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The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the characteristics of statutory internal auditors on operating efficiency.

This study investigates three characteristics pertaining to statutory internal auditors, namely, compensation, activity and expertise, based on 1,340 firm observations from 2009 to 2010 using publicly available disclosure data for Korean listed firms.

The authors find no evidence that statutory internal auditors’ compensation is positively associated with operating efficiency. This implies that compensation data on statutory internal auditors in Korea may not directly reflect their competence and ability to enhance operating efficiency. On the other hand, the authors find evidence for a positive association between full-time status for statutory internal auditors and operating efficiency and a positive association between the attendance at board meetings for statutory internal auditors and operating efficiency. The results also show a decrease in operating efficiency when statutory internal auditors are newly appointed. Finally, expertise of statutory internal auditors in financial or legal matters provides no advantage in terms of operating efficiency.

This study contributes to the extant literature on internal audit by examining the advisory role of statutory internal auditors and its effect on operating efficiency, which is one of the objectives established by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.

While most prior research on internal audit depends on survey data from statutory internal auditors or experimental data based on a limited sample of firms, this study is based on a large sample of publicly available data of the Korean market.

Based on 3,775 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2013 using publicly available disclosure data for Korean listed firms, this study examines whether and how firm-level governance characteristics are associated with investment in internal auditing proxied by compensation and the number of statutory internal auditors.

The authors investigate the association between governance characteristics and investment in internal auditing proxied by compensation and the number of statutory internal auditors.

The authors find that firms with greater ownership of the largest shareholders and with a higher proportion of outside directors invest more in internal auditing. These results indicate that firms with higher incentive and demand for monitoring are more likely to invest more in internal auditing. The authors further find that the positive effect of the largest shareholder ownership (board independence) on investment in internal auditing is attenuated in firms with greater board independence (ownership of the largest shareholders) suggesting that the complementary effect of the two governance mechanisms associated with internal auditing weakens as they function simultaneously.

The results provide regulators and investors with a clear picture of the governance characteristics of firms associated with investment in internal auditing. The results imply that both the largest shareholders and the outside board of directors play a significant role in resource allocation in internal auditing within a firm. The effect of allocation, however, can be attenuated contingent upon the combined characteristics of governance mechanisms.

Using large amounts of public archival data, this study adds to the extant literature on firm characteristics associated with investment in internal auditing. This study also contributes to the literature by expanding the scope of research on executive compensation to the locus of statutory internal auditors.

Based on 1,798 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2013, using publicly available disclosure data for Korean listed firms, this study aims to examine whether statutory internal auditors influence firm-level stock price crash risk.

Based on the bad news hoarding theory of crash risk, the authors investigate the association between the quality of statutory internal auditors and one-year-ahead stock price crash risk. The quality of statutory internal auditors is measured as the compensation of statutory internal auditors and the financial expertise of statutory internal auditors. Stock price crash risk is measured as an indicator variable whether a firm experiences one or more crash weeks during the fiscal year period.

The authors find that higher quality of statutory internal auditors – measured through greater compensation and greater financial expertise – is associated with lower possibilities of future stock price crash risk. These results indicate that high-quality statutory internal auditors mitigate bad news hoarding of managers because of their greater capability and stronger incentive to lower litigation risk and preserve their reputation. The results are mostly robust to different measures for stock price crash risk and the quality of statutory internal auditors.

The findings of this study regarding stock price crash risk are important for investors because such risk can significantly affect investor welfare. The results indicate that statutory internal auditors play an important role in controlling future stock price crash risk and maintaining stability in the equity market.

This study adds to the extant literature on the determinants of stock price crash risk and is the first to examine the impact of internal auditors on stock price crash risk. Moreover, this study also contributes to the existing literature on internal auditor quality by showing that high-quality statutory internal auditors reduce risks in financial markets.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of internal audit function (IAF) quality on the operational efficiency of Chinese firms.

The authors use regression models with a sample of Chinese listed companies to test their research hypotheses.

The authors find that IAF quality is positively associated with firm operational efficiency. The result is unchanged after correcting for endogeneity via the instrumental variable method and using an alternative measure of firm operational efficiency. The authors show that IAF competence improves firm operational efficiency, but the relationship between IAF independence and firm operational efficiency is insignificant. Additionally, they find that IAF quality can only significantly improve firm operational efficiency in the presence of effective corporate governance at the firm level and strong institutions at the province level. Using path analysis, the authors find that an IAF can improve firm operational efficiency directly or indirectly by promoting firm internal control quality.

The findings of this study suggest the need for a balance between IAF competence and independence to achieve the goals of IAF. Additionally, the authors study suggests that the effectiveness of IAF is contingent on corporate governance and market-based institutions.

The study’s findings contribute to the burgeoning literature on the relationship between IAF and firm operational performance and deepen the authors’ understanding of the role of IAF in an emerging economy whose government plays a major role in promoting and enforcing internal audits. The study also empirically support the Internal Audit Governance Maturity Model proposed by the Institute of Internal Auditors.

Examines the role of professional associations, governmental agencies, and international accounting and auditing bodies in promulgating standards to foster auditor independence domestically and abroad. Focuses specifically on the role played by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the Securities and Exchange Commission and the US Government Accounting Office. Also looks at other professional associations in banking, industry, and manufacturing sectors dealing with sensitive issues of auditors′ involvement in such matters as management advisory services, operating responsibilities, outsourcing, opinion shopping, auditor rotation, and other conflicts of interest which may impair auditor independence.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

The Howard Shuttering Contractors case throws considerable light on the importance which the tribunals attach to warnings before dismissing an employee. In this case the tribunal took great pains to interpret the intention of the parties to the different site agreements, and it came to the conclusion that the agreed procedure was not followed. One other matter, which must be particularly noted by employers, is that where a final warning is required, this final warning must be “a warning”, and not the actual dismissal. So that where, for example, three warnings are to be given, the third must be a “warning”. It is after the employee has misconducted himself thereafter that the employer may dismiss.

In order to succeed in an action under the Equal Pay Act 1970, should the woman and the man be employed by the same employer on like work at the same time or would the woman still be covered by the Act if she were employed on like work in succession to the man? This is the question which had to be solved in Macarthys Ltd v. Smith. Unfortunately it was not. Their Lordships interpreted the relevant section in different ways and since Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome was also subject to different interpretations, the case has been referred to the European Court of Justice.

In the last monograph an attempt was made at giving a short historical background of the trade union movement; at defining a trade union; at discussing the closed shop and at looking towards its future.

Explores objectives, functions, roles and contributions of the audit committee in the context of its relationships with the board of directors, internal auditors and external auditors. Suggests that the audit committee is a step forward in the development of corporate control so long as it does not have unrealistic expectations. Concludes that the role of the audit committee should be in an advisory and oversight capacity with independence, but should remain an internal organ of the corporation.