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The purpose of this study is to explore how governance mechanisms (internal and external) enhance the performance of the return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE), earning per share (EPS) and dividend payout ratios (DP) of the banks of Pakistan. The study incorporates not only the internal factors of governance (board size, out-ratio, annual general meeting, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, block holder stock ownership and financial transparency) but also the external factors (legal infrastructure and protection of minority shareholders, and the market for corporate control).

The sample size of the study consists of 30 banks (public, private and specialized) listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE) for the period 2008-2014. The panel data techniques (fixed or random effect model) have been used for the empirical analysis after verification by Hausman (1978) test.

The results revealed that not only do the internal mechanisms of governance enhance the performance of the banking sector of Pakistan but external governance also plays a substantial role in enriching the performance. The findings conclude that for a good governance structure, both internal and external mechanisms are equally important, to accelerate the performance of the banking sector.

Internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance can also be checked by adding some more variables (ownership i.e. foreign, female and family as internal and auditor as external), but they are not added in this work due to data unavailability.

The study contributes to the literature and could be useful for the policy makers who need to force banks to mandate codes of governance through which they can create an efficient board structure and augment the performance. The investments from different forms of ownership can be accelerated if they follow the codes properly.

The study facilitates the bankers in incorporating sound codes of corporate governance to enhance the performance of the banks.

This work is unique as no one has explored the impact of external mechanism of governance on the performance of the banking sector of Pakistan.

This paper aims to verify whether the legitimate pressure of external forces on heavily polluting firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR)-related behaviors affect firms’ assurance strategy in the Chinese context. The authors argue that, under external pressure, as a source of legitimacy, the assurance over CSR reports allows the business behaviors of heavy polluters to be recognized by society.

This paper sampled listed heavy polluters in China from 2011 to 2018 and used the multiperiod logit model to examine the effects of external corporate governance on firms’ assurance decisions. Principal component analysis methods were used to construct a comprehensive framework of external corporate governance. The indicators were obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research databases, the NERI Report and the China Urban Statistical Yearbook.

This paper confirms that external corporate governance positively affects firms’ assurance decisions, and good financial conditions, well-governed internal controls and sufficient government subsidies positively moderate this effect.

The findings provide feasible ways to encourage firms’ high-quality corporate environmental information disclosure, thus providing valuable guidance for policymakers and other stakeholders to effectively supervise firms’ CSR behaviors.

The findings are of great importance in encouraging high-quality corporate environmental information disclosures, improving the support of capital markets among developing countries and drawing social attention to the environmental protection and social responsibility of heavy polluters.

The research extends the current research in the field of social environmental accounting by using legitimacy theory to explain firms’ assurance motivations. Additionally, this paper focuses on the practices of assurance services in the emerging economy and provides suggestions for developing assurance over CSR reports.

The public listing of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) is a recent phenomenon in India, started in 2012. Such a paradigm shift for SMEs has altered the ownership structure of these firms. In addition, the listing has provided a notable status to SMEs, leading to a shift in exposure to market competition. Literature signifies that these changing dynamics are likely to impact the firm value. This study aims to examine the effects of promoters’ ownership and market competition on the firm value of listed SMEs in India. Ownership concentration (promoters’ ownership) is investigated as the primary proxy for internal governance mechanism, while market competition is investigated as an external form of firm regulation.

Three years of panel data from 2018 to 2020 of 80 listed Indian SMEs are used to conduct the analysis. The fixed effects model and cluster robust standard errors captured the detected fixed effects while adjusting for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Besides, moderation analysis is conducted to test if competition regulates the relation between promoters’ ownership and firm value.

Promoters’ ownership does not impact the firm value significantly. However, market competition is significant and negatively drives the firm’s value. So, the market competition provides external regulation and coerces the firms to behave well to conserve the firm value. Finally, competition does not regulate the relationship between ownership effects and firm value. Therefore, the study contrasts the belief that the benefits of internal governance (especially promoters’ ownership) for firms in competitive economies are subject to market competition.

The study establishes the possibility of an integrated approach where internal and external governance mechanisms coexist to drive the firm value and endorses the same. The study is relevant to shareholders, practitioners, lawmakers and academics.

This paper aims to examine the relevance of stock analysts’ opinions and institutional investors’ shareholding to the value of Chinese firms.

The authors use both internal and external corporate governance mechanism to investigate value relevance of analyst opinion and institutional shareholding to Chinese firms.

The authors find that Tobin’s Q is positively related to analysts’ consensus forecast optimism and institutional investors’ shareholding but negatively related to analyst forecast dispersions. Further analysis using subsamples of partially state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned firms indicate that institutional investors have significant impact on firm value for all firms irrespective of the ownership type, whereas analyst forecasts opinions appear to have significant effects on partially state-owned firms but insignificant effects on non-state-owned firms. The results also show that internal governance appears to be an important pre-requisite that affects analysts’ forecast opinions and that good internal governance reinforces external governance mechanism to create firm value.

Studies analysing the effects of both internal and external mechanisms on firm value in emerging economies are scant. This study attempts to extend and contribute to this line of research by investigating the relevance of institutional investors and stock analysts’ opinion to firm valuation.

This study focuses on the evaluation of the introduction of international corporate governance codes such as Combined Code (UK) and King Report III (SA) in the Greek publicly listed enterprises. This research is based on a case study analysis of six publicly listed enterprises (three of them are traded in the high capitalization index and another three in the medium‐low capitalization index of the Athens Stock Exchange). The main purpose of this paper is to examine the extent of international corporate governance codes impact in the relevant local laws and regulations, as well as the adopted best practices.

Qualitative research is carried out to address the research topic, using primary and secondary data. The primary source of this study is the professional experience of the author in the field of corporate governance within publicly listed enterprises, whereas secondary sources are the international corporate governance codes, Greek corporate governance laws, regulations and best practices, books, working papers and published articles.

Although certain parts of international governance codes requirements have been applied by a number of Greek publicly listed enterprises, there is a long way to go to achieve best practice. The reason for this is the typical, however not substantial application of international governance codes requirements.

Research is proved to be very useful as it describes a gap analysis in the application of international governance codes in the areas of corporate governance, internal and external auditing, as well as the regulators therefore making it easier to identify potential areas for improvement.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance by conducting a meta-analysis of 25 previous studies. The analysis has three specific concerns, i.e. the moderating effects of legal systems (common law or civil law), governance mechanisms (external or both external and internal governance together) and performance measures (accounting or market value).

The methodology used is the meta-analysis technique developed by Hunter et al. (1982).

The findings show that the external governance mechanisms measured by anti-takeover provisions and market value of firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q and market to book value are the key moderators of this relationship.

This paper has important implications for regulators and directors by proposing external governance to be an influential factor of firm performance. This paper is also of interest to the investors and companies by highlighting the significant relationship between corporate governance and market value of the firm.

As the author finds that the external governance mechanism (anti-takeover provisions) exerts more influential effect on firm performance than both external and internal governance together, this research confirms the imperative for external governance to increase the firm value.

This study contributes to the existing literature that corporate governance consist of internal and external governance behavior which refers to the complementarity of the elements of (1) competing values framework and (2) corporate legality framework theories and proper orientation in the provisions of the elements leads to a good corporate power in the modern legal environment. A questionnaire is designed, a survey is conducted based on the constructed corporate governance model in the study, which investigates the evolutionary background of the elements with the view of establishing the right corporate culture and corporate legality behavior. The empirical results revealed that there is a positive linear relationship between the elements of corporate culture provisions with internal governance behavior and a significant positive association between the elements of corporate legality provisions with external governance behavior. The model does not take into account long-term external factors. Therefore, measuring corporate governance may not be an easy task and may not be suitable for specific countries that have strong legal systems and corporate ownership. The elements in the model are practical to implement and facilitates corporate to improve shareholder involvement and governance reporting and hence prevent failure. The constructed model span almost every attribute embedding high quality corporate social responsibility and corporate governance for corporate to identify areas for improvement and contributes to existing corporate governance literature that, connecting corporate culture and corporate legality behavior positively affect financial markets and firm performance.

This paper aims to analyze the effects of internal and external governance mechanisms on the performance and risk taking of banks from the Euro zone before and after the 2008 financial crisis.

To avoid macroeconomic problems and shocks and because of data availability, the authors select some countries of the Euro zone, namely, France, Belgium, Germany and Finland, during the 2004-2009 period. These countries share similar macroeconomic environments (unemployment, inflation and economic growth rates). All the data relating to the banks are manually drawn from the supervising reports submitted to banks and are available on the banks’ websites and/or on that of the AMF website. The banks included in our sample are drawn from the list of European central banks on www.ecb.int

The empirical results show that banks undertake tradeoffs between different governance mechanisms to alleviate the intensity of the agency conflicts between the shareholders and managers. The findings also confirm that internal mechanisms and capital regulations are complementary and significantly impact bank performance.

This analysis can be extended through studying the interaction between bondholders’ governance and shareholders’ governance and their impact on the 2008 financial crisis.

The changes in banking governance help banks find a useful and necessary way to avoid ill-considered risks that can cause a systemic risk. Therefore, some conditions should be met so that banking governance can contribute to the economic development.

Culture and mentality of good banking governance must grow as much as possible through awareness-raising, training, promotion, recognition of performance, enhancing procedure transparency and stability of good banking governance and regulations, strengthening the national capacity to fight against corruption, and preventive mechanisms.

This paper complements previous studies, mainly those of Andres and Vallelado (2008) who examine the impact of the components of the board on banking performance and of Laeven and Levine (2009) who estimate the combined effect of regulatory and ownership structure on the risk-taking of each bank.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the important role played by corporate governance in de facto International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) convergence, and to provide empirical evidence that audit quality mediates the degree of IFRS convergence.

The paper develops a model showing the role of corporate governance in converging national accounting standards with the IFRS, and empirically tests the model using a sample of Chinese listed companies with B‐shares. Both analysis of variance and multiple regressions are employed to test the hypotheses.

Effective internal corporate governance helps companies to be more aligned with IFRS and thus provide high quality financial information. Furthermore, audit quality as an external governance factor mediates the relationship between internal corporate governance and IFRS convergence.

The paper extends research findings, as shown in the literature, by showing the role of corporate governance in the IFRS convergence, especially the mediating effect of audit quality. In addition to accounting standards, global convergence of auditing standards and corporate governance is imperative if de facto convergence of accounting standards is to be achieved.

The paper highlights the effect of corporate governance and the interaction between internal and external corporate governance in achieving IFRS convergence, which has been largely ignored in the literature. Based on the results, the paper proposes an explanation for the mixed results shown in the literature.

This paper aims to assess the effects of external governance mechanisms on the performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Togo.

Using annual time series data from a sample of 30 MFIs during the period 2011–2015, the authors apply panel data econometrics in their estimations.

The results indicate that the notation by a rating agency positively and significantly affects the financial return of MFIs. The quality and the regularity of the audits negatively and significantly influence the financial performance (measured by return on assets and operating self-sufficiency) but favorably and significantly influence social performance (increased number of active borrowers (NAB) and reduced size of loans). Furthermore, supervision increases the amount of individual loans but decreases the NAB, which means deterioration in social performance. Overall, this paper shows that external governance mechanisms significantly affect the performance of Togolese MFIs, but with varying effects depending on the mechanism considered.

The sample size of 30 MFIs is small, and the geographic coverage of the study is restricted to MFIs operating in the city of Lomé, Togo. The authors did not have access to the information regarding the portfolio at risk at 30 days, even though it is a measure of financial performance. Likewise, we did not have access to the appendices to the financial statements for the calculation of prudential ratios. This method, which consists of asking the institutions using a questionnaire if they comply with prudential standards, may be biased because this study cannot verify the authenticity of the responses given that the standards are quantitative.

The study findings advocate that improving the financial and social performance of MFIs requires improving the quality of external governance mechanisms. MFIs should then pay close attention to well-functioning external governance mechanisms.

As MFIs are key social actors in a society, all mechanisms that contribute to their efficiency benefit society.

This study contributes to the corporate governance literature by showing that external governance mechanisms influence performance. These external mechanisms are complementary disciplinary measures to internal governance mechanisms and other tools.