary lifestyle. In the Netherlands, different parties are responsible for financing and organising selective and indicated preventive interventions: the government, municipalities and health insurance companies. The aim of this study was two-fold: First, to describe the transition towards a sustainable prevention infrastructure. And second, to gain insight into barriers and facilitators associated with intersectoral collaboration regarding organising prevention for high-risk groups.

A longitudinal qualitative study was conducted among collaborative networks working together to build a prevention infrastructure. During a five-year study period, 86 semi-structured interviews were held. The COM-B model was used for data analysis.

Barriers to intersectoral collaboration are: unknown (cost-)effectiveness, limited incentives to invest in collaboration, lack of clarity about responsibilities, differences in priorities and organisational culture between municipalities and health insurers. Facilitators are commitment, trust, sharing knowledge between parties, meeting regularly within the network and acknowledgement of mutual responsibilities. Also, national policy interventions targeted at the development of regional prevention infrastructures facilitated collaboration.

This study shows that collaboration regarding prevention is becoming increasingly common. It can be concluded that the transition towards a sustainable prevention infrastructure has started. The relationship between key stakeholders, like municipalities and health insurers, is generally stronger than it was five years ago. They have a better understanding of each other’s interests and expectations.