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In the euro’s initial years, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain observed capital flow bonanzas and credit-booms, two cycles known to precede banking crises. Domestic banks fuelled those cycles via funding obtained from foreign financial institutions. Yet, these countries’ banking and financial crises have unfolded in different modes. In Ireland and Spain, credit-booms propelled real-estate bubbles, which dragged banks into crises, with governments’ accounts later being affected when rescuing banks (Spanish regional banks, and all Irish major banks). In Greece and Italy, extra monetary means perpetuated government imbalances (e.g. debt levels above 100% of GDP, large yearly deficits). More severely in Greece, banks were brought into crises by sovereign crises. In Portugal, a mixture of private and public sector–led crises have occurred. Our comparative study finds that these crises: (1) are connected to shocks and imbalances caused by dangerous banking sector cycles during the monetary integration process; (2) were not mere expansions of the US subprime crisis; (3) were not only caused by country-specific features and institutions; and (4) followed distinct paths, therefore, a uniform model encompassing all post-euro crises cannot exist.

The Eurozone debt crisis has indeed jeopardized the recovery plans put in place post global crisis by regulators, policymakers, and the sovereigns. Though the crisis is epicentered in the Eurozone, the knock-on effects of the crisis are felt all across the globe. The emerging and developing economies (EDEs) are also expected to post lower growth on account of worsening external environment and a weakening internal demand. This chapter analyzes the causes for sovereign debt crisis, presents the implications of sovereign debt crises, and draws lessons for banking sectors more particularly in the context of emerging markets like that of India.

This study aims to measure impact of several firm-specific factors on alternative measures of leverage. The authors also aim to study impact of the subprime crisis on such associations.

The authors utilized an unbalanced panel data of 973 firm-year observations on 47 UK listed non-financial firms for the years 1990–2019. Book-based and market-based long-term and total leverage measures have been used as explained variables. The explanatory variables are profitability, size, two measures of growth, asset tangibility, non-debt tax shields, firm age and product uniqueness. Fixed effect and random effect models with clustered robust standard errors have been utilized for data analysis. To find the effect of subprime crisis, original dataset was split to create pre-crisis and post-crisis datasets.

The authors find that profitability significantly reduces leverage while firms having more tangible assets use significantly more debt in capital structure. Firm size and non-debt tax shield have statistically insignificant positive impact on leverage. Having more unique products reduces use of external debt, albeit insignificantly. Growth, when measured as market-to-book ratio, has inconsistent impact, whereas capital expenditure insignificantly reduces leverage. Age is found to be an insignificant predictor of leverage. After the subprime crisis, firms started relying more on internal fund instead of external debt, more particularly short-term debt. Having more collateral is gradually becoming more important for availing external debt.

Data limitations restrict generalization of the findings.

This is one of the pioneering attempts to show how subprime crisis altered the theoretical domain of capital structure research in the UK.

This chapter analyses the causes and effects of the financial crisis that commenced in 2008, and it examines the dramatic government rescues and reforms. The outcomes of this, the most severe collapse to befall the United States and the global economy for three-quarters of a century, are still unfolding. Banks, homeowners and industries stood to benefit from government intervention, particularly the huge infusion of taxpayer funds, but their future is uncertain. Instead of extending vital credit, banks simply kept the capital to cover other firm needs (including bonuses for executives). Industry in the prevailing slack economy was not actively seeking investment opportunities and credit expansion. The property and job markets languished behind securities market recovery. It all has been disheartening and scary – rage against those in charge fuelled gloom and cynicism. Immense private debt was a precursor, but public debt is the legacy we must resolve in the future.

Purpose: This chapter presents a discussion of the COVID-19 global debt crisis.

Methodology: The chapter uses the discourse analysis method to identify the cause of the COVID-19 global debt crisis and suggests ways to overcome the crisis.

Findings: The chapter argues that the high debt incurred by many countries during the COVID1-19 pandemic, combined with tightening global financial conditions, led to a significant increase in global debt. The author suggests ideas to avert a debt crisis. It was argued that rich countries could forgive the debt owed to them by heavily indebted countries or consider interest repayment holidays, debt-for-green swaps, or other debt-relief options. Heavily indebted countries can consider restructuring their debt, reevaluating their economic policy priorities, and raising taxes. Multilateral organisations can assist heavily indebted countries and engage in debt forgiveness advocacy.

Implication: There is a need for rich countries and creditor organisations to offer some relief to heavily indebted countries to help them meet their debt repayment obligations during and after the pandemic.

Originality: The chapter is one of the first to analyse the global COVID-19 debt situation.

This paper sets up a model of strategic sovereign default, in which crony capitalism provides policymakers with incentives to service the debt beyond what is socially optimal. It then considers reforms to deal with the supply side of clientelism: the private sector. This involves tackling agency problems between managers and corporate stakeholders, since a key element to constrain the ability of powerful economic interests to capture the state is good corporate governance. Economic hard times provide such an opportunity, as the implicit coalition between groups of cronies may break down. A model is built along those lines, which highlights international contagion of debt repudiation.

This paper aims to use a risk management approach for re-profiling of sovereign debt. It develops profiles that trade off expected cost of financing alternative debt structures against their risk. The risk profiles are particularly informative for countries facing sovereign debt crisis, as they allow us to identify, with high probability, debt unsustainability. Risk profiles for two eurozone countries with excessive debt, Cyprus and Italy, were developed. In addition, risk profiles were developed for a proposal to impose debt sanctions in the Ukrainian crisis and it was shown that the financial impact could be substantial.

Using scenario analysis, a risk measure of the sovereign’s debt – Conditional Debt-at-Risk – was developed, and an optimization model was then used to trade off expected cost of debt financing against the Conditional Debt-at-Risk. The model is applied to three diverse settings from current crises.

The methodology traces informative risk profiles to identify sustainable debt structures. Interesting, although tentative, conclusions are drawn for the countries where the methodology was applied. Cyprus’s debt sustainability hinges on current International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections about gross domestic product growth and small deviations can push debt into unsustainable territory. For Italy, our analysis provides evidence of debt unsustainability. Common assumption of debt by eurozone member states could restore sustainability for Italy. Finally, it is shown how a proposal to impose debt sanctions against Russia for the Ukrainian crisis could have significant financial impact for Ukraine.

Additional work is needed to calibrate the simulation models for each country separately. Nevertheless, the direction of the results is such that more careful calibration will most likely not alter the conclusions but make them stronger instead.

The results provide significant insights for the management of sovereign debt for Cyprus and Italy. They also show the significant positive impact on Ukrainian public finances from debt sanctions. However, the most important practical implication is to show how the proposed methodology provided a decision support tool for restructuring and rescheduling sovereign debt for crisis countries.

There is widespread acceptance that debt restructuring has been too little and too late in recent crises failing to re-establish market access in a durable way. How to develop risk profiles for alternative debt structures has been illustrated. Debt profiles that are unsustainable can be identified, with high probability, and alternative structures proposed that restore sustainability. The methodology proposed in this paper is providing a useful tool of analysis. The topic of debt relief is currently debated widely at policy circles by the IMF and the United Nations, and the analysis of this paper provides some insightful input to the debate.

The use of scenario analysis for sovereign debt modeling and the use of an optimization model developed by the authors in previous research provide empirical analysis for three current problems in sovereign debt management. Useful insights are obtained for three important real-world cases for Cyprus, Italy and Ukraine.

The purpose of this paper is to uncover the determinants of the ten-year Greek bond yield in both pre- and post-crisis period that caused the unprecedented event, a country member of the Euro area, not to be able to tap the market. In doing so, following the recent literature, the authors employ two major set of variables, market driven and macroeconomic variables and the authors find two classes of results. Among others, debt to GDP ratio, deficit, inflation and unemployment, play a more significant role as determinants of the ten-years Greek bond yield during the crisis and second, the ten-years yield exceeds that fundamentals that price in. Moreover, the authors explicitly test for the impact of speculation on the yield. These results are in line with other empirical studies and shed line to the dramatic evolution of the bond yields in terms of fiscal consolidation era as it is in Greece. Since the Greek debt crisis is ongoing more than five years, policy makers should make substantial changes in their macro projections taking under consideration more the variables of inflation and unemployment, and release a viable concrete plan of debt relief, which among other, secures the success of the macro projections.

Empirical study on Greek debt crisis applying both macroeconomics and market indicators in separated estimations.

Debt to GDP ratio, deficit, inflation and unemployment among others, play a more significant role as determinants of the ten-years Greek bond yield during the crisis than had before and second, during the crisis ten-years yield is above the price that fundamentals would imply.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge it is the first time that the authors study the Greek debt crisis applying fundamental and market factors.

In the domestic credit market creditor and debtor rights are clearly defined. In contrast, sovereign debt repayment is largely contingent on the debtor government’s willingness to repay as enforcement of contracts at the international level is limited. In this chapter we explore different sources of sovereign debt crises as opportunistic and myopic behavior by debtor nations, over-consumption of imported goods, credit temptation by lenders eager to allocate savings surpluses, and unexpected consequences of initially seen appropriate policies. We explore how these factors have played out in the Euro-debt crisis and outline a framework for creditor responsibility to complement debtor self-restraint.