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The purpose of this paper is to uncover the determinants of the ten-year Greek bond yield in both pre- and post-crisis period that caused the unprecedented event, a country member of the Euro area, not to be able to tap the market. In doing so, following the recent literature, the authors employ two major set of variables, market driven and macroeconomic variables and the authors find two classes of results. Among others, debt to GDP ratio, deficit, inflation and unemployment, play a more significant role as determinants of the ten-years Greek bond yield during the crisis and second, the ten-years yield exceeds that fundamentals that price in. Moreover, the authors explicitly test for the impact of speculation on the yield. These results are in line with other empirical studies and shed line to the dramatic evolution of the bond yields in terms of fiscal consolidation era as it is in Greece. Since the Greek debt crisis is ongoing more than five years, policy makers should make substantial changes in their macro projections taking under consideration more the variables of inflation and unemployment, and release a viable concrete plan of debt relief, which among other, secures the success of the macro projections.

Empirical study on Greek debt crisis applying both macroeconomics and market indicators in separated estimations.

Debt to GDP ratio, deficit, inflation and unemployment among others, play a more significant role as determinants of the ten-years Greek bond yield during the crisis than had before and second, during the crisis ten-years yield is above the price that fundamentals would imply.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge it is the first time that the authors study the Greek debt crisis applying fundamental and market factors.

Austerity in Greece has produced the ostensibly counterproductive effect of throwing the country into a deeper depression and rendering it more difficult to repay its debts. I address this apparent paradox by examining both the integration of Greece into the European Monetary Union and post-crisis austerity measures with a particular focus on the Greek credit system. I do so by employing a historical materialist framework focusing on Marx’s concept of ‘fictitious capital’, capital not backed by a commodity transaction, but by a claim on future value. I argue that, while the crisis is overdetermined, one hitherto unexplored dimension is the rapid expansion of the Greek credit system in the 1990s and 2000s. More specifically, Greek banks expanded to neighbouring countries, and borrowing by households and firmed spiked dramatically after Greece adopted the Euro, but a number of domestic political-economic factors acted as drags to this process. In this context, I argue that the crisis has served as an opportunity to impose a radically accelerated restructuring of the Greek economy in line with the ideal neoliberal utopia. This can be understood as one of the three responses to a crisis of fictitious capital: internal devaluation, asset devaluation or upward. However, the success of this project is far from guaranteed, so far the austerity project pursued by the troika has failed to replace the old Greek balance of social forces that have dominated the post-junta political economy of Greece.

The aim of the paper is to present a review of the fiscal imbalances and debt crisis in Greece and identify the possible links with the recent developments in the Greek property market.

The author follows a non-technical approach to discuss a number of factors that have contributed to the fiscal crisis that Greece has been experiencing since October 2009. The author critically analyses both the “internal” causes of the deteriorating fiscal stance of the Greek economy (that is the prolonged macroeconomic imbalances that the Greek economy faces and the credibility problem of macroeconomic policy) and the “external” factors that might have contributed to the Greek fiscal crisis (that is implications of the recent financial turmoil and the timing of the response of Europe to the Greek fiscal crisis). The author then studies the extent to which fiscal imbalances and the debt crisis have affected the Greek property sector.

The analysis indicates that the current fiscal stance of the Greek economy and the Greek property market crisis are intertwined.

The author believes that these results are useful, make a contribution to the existing knowledge and provide some evidence that current economic recession has a considerable adverse effect on the property sector in Greece.

One of the distinctive features of the paper is to critically discuss the direct and indirect effects of the prolonged macroeconomic imbalances on the Greek property sector. To the best of the author's knowledge, none of the existing studies in this area provides systematic treatment of the Greek fiscal crisis as a contributory factor in explaining the current crisis in the Greek property market.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the co-movements between the Portuguese, Greek, Irish and German government bond markets after the subprime crisis (2007 to 2013), with a special focus on the European sovereign debt crisis. It aims to assess the existence of contagion between the Portuguese, Greece and Irish bond markets and to explore the phenomenon of flight-to-quality from the Portuguese and Greek bond markets to the German market.

The analysis is undertaken using a DCC-GARCH model with daily data for 10-year yield government bonds. The change in correlation from the stable periods to the crisis periods is used to identify contagion or flight-to-quality.

Results suggest that there was contagion between the Greek and Portuguese markets, and to a lesser extent between the Irish and Portuguese markets. During most of the identified crisis periods, there are evident flight-to-quality flows from the Portuguese and Greek bond markets to the German market.

This paper contributes to the literature by applying the methodology DCC-GARCH to several crisis episodes for the analysis of contagion and flight-to-quality during the European sovereign debt crisis.

The Greek sovereign debt crisis had a substantial impact on the real economy and the Greek banking sector. From a period of growth in the economy and high levels of profitability, Greek banks experience a major decrease in demand in the local market, and a large increase in non-performing loans. This had a negative effect on the financing of the Greek firms and households, especially after the PSI and the recapitalisations of the Greek Banks. The Greek banking system has been restructured into four large systemic banking groups and after a long time of depression, the efforts are now being directed into restarting the economy through the financing of firms and individuals. However, the recent and on-going experience with substantial volumes of non-performing loans and strategic defaults, poses many challenges. The same can be said for stricter regulation that was introduced in the aftermath of the financial crisis, business model transformation, developments in the fintech and IT arena, and most recently COVID-19 pandemic, all introducing challenges to bank managers. This chapter provides an overview of these issues.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the value relevance of goodwill and its additional aspects during a long-term period in Greece. Furthermore, by implementing two of the most popular value relevance models, the Ohlson’s price and Easton and Harris’ return model, this study examines the impact of goodwill on Greek stock prices from 2007 to 2018, a period of 12 years in which International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are applied. Furthermore, this study analyzes how goodwill’s value relevance changes as it ages and during the Greek debt crisis.

In order to test the value relevance of goodwill we implemented two of the most popular value relevance models, Ohlson’s price and Easton and Harris’ return model. Our sample consists of non-financial listed Greek companies that reported positive goodwill accounting balances on their financial statements during the financial period from 2007 to 2018. Finally, we applied fixed-effects regression model to all equations.

The results provide evidence that the year-end goodwill accounting balance is value relevant, and that the debt crisis has improved goodwill’s information content. Finally, the empirical findings suggest that only current year acquired goodwill is value relevant compared to older goodwill, and therefore, goodwill’s impact on stock prices is decreasing as it ages.

A noteworthy limitation of this study is that it focuses on a specific code-law country Greece, which is a relatively small economy compared to the whole Eurozone. This research contributes to the research literature as it confirms other research findings in the European context and specifically that goodwill based on IFRS is value relevant to financial statement users. Additionally, it investigates for the first time how goodwill was affected by the Greek debt crisis. Finally, it contributes to other researcher’s debate concerning the duration of goodwill’s value relevance in a code law environment such as Greece.

Financial analysts and institutions are provided with more assurance about goodwill’s financial reporting quality to be embedded in the financial evaluation process of corporates. As this research confirms that goodwill should be regarded as an asset, companies should obtain better financial ratings from financial institutions and investors and thus will have better access to equity and debt funding.

We investigate the value relevance of goodwill in Greece during a long-term period of 12 years. Additionally, our study examines the impact of the Greek debt crisis on the information content of goodwill accounting balances and the period during which accumulated goodwill balances and within-year acquired goodwill maintain its value relevance. Our research could assist accounting standard setters such as the International Accounting Standard Board to evaluate the quality of specific standards such as IFRS 3 “Business Combination” and IAS 38 “Impairment of Assets.”

The purpose of this paper is to present measures and policies followed during the Greek fiscal crisis to safeguard financial stability.

Greece since 2009 was subjected to the Excessive Deficit Procedure and a government debt crisis due to the arrival of the global economic crisis leading to a major economic and banking crisis. Two huge bailout loans and programs helped Greece avoid default. However the second bailout loan and participation of banks in the Private Sector Involvement caused losses to the banking system that amounted to €37.7 billion. To deal with the prospect of potential bank failure Bank of Greece the central bank in cooperation with national and international authorities developed many strategies to safeguard financial stability such as cash management and liquidity operations establishment and operation of Greek Financial Stability Fund (GFSF) institutional framework for recapitalization and resolution of credit institutions.

The first step was to support bank liquidity pressures. In the face of these pressures the Eurosystem’s monetary policy operations provided lending to euro that ended 2010 and accounted to €97.6 billion. The second step was to establish a legal and regulatory framework for bank resolution and assess funds needed to recapitalize banks through stress tests and diagnostic assessments. Results showed that during 2012–2014 the Greek banking sector would require approximately €40.5 billion for strengthening its capital base of which €27.5 billion corresponded to the four “core banks”. Bank of Greece and GFSF managed to complete a €48.2 billion bank recapitalization in June 2013 of which the first €24.4 billion was injected into the four biggest Greek banks. In return Bank of Greece received a number of shares in those banks which it can now sell again during the upcoming years. The third step of policies was to implement resolution and restructuring measures. From October 2011 to March 2014 12 banks resolved through the new legal and regulatory framework under either a transfer order (order to transfer assets and liabilities to a transferee credit institution) or establishment of a bridge bank. All policies succeeded to safeguard Greek financial stability and restore bank losses that resulted from Greek public debt “haircut”.

To the best of the author’s knowledge this is the first paper examining this issue.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of IFRS adoption on financial statement data and their usefulness in Greece. Additionally, the authors examine the effect on the informativeness/usefulness of financial statement data for stock prices in Greece and the effect of the Greek Financial Crisis.

This study examine the effects of IFRS adoption on financial statement data and their usefulness in Greece. Additionally, the authors examine the effect on the informativeness/usefulness of financial statement data for stock prices in Greece and the effect of the Greek Financial Crisis.

The results indicate that several financial ratios were dramatically affected by IFRS adoption in Greece. In contrast to other countries, IFRS has not resulted in improved statistical behavior of these ratios in Greece: the ratios are highly skewed and the normality of their distribution is not improved. Additionally, when examining the usefulness of financial statement data for stock prices in Greece, results indicate that IFRS adoption did not necessarily improve the usefulness of the financial statements. However, the authors do find that since the financial crisis in Greece these IFRS financial statement measures are significant when regressed on stock prices.

The authors are not able to necessarily rule out other causal factors that may have occurred in Greece during the sample period. The authors do look at the financial crisis as a potential confounding factor, but other factors such as political or macroeconomic factors have not necessarily been ruled out. Also, this study only examines the Greek situation.

This study may have implications for other countries in similar situations as that found in Greece – IFRS adoption and severe economic crisis.

To date only the impact of IFRS on earnings, stockholders’ equity, and some financial ratios has been investigated in prior Greek research studies (Hellenic Capital Market Commission, 2006; Grant Thornton, 2006). However, no academic research has been developed in this area. In addition, the authors examine the impact of IFRS on stock prices emphasizing the mandatory financial disclosure and IFRS adoption in a financially and politically distressed country – Greece.

In January 2011, during the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, Jason Sterling, a hedge fund manager, was conducting online research to see if he could trade on any newsworthy information emerging from the summit. Sterling's fund traded primarily in sovereign debt, and he needed to figure out if European leaders would be able to come up with a viable solution to the crisis or whether the debt crisis would lead to the default of several European nations. He knew that if a solution was not found in the coming weeks, the sovereign debt markets could be thrown into turmoil.

The Greek debt crisis (2009–2018) was an event that received unprecedented media attention worldwide. The media reproduced a highly negative image of Greece, addressing the crisis in exceptionalist terms, usually under a moralistic and culturalist explanatory framework. Drawing on earlier research, this chapter focusses on the culturalist discourses developed by popular Greek mainstream news media, of conservative and liberal political orientation, such as Kathimerini, Athens Voice and Protagon.gr. Through what is understood as a ‘self-orientalising’ process, such media tend to reproduce the neo-orientalist hegemonic crisis and austerity discursive construction, as enunciated by the EU's political and economic establishment. Under this lens, austerity emerges as a modernising project that would presumably correct Greece's irregularities and would make Greece European and economically competitive for global capitalism. The period studied concerns the years of the crisis between 2010 and 2015. The analysis discloses the classist underpinnings of such discursive repertoires and their antipolitical and antidemocratic character. The analysis also discusses the disciplinary effects of such media practices, which mystify austerity and the processes of expropriation it unfolds, and passivises civic culture, and counterhegemonic resistances, by promoting a collective ‘self-bashing’ strategy.