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This chapter discusses the current landscape for digital asset investing and the many operational risks facing cryptocurrency investors. It also discusses the ongoing progress in the institutionalization of digital asset investment and the risks inherent when investing in cryptocurrencies and blockchain opportunities. Investors considering investing in a public or private fund that invests in digital assets must be aware of the operational risks that may directly impact their investments, including risks from portfolio concentration, illiquidity, hacking, digital asset custody, and digital asset valuations. Operational due diligence reviews of funds and fund managers are critical in assessing operational risks for digital asset investment.

In December 2008, as the financial and economic crisis continued on its devastating course, a new scandal erupted. After the 1998s failure of Long-Term Capital Management, Madoff's fraud once again discredits the hedge funds industry. This scandal is, however, of a different kind. Indeed, Madoff's firm is not a standard hedge fund but a developed Ponzi scheme. By explaining Madoff's system and exploring the reasons for its collapse, this paper draws risk management lessons from this fraud, especially for operational risk management, due diligence processes, and the use of quantitative replication, regulatory, and standardizing approaches of the hedge fund industry.

The purpose of this paper is events and analysis of present a hedge fund collapse, offer lessons to investors and hedge fund industry stakeholders and propose a possible remedy for mitigating operational risks and associated potential losses.

This study focused on one hedge fund case study and conducted a thorough investigation of the events that led to the collapse and eventual filing of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) complaint. All articles and publications used for this research are available in the public domain and accessible.

Wood River Capital Management had concentrated the portfolios of its two hedge funds into one stock, EndWave Corp. Fund Manager violated terms of offering memorandum. Investors were not made aware of and did not discover the operational risks. Stock price of EndWave plummeted. There was no independent oversight over the funds. The values of the two funds dropped significantly. Investors attempted to redeem but the funds were not liquid. The SEC filed a complaint. Mr Whittier was sentenced for three years in jail.

It is an analysis of US-based hedge fund, not an empirical paper. The article presents critical analysis and offers many valuable lessons to hedge fund industry stakeholders.

This paper helps investors in terms of identifying a hedge fund’s operational risks and conducting more effective due diligence while vetting a hedge fund. This could potentially save investors and constituents billions of dollars, by avoiding potential hedge fund collapses. This paper suggests that the scope of fiduciary duty be expanded to cover hedge fund industry vendors.

Thorough research of a hedge fund that collapsed because of poor investment decisions, not self-enrichment at expense of fund investors. This paper provides lessons to investors in terms of identifying a hedge fund’s critical operational risks and conducting value preserving due diligence. This could potentially save hedge funds investors billions of dollars, by avoiding potential hedge fund collapses. This paper recommends that the scope of fiduciary duty be expanded to cover hedge fund industry vendors.

The loss of an amount in excess of $100m cash deposit can be disruptive to the operations, definitely the liquidity of the hedge fund. Should a hedge fund liquidity position deteriorate, its compromised solvency could impact its vendors, most notably creditors and prime brokers. Large successful hedge funds do make basic mistakes. Lawyer Marc Dreier committed the criminal act of selling fraudulent promissory notes to hedge funds and others. Mr Drier’s success in selling fraudulent promissory notes was facilitated by his accomplices who posed as fake representatives of legitimate institutions. Drier and team presented bogus “audited financial statements” and forged developer’s signatures, and even went as far as using the unsuspecting institutions’ premises for meetings to meet potential notes buyers to further falsely legitimize the scheme. He had the notes buyers send their payments to his law firm account, to secure the money. His actions cost his victims, who include 13 hedge fund managers, other investors and entities, $400m in addition to his law firm’s employees who also suffered when his law firm was dissolved. For his actions, he was sentenced 20 years in federal prison for investment fraud. This study aims to direct hedge fund investors and other stakeholders to thoroughly vet the compliance function, especially controls on cash disbursements, even if the hedge fund is sizable (in excess of $1bn). Investors and even other stakeholders also should place a greater focus on what is usually overlooked issue; most notably the credit quality and authenticity of short-term investments bought by their hedge funds.

A thorough investigation of a fraud committed by a lawyer against a number of hedge funds. Several important lessons are identified to professionals who conduct due diligence on hedge funds.

The details of the case are very remarkable. This case directs investors’ attention to place greater efforts on certain aspects of operational risk and due diligence on not only hedge funds but also other investment managers. Normally investors conduct operational due diligence on the fund and its operations. Investors also vet fund external parties such as prime brokers, custodians, accountants and fund administrators. Yet, investors normally do not suspect the quality of short-term fund investments. In this case, the short-terms investments were the source of unforeseen yet substantial risk.

Stakeholders in hedge funds need to carefully investigate the issuer of and the quality of short-term investments that a hedge fund invests in. Future research can investigate the association of hedge fund manager failure with a liquidity position of the fund.

Investors must thoroughly the entirety of the fund including short-term securities.

Normally, it is the hedge funds that commit the fraud against investors. In this case, it is the multi-billion hedge funds run by sophisticated fund managers, who are the victims.

The aims of this paper are: first, to draw attention to the issues of displaced commercial risk (DCR) which arise as a result of the risk characteristics of profit‐sharing investment accounts (PSIA), the main source of funding of Islamic banks in most jurisdictions; and, second, to present a value‐at‐risk approach to the estimation of DCR and the associated adjustments in capital requirements.

The paper is based on empirical research into the characteristics of PSIA in practice, which vary to a greater or lesser extent from what one would expect them to be in principle, on an analysis of the capital adequacy and risk management implications that flow from this, and on an econometric formulation whereby the extent of DCR in Islamic banks may be estimated.

The findings are, first, that the characteristics of PSIA can vary from being a deposit like product (fixed return, capital certain, all risks borne by shareholders) to an investment product (variable return, bearing the risk of losses in underlying investments), depending upon the extent to which the balance sheet risks get shifted (“displaced”) from investment account holders to shareholders through various techniques available to Islamic banks' management. Second, the paper finds that this DCR has a major impact on Islamic bank's economic and regulatory capital requirements, asset‐liability management, and product pricing. Finally, it proposes an econometric approach to estimating DCR but report that individual Islamic banks generally lack the data needed to apply this approach, in the absence of which panel data for a population of Islamic banks may be used to estimate DCR for that population.

Empirically, the paper is thus limited by the lack of data just mentioned. Furthermore, the application of the proposed panel data approach has been left for future research.

The analysis of the issues and the development of the econometric model represent in themselves an original research contribution of some significance.

This piece critically reviews the potential impact of the FSA’s application of its ‘Operational Risk’ approach to regulation. It uses the Treasury proposals for ‘Sandler’ products as an example of the disastrous results that can arise from the combination of political direction of product design with inept regulation.

This paper aims to provide an analysis and report on the current regulatory environment for US hedge funds and explore the latest actions from governmental groups and the private sector.

A compilation of the most recent government communications, legislative proposals, industry newsletters and seminars, and other related sources.

US regulation surrounding hedge funds is in a state of flux. Substantially more pension money being invested in hedge funds has become a very important factor in the discussions. Hedge funds that are already registered are staying so in the vast majority of cases. The consensus is that more regulation is likely; however, what form that regulation will take is still unsettled at this point.

Based on first‐hand experience working with hedge funds, the authors have endeavored to present and outline the most up‐to‐date information on this hot‐button issue.

Advances in market risk management have had a huge impact on asset liability management in recent years, enabling the most advanced institutions to analyze their balance sheet risks in a much more realistic and dynamic way. In future, as risk management develops still further and computing power increases, ALM could find itself with a new, broader function to perform.

The purpose of this paper is to advance a holistic model of venture capital (VC) firms’ syndication decisions in an emerging economy. When considering syndication with local partners, VC firms consider multiple sources of risk related to firm-specific characteristics (life-cycle, operational and political). In conjunction with these risk factors, they also consider their own capabilities, namely, their knowledge breadth and knowledge depth. Knowledge breadth stems from a VC firm’s network position and knowledge depth is a result of its prior industry expertise. Together, these capabilities have competing impacts on VC firms’ desire to syndicate. From one perspective, VC firm capabilities may help deal with risk such that syndication may not be perceived as necessary. Alternatively, VC firm capabilities may signal attractiveness to a local partner and allow the VC firm to syndicate more easily.

Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis is conducted on a sample of 111 US VC firms investing in China between 1993 and 2010.

Lower VC firm capabilities are associated with a tendency not to syndicate with a local partner when venture risk factors are low. This pattern may arise because of such VC firms’ relative lack of experience with partnership management or weaker appeal to local partners.

This study is one of the earliest attempts to develop a neo-configurational perspective within the VC literature and thus contributes to a more nuanced understanding of international VC firms’ strategic behaviour in emerging economies by examining multiple risks and capabilities simultaneously and in conjunction.