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The use of economic sanctions has grown dramatically in recent decades. Nevertheless, many arguments are presented in the public policy space regarding their effects on target populations. The author presents the first systematic analysis of the effects of sanctions on living conditions in target countries.

This paper provides a comprehensive survey and assessment of the literature on the effects of economic sanctions on living standards in target countries. The author identifies 31 studies that apply quantitative econometric or calibration methods to cross-country and national data to assess the impact of economic sanctions on indicators of human and economic development. The author provides in-depth discussions of three sanctions episodes—Iran, Afghanistan and Venezuela—that illustrate the channels through which sanctions affect living conditions in target countries.

Of the 31 studies, 30 find that sanctions have negative effects on outcomes ranging from per capita income to poverty, inequality, mortality and human rights. The author provides new results showing that 54 countries—27% of all countries and 29% of the world economy— are sanctioned today, up from only 4% of countries in the 1960s. In the three cases discussed, sanctions that restricted the access of governments to foreign exchange limited the ability of states to provide essential public goods and services and generated substantial negative spillovers on private sector and nongovernmental actors.

This is the first literature survey that systematically assesses the quantitative evidence on the effect of sanctions on living conditions in target countries.

When terrorism threaten geopolitical stability, many policymakers turn to economic sanctions. In this way, governments and multilateral organizations continue to affect corporate and managerial choices, through the shaping and constraining of international trade policies. Still, most of the international business remain relatively quiet about the impact of the non-market environment on firms’ strategic efforts. Questions remain about how firms adjust their strategies in the face of the often-sudden impact of changes in multilateral rules and enforcement mechanisms. This study aims to address this question by shedding light on three potential adjustment strategies for firms that have been impacted by sanctions.

As part of a larger, multimethod study, the authors undertook 16 semi-structured interviews with senior managers of firms whose operations have been affected by international sanctions.

International and political tensions can affect businesses in many ways, from exporting to strategies associated with global knowledge sourcing. Learnings from organizations that have had to respond to sudden and extreme changes in their fragile ecosystems will aid this study. In this commentary paper, the authors offer suggestions about how to adapt, respond and operate in a new reality.

While the imposition of long-term political sanctions, especially by powerful nations and multilateral institutions, has become more frequent, how businesses cope with these extreme external shifts still remains unknown. This paper focuses on firms operating in a sanctioned regime, investigating how they deal with these sudden changes in their environment.

This study aims to examine the implications of short-term and long-term reputation change because of government agency responses to firm product defects.

This study’s findings have important implications for both scholars and practitioners. From a scholarly perspective, the authors create a more fine-grained examination of reputation that may be used to assess various performance dimensions. From a practice perspective, managers must realize that reputation can be one of an organization’s most important resources as it meets each of the valuable, rare, inimitable and nonsubstitutable criteria associated with those resources capable of providing sustainable competitive advantage.

Analysis of 17,879 product recalls from 15 automobile manufacturers in the US suggests that firms with higher long-term reputations are more likely to face regulator sanctions when a reputation-damaging event happens. On the other hand, firms with higher short-term reputations are less likely to face sanctions in such circumstances. Finally, firms whose short-term reputation exceeds their long-term reputation are less likely to be sanctioned by regulators when reputation-damaging events occur.

There are several limitations that should be addressed. First, as our reputation measure is based on government investigations of potential defects, vehicles that have never been inspected are not included in the sample. Although this number is likely extremely low, omitting vehicles that have never been inspected leaves out some high-reputation firms from the sample. In addition, the study relies on a single-firm stakeholder that is capable of punitive actions.

From a practical perspective, this study’s findings encourage managers to think about the temporal aspects associated with firm reputation, and to realize that stakeholders may react differently when their expectations are not met depending on an organization’s relative long- and short-term reputations. From a theoretic perspective, the primary contribution of this study is to illustrate how long-term and short-term changes in reputation can provide mixed signals to firm stakeholders regarding future performance.

This study explores the temporal aspects of firm reputation by examining how government sanctions vary depending on firms’ long-term (10 years) and short-term (1 year) reputation. The findings of this study contribute to current reputation research by illustrating the variation in government responses to product defects as a function of short-term and long-term reputation. In doing so, the important role of the timing of firm performance is considered.

Wars, and violent conflicts generally, can generate significant institutional dynamics and new legitimacy pressures for multinational enterprises (MNEs). The purpose of this paper is to understand the nature or source of institutional pressures facing MNEs in war and to examine how MNEs respond and navigate these institutional pressures.

This is a conceptual paper.

Through the theoretical lens of institutional theory and drawing on insights from the devastating Russian–Ukrainian war in Europe, the study provides a framework that explains the nature of institutional pressures impacting MNEs in a major war conflict and how MNEs respond to these pressures. Central to the framework is the impact of formal and informal institutions on MNEs during war. As a result of regulatory and social pressures, MNEs have to make important strategic decisions either to protect their legitimacy or to defend their economic objectives against institutional demands.

As the paper situates the pressures of war for MNEs in a formal and informal institutional context, this offers a new approach to understanding the costs and pressures of war on MNEs.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the practical problems which Swiss financial service providers face following the government’s decision to implement economic sanctions.

The practical problems of implementation are based on the identified methods of circumvention in the first author’s empirical research on the mechanisms of money laundering.

Secure anti-money laundering mechanisms promote the smooth implementation of sanctions. Despite the novelty of specific sanctions requirement, it is possible to have a supportive framework in place. Also, there remain a number of practical hurdles for Swiss banks to overcome, including the pressure on sanction alignment and the significant threat of noncompliance.

The sanctions imposed on Russia in 2022 are largely examined either from a broad political perspective or from the finite details of a business consultancy perspective. This paper aims to reconcile both perspectives to illustrate how the concrete problems of sanction implementation becomes evident in the wider political picture.

This study examines how firm product reputation functions as an internal and external expectations-setting mechanism shaping firm and external stakeholder behavior.

Longitudinal analysis of 17,879 recalls from 15 automobile manufacturers operating in the United States between 1967 and 2016.

Applying the behavioral theory of the firm (BTF) and signaling theory, this study’s findings suggest that product safety reputation creates variability in the likelihood of both voluntary and government-ordered recalls.

Performance expectations set by past product performance influence managerial decision-making such that products with a higher reputation for quality are more likely to be voluntarily recalled than are their less reputable counterparts. Similarly, regulators are more likely to order the recall of higher reputation products, suggesting that past product performance also influences enforcement behavior. Finally, the scope and severity of product defects are shown to interact with product reputation to influence the likelihood of government-ordered recall.

Firms and firm stakeholders make distinct decisions based on performance variations within firm product portfolios.

Overall firm reputation is important, but there are distinct dynamics that result in product performance variability within firm product portfolios that have important implications on issues such as product safety recalls.

This study's findings reveal that as an internal signal, managers' expectations of product performance can change their behavior following product safety defects. Specifically, voluntary product recalls are more likely for higher-reputation products than those with lower reputations for product safety. This suggests that firm behavior regarding product safety recalls is not consistent within their own product lines. Externally, this study’s findings suggest that product reputation also influences relationships with key stakeholders. Product reputation for quality was shown to be associated with an increased likelihood of government sanctions. Regulators will also be more likely to initiate punitive sanctions against higher-reputation products as the severity and scope of safety defects increase. Under such circumstances, higher-reputation products are more likely to face government sanctions than lower-reputation products. Hence, government regulatory behavior is subject to influence from performance signals such as product reputation.

Background: Rising food bank usage in the UK suggests a growing prevalence of food insecurity. However, a formalised, representative measure of food insecurity was not collected in the UK until 2019, over a decade after the initial proliferation of food bank demand. In the absence of a direct measure of food insecurity, this article identifies and summarises longitudinal proxy indicators of UK food insecurity to gain insight into the growth of insecure access to food in the 21st century.

Methods: A rapid evidence synthesis of academic and grey literature (2005–present) identified candidate proxy longitudinal markers of food insecurity. These were assessed to gain insight into the prevalence of, or conditions associated with, food insecurity.

Results: Food bank data clearly demonstrates increased food insecurity. However, this data reflects an unrepresentative, fractional proportion of the food insecure population without accounting for mild/moderate insecurity, or those in need not accessing provision. Economic indicators demonstrate that a period of poor overall UK growth since 2005 has disproportionately impacted the poorest households, likely increasing vulnerability and incidence of food insecurity. This vulnerability has been exacerbated by welfare reform for some households. The COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically intensified vulnerabilities and food insecurity. Diet-related health outcomes suggest a reduction in diet quantity/quality. The causes of diet-related disease are complex and diverse; however, evidence of socio-economic inequalities in their incidence suggests poverty, and by extension, food insecurity, as key determinants.

Conclusion: Proxy measures of food insecurity suggest a significant increase since 2005, particularly for severe food insecurity. Proxy measures are inadequate to robustly assess the prevalence of food insecurity in the UK. Failure to collect standardised, representative data at the point at which food bank usage increased significantly impairs attempts to determine the full prevalence of food insecurity, understand the causes, and identify those most at risk.

Social media has played a pivotal role in polarizing views on Russia–Ukraine conflict. The effects of polarization in online interactions have been extensively studied in many contexts. This research aims to examine how multiple social media sources may act as an integrator of information and act as a platform for depolarizing behaviors.

This study analyzes the communications of 6,662 tweets related to the sanctions imposed on Russia by using textual analytics and predictive modeling.

The research findings reveal that the tweeting behavior of netizens was depolarized because of information from multiple social media sources. However, the influx of information from non-organizational sources such as trending topics and discussions has a depolarizing impact on the user’s pre-established attitude.

For policymakers, conflict mediators and observers, and members of society in general, there is a need for (1) continuous and consistent communication throughout the crisis, (2) transparency in the information being communicated and (3) public awareness of the polarized and conflicting information being provided from multiple actors that may be biased in the claims being made about the conflict crisis.

While previous research has examined Russia–Ukraine conflict from a variety of perspectives, this is the first study to examine how social media might be used to reduce attitude polarization during times of conflict.