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In the mid 1990s the NHS “did” competition, in the mid 2000s the NHS is “doing” choice. This paper aims to cut through the rhetoric, highlight the differences and parallels between then and now and identify if these differences will have a different or the same impact on local services.

Following a review of literature from the 1990s, a qualitative research study is used to examine the impact of competition and markets in the 1990s. The discussion examines the implications of this study for current system reform.

Patient choice recreates many of the features of the internal market, but despite concerns at the time, the internal market did not have a significant impact on services. It is likely that patient choice will similarly have a limited impact.

The research is a case study confined to Day Surgery in one part of the North of England.

The paper reminds academics and practitioners what happened last time the NHS attempted to introduce a market‐based system.

Policy makers are applying market-inspired competition and financial incentives to drive efficiency in healthcare. However, a lack of knowledge exists about the process whereby incentives are filtered through organizations to influence staff motivation, and the key role of managers is often overlooked. The purpose of this paper is to explore the strategies managers use as intermediaries between financial incentives and the individual motivation of staff. The authors use empirical data from a local case in Swedish specialized care.

The authors conducted an exploratory qualitative case study of a patient-choice reform, including financial incentives, in specialized orthopedics in Sweden. In total, 17 interviews were conducted with professionals in managerial positions, representing six healthcare providers. A hypo-deductive, thematic approach was used to analyze the data.

The results show that managers applied alignment strategies to make the incentive model motivating for staff. The managers’ strategies are characterized by attempts to align external rewards with professional values based on their contextual and practical knowledge. Managers occasionally overruled the financial logic of the model to safeguard patient needs and expressed an interest in having a closer dialogue with policy makers about improvements.

Externally imposed incentives do not automatically motivate healthcare staff. Managers in healthcare play key roles as intermediaries by aligning external rewards with professional values. Managers’ multiple perspectives on healthcare practices and professional culture can also be utilized to improve policy and as a source of knowledge in partnership with policy makers.

Purpose: In this chapter, we examine the National Health Service (NHS) and Adult Social Care (ASC) in England, focussing on policies that have been introduced since 2000 and considering the challenges that providers face in their quest to provide a high standard and affordable health service in the near future.

Methodology/Approach: We discuss recent policy developments and published analysis covering innovations within major aspects of health care (primary, secondary and tertiary) and ASC, before considering future challenges faced by providers in England, highlighted by a 2017 UK Parliament Select Committee.

Findings: The NHS and ASC system have experienced tightening budgets and serious financial pressure, with historically low real-terms growth in health funding from central government and local authorities. Policymakers have tried to overcome these challenges with several policy innovations, but many still remain. With large-scale investment and reform, there is potential for the health and social care system to evolve into a modern service capable of dealing with the needs of an ageing population. However, if these challenges are not met, then it is set to continue struggling with a lack of appropriate facilities, an overstretched staff and a system not entirely appropriate for its patients.

Using financial incentives has been criticised for putting too much focus on things that can be measured. Value-based reimbursement may better align professional values with financial incentives. However, professional values may differ between actor groups. In this article, the authors identify institutional logics within healthcare-providing organisations. Further, the authors analyse how the centrality and compatibility of the identified logics affect the institutionalisation of external demands.

41 semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives from healthcare providers within spine surgery in Sweden, where a value-based reimbursement programme was introduced. Data were analysed using thematic content analysis with an abductive approach, and a conceptual framework based on neo-institutional theory.

After the introduction of the value-based reimbursement programme, the centrality and compatibility of the institutional logics within healthcare-providing organisations changed. The logic of spine surgeons was dominating whereas physiotherapists struggled to motivate a higher cost for high quality physiotherapy. The institutional logic of nurses was aligned with spine surgeons, however as a peripheral logic facilitating spine surgery. To attain holistic and interdisciplinary healthcare, dominating institutional logics within healthcare-providing organisations need to allow peripheral institutional logics to attain a higher centrality for higher compatibility. Thus, allowing other occupations to take responsibility for quality and attain the feeling of professional pride.

Interviewing spine surgeons, physiotherapists, nurses, managers and administrators allows us to deepen the understanding of micro-level behaviour as a reaction (or lack thereof) to macro-level decisions.

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to examine the diffusion of a new surgical procedure with lower per-case cost and how its diffusion path is affected by the simultaneous introduction of a new drug class that may be an effective treatment to prevent surgery. In particular, we examine whether a process of technology substitution exists that influences the diffusion process of the surgical technology. Given their different cost implications, the interaction of these two different technologies, surgery and drug intervention, is relevant from the perspective of health expenditure. This is of particular interest in health care as technology adoption and diffusion has been cited as a major driver of expenditure growth. Such expenditure growth has been increasingly targeted through the use of market-orientated policy tools aimed at increasing efficiency. Our research is thus addressing the question of how economic incentives influence the diffusion process and we discuss the impact of a set of incentives on hospital behavior.

Design/methodology – Hospital admission data for the financial years 1998/1999 to 2007/2008 in England are used to empirically test the contribution of prescription uptake and market-oriented reforms. Dynamic panel data models are used to capture any changes in technology preference during the period of study.

Findings – Our results suggest that the hospital sector exhibits a strong new technology preference, tempered by the interaction of competition for patients and the ability of the primary care sector to substitute treatments.

Value/originality – Given the current fast technological change, we examine the technological race occurring in the health care sector. We account simultaneously for the diffusion of different technologies not only within the same typology but also with technologies of a different class.

Hospitals are complex organisations accounting for most of total health expenditure. They play a critical role in providing care to patients with high levels of need. A key policy concern is that patients receive high quality care. Policymakers have attempted to influence hospital quality in different ways. This chapter focuses on three key policy levers: the extent to which hospital competition and higher hospital tariffs (of the DRG type) can stimulate quality, and whether non-profit hospitals provide higher or lower quality than for-profit ones. The chapter outlines key methodological challenges and selectively reviews the main findings from the literature. While several studies suggest that hospital competition reduces mortality rates for heart attack cases when hospital tariffs are fixed (under a DRG system), at this stage is unclear whether the effect holds across a range of quality indicators. Moreover, the limited literature on hospital mergers tends to suggest that hospital quality does not change following a merger. Finally, whether non-profit hospitals provide higher or lower quality varies across regions and institutional arrangements. The economic theory suggests several mechanisms with opposite effects on quality. To guide policy, future work needs to further unpack the various mechanisms through which these three key policy issues affect hospitals incentives.

This paper describes the first year of a national programme supporting implementation of one of the key policy initiatives forming part of the programme of health reform in England, practice‐based commissioning (PBC). The paper presents an audit of service redesign initiatives based on the first six months' work of 27 sites in the first wave of the programme, and discusses the early practical learning about the implementation of PBC by both participants and stakeholders. The role of the programme in facilitating two‐way links between policy development and practical implementation is highlighted, and the development of the programme, and other parallel learning routes, to meet the emerging needs of particular groups in relation to practice‐based commissioning is described.

Payments to healthcare providers create incentives that can influence provider behaviour. Research on unit-level incentives in primary care is, however, scarce. This paper examines how managers and salaried physicians at Swedish primary healthcare centres perceive that payment incentives directed towards the healthcare centre affect their work.

An interview study was conducted with 24 respondents at 13 primary healthcare centres in two cities, located in regions with different payment systems. One had a mixed system comprised of fee-for-service and risk-adjusted capitation payments, and the other a mainly risk-adjusted capitation system.

Findings suggested that both managers and salaried physicians were aware of and adapted to unit-level payment incentives, albeit the latter sometimes to a lesser extent. Respondents perceived fee-for-service payments to stimulate production of shorter visits, up-coding of visits and skimming of healthier patients. Results also suggested that differentiated rates for patient visits affected horizontal prioritisations between physician and nurse visits. Respondents perceived that risk-adjustments for diagnoses led to a focus on registering diagnosis codes, and to some extent, also up-coding of secondary diagnoses.

Policymakers and responsible authorities need to design payment systems carefully, balancing different incentives and considering how and from where data used to calculate payments are retrieved, not relying too heavily on data supplied by providers.

This study contributes evidence on unit-level payment incentives in primary care, a scarcely researched topic, especially using qualitative methods.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute knowledge on ethical issues and reasoning in expert reports concerning healthcare governance, commissioned by the Swedish healthcare system.

An in-depth analysis of ethical issues and reasoning in 36 commissioned expert reports was performed. Twenty-seven interviews with commissioners and producers of the reports were also carried out and analysed.

Some ethical issues were identified in the reports. But ethical reasoning was rarely evident. The meaning of ethical concepts could be devalued and changed over time and thereby deviate from statutory ethical goals and values. Several ethical issues of great concern for the Swedish public healthcare were also absent.

The commissioner of expert reports needs to ensure that comprehensive ethical considerations and ethical analysis are integrated in the expert reports.

Based on an extensive data material this paper reveals an ethical void in expert reports on healthcare governance. By avoiding ethical issues there is a risk that the expert reports could bring about reforms and control models that have ethically undesirable consequences for people and society.