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This paper addresses the social value of commercial enterprises that are jointly owned by a government and private sector investors and where the shares are listed on a stock exchange: thus, “listed public–private enterprises” (LPPEs). The theoretical part of the paper addresses how differences in ownership patterns influence the behavior and performance of LPPEs.

We develop a conceptual taxonomy, drawing on the empirical evidence on the behavior and performance of public–private hybrid enterprises and on the application of agency theory to that evidence. The taxonomy discussion predicts how different ownership patterns affect enterprise productive efficiency and the ability of governments to achieve social goals through LPPEs. We review the empirical literature on government enterprise ownership and on the concentration of private share ownership to deduce how these matter for owner and managerial behavior and productive efficiency. We review the literature that considers the informational content that listing of an enterprise's shares on a stock exchange can provide to enterprise owners, managers and other domestic audiences with a policy interest. We employ a social welfare perspective to derive policy implications as to when the LPPE governance structure is most appropriate.

We show how the monitoring and performance weaknesses of state ownership are offset by some private ownership, particularly when combined with listing on a stock exchange. We demonstrate the effects of different governance structures on enterprise productive efficiency. We find that the LPPE structure is particularly appropriate as an alternative to nationalization or to full privatization and regulation of natural monopoly public utilities, and as an alternative to full private ownership and taxation of non-renewable natural resource extractive enterprises.

This paper explicitly addresses the question of why and how the combination of government ownership, private investor ownership and listing on an exchange is socially valuable in providing information on productive efficiency to governments.

Against the background of actively promoting the reform of mixed ownership in China, this study regards government ownership in private sector enterprises (PSEs) as an important political connection mechanism and examines private holding listed companies in high-polluting industries that sold China A-shares from 2012 to 2019.

Using regression models such as Tobit and negative binomial estimation, the research empirically examines the impact of government ownership in PSEs on the corporate fulfillment of their environmental responsibilities.

Government ownership can effectively promote PSEs to fulfill their environmental responsibilities. Government ownership, as a corporate-level political connection mechanism, enables the government to provide firms with more environmental protection subsidies and environmental tax incentives, encouraging firms to fulfill their environmental responsibilities. When considering the policy risks faced by PSEs, government ownership effectively reduces the impact of policy uncertainty on firms’ fulfillment of environmental responsibilities. Additionally, verifying the economic development level of the city in which the firm is located makes the positive impact of government ownership on fulfillment of environmental responsibilities of PSEs in regions with lower economic development levels more significant.

Unlike existing studies that generally use the personal political identity of entrepreneurs to measure the political connections of PSEs, this study regards government ownership in PSEs as an important political connection mechanism. It provides a useful reference for China to formulate environmental protection policies for PSEs.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate financing decision and the moderating effect of government ownership on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and corporate financing decision.

Pooled OLS, fixed effect models (FEM), and Tobit regressions are employed to examine the relationship between managerial overconfidence, government ownership and corporate financing decision of publicly listed companies in Malaysia for the period of 2002-2011.

The authors conclude that: first, CEO overconfidence is significantly and negatively related to corporate financing decision; second, a higher degree of managerial overconfidence would result in lower leverage in GLCs, whereas the effect does not significantly exist in NGLCs; third, a larger ownership of government in a firm will reduce the negative effect of managerial overconfidence on corporate financing decision; fourth, the moderating effect of government ownership on the association between managerial overconfidence and corporate financing decision in GLCs is more effective than NGLCs; and fifth, government intervention plays its role as moderating effect on the relationship between managerial overconfidence and corporate financing decision in firms with lower ownership concentration but not in firms with high ownership concentration (more or equal than 50 percent).

The finding implies that the moderating effect of government ownership on the association between managerial overconfidence and corporate financing decision in GLCs is more effective than NGLCs.

The authors make the first attempt to test the moderating effect of government ownership on the relationship between ownership concentration and corporate financing decision.

This paper aims to examine the impact of government ownership on the cost of debt and firm valuation in listed Vietnamese companies for the period 2007 to 2016.

The authors use both the generalised methods of the moment (GMM) and the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to analyse a panel data spanning over the period 2007 to 2016 in the markets of Vietnam. Further, the instrumental variable is used in the paper.

The authors find that firms with relative higher government stockholdings or state-owned companies where the government owns 50 per cent or more of shares outstanding enjoy a lower cost of debt compared to the other firms. Consequently, these firms have higher firm valuation and profitability. The results are robust for both the GMM and the OLS regressions. Further, firms that no longer retain government ownership have a higher cost of debt than the other firms. The results of the paper imply the importance of political connections in businesses in the market of Vietnam.

This paper connects the relationship between government ownership and the cost of debt with the relationship between government ownership and firm valuation. The paper tests the relationship between the cost of debt and government ownership using both OLS and GMM specifications and the results are robust for both approaches. The manuscript uses an instrumental variable to show that government ownership has a positive impact on higher firm performance through reducing cost of debt. Further, this paper addresses the possible issue of endogeneity.

This study examines the impact of ownership structure on firm financial performance, for 146 manufacturing firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) for the period 2003–2012.

The theoretical background of the present study is based on the agency theory. Ownership structure is measured by institutional shareholdings, insider shareholdings, foreign shareholders and government shareholdings, while return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), market-to-book ratio (MBR) and Tobin's Q (TQ) are used as proxies of corporate financial performance. The dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) method is employed to cater for the issue of endogeneity.

We find that institutional ownership exerts a significant positive impact on ROE and MBR, which suggests that institutional investors play a significant role in improving the financial performance of the sample Pakistani. Furthermore, the results reveal a significant positive relationship of insider ownership with ROA, ROE, MBR and TQ, which is consistent with the prediction of agency theory that concentration of insider ownership aligns the interest of shareholders with those of the managers and hence improves performance. A significant positive association of government shareholdings with ROA and ROE was also found. Therefore, policymakers may encourage government ownership in firms, which can help to improve corporate financial performance.

The present study contributes to the existing literature on ownership structure and corporate financial performance in an emerging market like Pakistan. It is worth mentioning that the institutional setup and corporate governance structure in Pakistan is yet at an evolving stage. Findings of this study may provide useful insights to corporate managers and investors about the relationship between ownership structure and financial performance of firms from the manufacturing sector in Pakistan.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on the differential impact of government promotional measures and government ownership on two internationalization variables: location and speed of internationalization of emerging market multinationals (EMNEs). Central to the authors’ study is the mediating role of strategic intents to internationalize. In particular, we study how government impacts the resource-seeking, market-seeking and technology-seeking motives to internationalize.

The empirical setting for the paper is Chinese companies that have internationalized via an equity based entry mode. The authors employ 672 firm responses collected by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade.

The empirical results demonstrate that different home government measures have differential impact on internationalization outcomes. Government promotional measures (such as direct incentives and bilateral agreements to support internationalization) have only an indirect effect on international location and speed through the effect they have on the strategic motives to internationalize; while government ownership in the company has a direct impact on international location.

The study highlights that home governments are shaping EMNEs strategic intent. Home government can influence EMNEs internationalization choices by providing resource flows through financial resources and state ownership or through asset-accumulation mechanisms via promotional measures.

Policy makers in emerging markets need to develop policies focused on the specific motivations that firms have when internationalizing. EMNEs are suggested to take advantage of government policies more intentionally.

The theoretical contribution centers on identifying important mediating mechanisms pointing to the interplay between government policies and international location and speed of firms. The authors contribute to the growing stream of research on internationalization of emerging market firms by building a sound theoretical model and examining empirically the role of home government in the internationalization of EMNEs.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between corporate ownership structures and audit fees paid to external auditors by Malaysian companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. This study focusses on the extent of the auditor’s reliance on the client’s internal control inasmuch as the corporate ownership structures are varied, and, ultimately, affect the audit fees.

This study applies the agency theory in formulating three hypotheses that guide the results analysis. By employing a multi regression model for a sample of 345 Malaysian companies listed on Bursa Malaysia, this study examines the relationship of ownership structure, namely, managerial ownership, foreign ownership and government ownership with audit fees using data for 2010.

The results show a significant positive relationship between audit fees and firms with larger foreign ownership and government ownership but no significant relationship with firms with higher managerial ownership. This study contributes recent evidence concerning the relationship between corporate ownership structure and audit fees.

Regulators may consider ownership structure on the standards or regulation setting in order to be practical and operationalized in line with the impact associated with different ownership structures. The practitioners may also design appropriate methodologies and procedures for the different ownership structures for high-quality service and to standardize the risk mitigation process.

The ownership structures have different influences on the audit fees, as well as complexity of the firms and their profitability.

The study looks upon certain percentages of ownership structures, and how they affects audit fees, firms complexity and profitability.

This study aims to examine the effects of corporate ownership (government-linked investment companies, GLICs), linearity of GLICs, board ownership and linearity of board ownership on company performance.

Using panel data from companies that are listed on the Malaysian Stock Exchange during the period of 2000 to 2009, this study uses weighted least square models.

The results show that GLICs ownership is positively and significantly related to company performance, while board ownership is negatively and significantly related to company performance. These findings suggest that GLICs ownership improves company performance, while board ownership destroys company performance. The results also show that while GLICs ownership has an inverted U-shaped relationship with company performance, board ownership has a U-shaped relationship with company performance.

The theoretical implication of this study is that agency problem decreases in companies with low and high levels of board ownership concentration, while it increases in companies with middle level of board ownership concentration. Furthermore, agency cost decreases in companies with a certain level of GLICs ownership concentration as the government’s New Economic Model (NEM) expects. However, agency cost increases in companies after a certain level of GLICs ownership concentration.

In practical perspectives, this study provides evidence to policy makers that the government’s proposal to reduce GLICs’ investments in Malaysia and diversify them aboard as mentioned in NEM is supported because the decrease in GLICs stakes in certain level may increase company performance. On the other hand, if the policy of the government is to increase GLICs stakes, the company performance may decrease after a certain level of ownership concentration. This study also provides evidence that investors can invest in companies with low and high board ownership concentration. Furthermore, the NEM policy gives investors an opportunity to invest in the companies with GLICs. Reducing GLICs stakes in the Malaysian market and putting them in the international markets, as mentioned in the Malaysian Government’s NEM policy, will create more opportunities for international investors to invest their fund in the Malaysian market. Thus, the emerging markets exist. In addition, the NEM policy also encourages institutional ownerships like domestic and foreign to increase their stakes instead of GLICs in the Malaysian market.

So far, most of the previous studies on GLICs and board ownerships in the Malaysian setting focused on the relationship of the ownership structure with company performance. However, no study has been done to examine the linearity effects of GLICs and board ownerships on company performance. The study is very important to perform to provide the policy makers and investors with clear guidance before their decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between corporate governance characteristics, namely the board size, board independence, duality, audit committee, ten largest shareholders, managerial ownership, foreign ownership and government ownership and the extent of corporate social responsibility disclosure.

The content analysis was used to extract the CSR disclosure items from annual report and companies' web sites. Then, a CSR disclosure index was constructed after combining CSR disclosure items disclosed both in annual reports and in companies' web sites. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to examine the relationship between the corporate social disclosures index and the independent variables, namely the board size, board independence, duality, audit committee, ten largest shareholders, managerial ownership, foreign ownership and government ownership after statistically controlling the effects of a firm's size and the profitability of the companies.

Results based on the full regression models indicated that only two variables were associated with the extent of disclosures, namely government ownership and audit committee. Government ownership and audit committee are positively and significantly correlated with the level of corporate social responsibility disclosure. The most significant variable that influences the level of CSR disclosure is government ownership.

The findings are limited to the context of the study and it was limited to Malaysian public listed companies, January to December 2006. The sources of data in this study were companies' annual reports and web sites only.

The study is useful to organizations and statutory bodies to take into consideration in identifying the corporate governance characteristics that will enhance CSR disclosure, since it had been shown in previous studies that corporate social responsibility reporting in Malaysia is generally low. The government can determine how important it is that a company should be willing to allocate their costs towards corporate social responsibility activities. Thus, this study will emphasize the level of activities through corporate social responsibility reporting in Malaysian public listed companies and help the government to ascertain the level of corporate social responsibility activities through corporate social responsibility reporting among Malaysian public listed companies.

The study reveals the extent of the disclosure of corporate social responsibility to companies web sites and constructed the CSR index based on two sources of data, namely companies' web sites and annual reports.

This research aims to examine the effect of ownership structure on dividend policy using the Indonesian context. The most common ownership structure is concentrated in the hand of family owners except in the UK and USA (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000). Family owners hold more than half of the companies in Indonesia (Carney & Child, 2013; Claessens et al., 2000). Family firms play an important role in Indonesia. Another important characteristic that emerges is the rise of government- and foreign-controlled firms in Indonesia. Thus, this research also divides ownership concentration into family firms, government-controlled and foreign-controlled firms.

Samples of this research consist of dividend announcements during 2006-2012 in Indonesian Stock Exchange. This research excluded financial data because these have characteristics that are different non-financial sectors’ characteristics. The final sample of this research consists of a 710 firm-year observation.

The result of this research shows that ownerships have a positive effect on dividend payout. This research divides the sample into family-controlled firms, government-controlled firms (GOEs) and foreign-controlled firms. This research shows that government- and foreign-controlled firms have a positive impact on dividend payout. However, family firms have a negative effect on the dividend payout. Family firms pay lower dividends because they prefer to control it themselves. Family firms earn benefit from those resources, but at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus, family firms engage in expropriation to minority shareholders.

This study focuses on ownership structure of Indonesian listed firm. This study does not analyze the impact of other corporate governance mechanism such as board structure on dividend decisions. The owner of the companies (family, government and foreign firm) has an opportunity to put their member as part of board members. However, this study does not analyze the impact of board structure on dividend decisions.

This study provides evidence that ownership concentration positively affects dividend payout. However, there is a different effect of ownership structure (family-controlled firms, GOEs and foreign-controlled firm). Government- and foreign-controlled have a positive effect; however, family-controlled firm have a negative effect on dividend payout. Therefore, this study provides evidence of the importance of ownership structure on dividend decision.