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This study aims to explore the relationship between risk governance characteristics (chief risk officer [CRO], chief financial officer [CFO] and senior directors [SENIOR]) and regulatory adjustments (RAs) in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development public commercial banks.

Using principal component analysis (PCA) and regression models, the research analyzes a representative data set of these banks.

A significant negative correlation between risk governance characteristics and RAs is found. Sensitivity analysis on the regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio and the total capital ratio indicates mixed outcomes, suggesting a complex relationship that warrants further exploration.

The study’s limited sample size calls for further research to confirm findings and explore risk governance’s impact on banks’ capital structures.

Enhanced risk governance could reduce RAs, influencing banking policy.

The study advocates for improved banking regulatory practices, potentially increasing sector stability and public trust.

This study contributes to understanding risk governance’s role in regulatory compliance, offering insights for policymaking in banking.

The study explores extant knowledge on the nature of the relationship between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, particularly board characteristics and audit quality, respectively, while also investigating how the relationship varies across geographies.

The extant knowledge is synthesized using a meta-analysis, which is conducted using a sample of 56 empirical studies from publications of varying grades. The studies span over 25 years (1996–2021) and cover 147 empirical samples (343,787 firm-year observations) across more than 20 countries. The dependent variable is audit fees, and the independent variable captures 12 different measures of board characteristics.

Overall, the results reveal a positive association between board characteristics and audit fees, indicating complementarity between governance mechanisms. Effect size analysis shows board characteristics, like size and independence, are positively associated with audit fees. However, heterogeneity is noted for some characteristics, and further analysis by geography (developed vs emerging countries) explains the heterogeneity.

This study helps multiple stakeholders like firms, shareholders, boards, regulators and policymakers in designing and strengthening governance frameworks.

Both governance and auditing literature benefit from identifying specific board characteristics that drive audit quality consistently across different institutional settings and samples. Heterogeneity analysis helps improve the understanding of contradictions documented in prior literature.

This meta-analysis is the first to explore the interplay between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms, with a focus on board characteristics and audit quality. The study provides valuable insights on how different governance mechanisms influence each other while highlighting, for the first time, how the interaction between governance mechanisms varies by a country's level of development.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between corporate governance attributes in the form of board and ownership characteristics and the remediation of internal control material weaknesses (ICMW) reported under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002.

The paper employs multivariate logistic regression models for a sample of 528 firms having ICMW as per their auditors' attestation reports during the fiscal periods of 2004, 2005 and 2006 to investigate the empirical relationships between board and ownership characteristics, and remediation of control weaknesses in subsequent fiscal years.

The board diligence, CEO‐independent board, and managerial, institutional and dominant shareholdings are all positively and significantly associated with the ICMW remediation of the sample firms in the presence of other firm‐specific variables in the analysis. The results also suggest that, in general, the ownership characteristics play a greater role in the firms' remediation action than the board‐related factors except board diligence. The separate sub‐sample tests demonstrate that board diligence and several stock ownership characteristics are positively and significantly associated with a firm's action to remediate both the systematic and non‐systematic internal control weaknesses though the results are more robust for non‐systematic control weaknesses.

A useful extension is to conduct a detailed analysis of the effect of audit committee characteristics in conjunction with board and ownership characteristics on firms' remediation action in a setting where ICMW firms take such action at a differential pace that may continue over two or more fiscal periods. Further, the present study examines the empirical associations between variables of interest, and does not, by virtue of its results, establish any cause‐and‐effect relationship between governance attributes and timeliness in ICMW remediation. Finally, this research can be extended to a detailed analysis of the types of systematic and non‐systematic control weaknesses, their probable effect on firms' financial reporting process and the role of corporate governance in timeliness of management's remediation action for different types of internal control problems.

The paper adds to the existing literature on corporate governance and financial reporting quality by documenting the association between a firm's board and ownership characteristics and management's immediate action to remediate internal control problems that ultimately impacts the quality of reported accounting information. The study complements prior studies on ICMW remediation and accrual quality by demonstrating that the effective monitoring by board and large, sophisticated shareholders as well as greater alignment of manager‐shareholder interests ensures more timeliness in remediation of internal control weaknesses and improves financial reporting quality.

The aim of this research is to study the direct and indirect effects among governance characteristics, long-term orientation and sustainable longevity of family firms.

Data were collected from 108 family firms operating in different sectors using survey questionnaires. The authors used the partial least square structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) to examine the hypotheses of the study.

Results indicate that governance characteristics influence long-term orientation and sustainable longevity. Furthermore, results also suggest that long-term orientation partially mediates the impact of governance characteristics on sustainable longevity. These findings provide critical implications for both theory and practice.

The findings of the study fill gaps in the existing literature and contribute to the body of knowledge in strategic management literature by providing additional evidence of the internal drivers of corporate sustainable longevity, particularly for family SMEs in developing economies.

The study aims to yield evidence on the relation between the quality of governance characteristics and the firms' financial credibility involved in financial violations.

The study uses annual data ranging from 2000 to 2018. The sample consists of 154 nonfinancial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange, comprising 77 fraudulent and 77 non-fraudulent companies. To examine the relationship between improvements in the governance structure and financial credibility of the firms, hypotheses are tested using the univariate analysis and multivariate regression model through the ordinary least square method.

The results affirm that fraud firms are possessed with poor governance structure compared to control firms in the pre-fraud year. The findings further imply that an improved governance structure brings foremost performance in stock price. The results of the study divulge that board of directors characteristic i.e. change in outside directors' percentage has a significant positive impact (β = 0.015, p = 0.05) on the financial credibility of the firms. The governance variables in terms of CEO-COB joint position has a significant negative (β = −0.824, p = 0.05) association with the financial credibility, which means that whenever CEO-COB joint position enhances, the financial credibility of the firms decreases. However, governance variables in the context of blockholders percentage has a significant positive (β = 0.13, p = 0.01) impact on financial credibility. The results of the study overall indicate that the governance structure has a significant influence on the financial performance of firms in the stock market.

The study provides an understanding of how fraudulent firms rehabilitate their governance structure and accrue economic benefits by the means of financial credibility after when the fraud is made public. It also adds to the literature in the area of corporate frauds specifically the role of governance structure in the financial performance of fraudulent firms in the stock market; this field is in its initial stage, even in developed countries, while, in developing countries, little work has been done.

The purpose of this paper is to explore relationships between corporate governance characteristics and strategic management accounting (SMA). The relationships provide insight into a debatable issue of whether corporate governance characteristics affect applications of SMA in Thailand. SMA is supporting tools for an organization to effectively execute its management strategies aiming for business success.

This study analyzes primary data from survey and corporate governance data from year 2011 to 2013 of companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand.

Results show that corporate governance characteristics significantly affect SMA in two aspects, namely, participation and usage. This study finds some results that, on the one hand, separation of CEO’s role and chairmanship, size of independent board, and frequency of audit committee meetings positively affect both participation and usage. On the other hand, an independent chairman and board size negatively affect both participation and usage.

Findings confirm framework of enterprise governance issued by the International Federation of Accountants that not only does corporate governance provides assurance control, but it also provides strategic governance through behavioral applications of SMA tools and supports.

Based on 3,775 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2013 using publicly available disclosure data for Korean listed firms, this study examines whether and how firm-level governance characteristics are associated with investment in internal auditing proxied by compensation and the number of statutory internal auditors.

The authors investigate the association between governance characteristics and investment in internal auditing proxied by compensation and the number of statutory internal auditors.

The authors find that firms with greater ownership of the largest shareholders and with a higher proportion of outside directors invest more in internal auditing. These results indicate that firms with higher incentive and demand for monitoring are more likely to invest more in internal auditing. The authors further find that the positive effect of the largest shareholder ownership (board independence) on investment in internal auditing is attenuated in firms with greater board independence (ownership of the largest shareholders) suggesting that the complementary effect of the two governance mechanisms associated with internal auditing weakens as they function simultaneously.

The results provide regulators and investors with a clear picture of the governance characteristics of firms associated with investment in internal auditing. The results imply that both the largest shareholders and the outside board of directors play a significant role in resource allocation in internal auditing within a firm. The effect of allocation, however, can be attenuated contingent upon the combined characteristics of governance mechanisms.

Using large amounts of public archival data, this study adds to the extant literature on firm characteristics associated with investment in internal auditing. This study also contributes to the literature by expanding the scope of research on executive compensation to the locus of statutory internal auditors.

This study examines the association between internal corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. board of directors and audit committee) and the information value of bank earnings. The authors comparatively assess this association across different bank types, Islamic versus conventional banks. The authors also investigate the mediating effect of Shariah governance.

The authors utilize a unique and an international sample of 723 bank-year observations representing 100 listed banks from 16 countries during the period 2007–2015. The authors investigate the characteristics of the board of directors and audit committee (i.e. size and independence) and employ three core analyses for earnings informativeness (i.e. earnings persistence, cash flow predictability and reliability of loan loss provisions). Additional analyses address Shariah supervisory boards’ (SSBs’) size, financial expertise and multiple outside directorships. The authors use the random-effect Generalised Least Squares (GLS) estimation technique and provide several robustness checks and sensitivities.

The authors find that, on average, having large and independent boards (and audit committees) increases the informativeness of reported earnings for banks. Conditional on bank type, our results report strong evidence for differential effects across the two alternative banking systems. In Islamic banks, large and independent board of directors (and audit committees) is positively associated with all measures of information value. There is insignificant evidence for conventional banks. However, SSBs show no significant effect on the reported earnings’ informativeness.

This is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, that empirically and comparatively assesses the information value of reported earnings in association with effective internal governance while recognizing the institutional characteristics of different bank types. The authors offer new insights to policymakers, investors and other stakeholders located within countries operating on a dual banking system. The results could help regulators to improve their rules/guidance related to double-layer governance and financial reporting quality.

From the agency theory’s point of view, this paper aims to analyze corporate governance mechanisms about the characteristics of the companies quoted in the segments Bovespa Mais and Bovespa Mais 2 and their influence on the creation of value in preparation for the opening of the initial public offering (IPO).

A quantitative approach was adopted to achieve the proposed objective using the panel data with fixed effects and secondary data collected on the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários website, using statistical software Stata® 13.0 for statistical tests. The population comprises non-financial companies belonging to the Bovespa Mais and Bovespa Mais Level 2 groups, as the survey sample took into account the period of adhesion of the companies, totaled in 15 companies, which cover the period from 2008 to 2019. The selected variables correspond to the ownership structure’s characteristics, then the board’s composition and the fiscal council as the body responsible for supervising the administrators’ acts.

The main results indicate that the number of independent members on the board of directors and the supervisory board’s participation positively influence market performance. However, it also reveals that the concentration of ownership brings fundraising for other companies’ acquisitions, risk reduction concerning information asymmetry between investing powers.

The main results indicate that the number of independent members on the board of directors and the supervisory board’s participation positively influence market performance. Despite this, it also reveals that the concentration of ownership brings fundraising for other companies’ acquisitions, risk reduction concerning information asymmetry between investing powers.

This paper advances a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market. This paper finds that internal governance characteristics (founder-chief executive officer, executive incentives and board independence) and external network characteristics (prestigious underwriters, degree of venture capitalist syndication and board interlocks) are significant predictors of foreign capital market choice by foreign IPO firms.

While product market choices have been central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, financial markets’ integration makes capital markets an equally crucial strategic decision. This paper advances a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market.

This situation generates value to shareholders and is perceived by the market and, ultimately, generates a direct relationship with the market performance of companies. While product market choices have been central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, financial markets’ integration makes capital markets an equally major strategic decision.

This study aims to analyze the impact of corporate governance on firms’ external financing decisions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

The authors analyzed a unique set of panel data comprising 2,425 nonfinancial firms whose shares are traded on stock exchanges in countries in the MENA region. The authors fitted an ordinary least squares model to estimate the regression coefficients. The authors performed a sensitivity analysis using alternative measures of the critical variables and an endogeneity analysis using instrumental variable methods with plausible external instruments.

The results revealed that corporate governance characteristics of firms are strongly associated with their degree of leverage. They also showed that macrofinancial conditions, financial regulations, corporate governance enforcement and social conditions mitigate the impact of corporate governance on firms’ financing decisions.

A larger sample size will further improve the results; however, this is difficult and depends on the extent to which increasing disclosure practices allow more corporate information to reach international databases.

This study provides new evidence on the role of corporate governance on firms’ financing decisions and documents the essential mitigating role of institutions, alerting managers to consider them.

This study is a novel attempt. Based on information from different data sources, this study explored the predictive power of corporate governance, ownership structures and other firm-specific characteristics in explaining corporate leverage in MENA countries. Overall, the analysis provides new evidence of the association between corporate governance and capital structure in the MENA region, highlighting the critical role of institutions.