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The purpose of this paper is to discuss the implications of recent decisions by the UK Information Commissioner under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, ordering the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA), over its objections, to disclose details of certain investigations.

Explains the details of two recent decisions by the Information Commissioner that have called into question whether the FSA can refuse to disclose the names of firms it investigates or censures privately or informally.

If the Information Commissioner's view is upheld over the FSA's appeals, the FSA could no longer conduct mystery shopping exercises and other types of informal thematic investigations without the risk of the details of those exercises having to be disclosed, and the Information Commissioner's reasoning could possibly be extended to require the disclosure of the FSA's views about firms expressed in reports prepared by supervisors, such as Arrow reports, and private warnings.

Practical interpretation of FSA policy by expert securities lawyers.

This paper seeks to consider the first ever report by the National Audit Office (NAO) on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the Financial Services Authority (FSA).

This paper reviews the NAO's report and the FSA's response.

The paper finds that the majority of the NAO's findings and recommendations have been accepted and incorporated into the FSA's planning.

This paper will be of interest to regulated firms and regulatory and public law lawyers.

This paper reviews the major developments in law and policy arising from cases involving the FSA Enforcement Division in the two years after N2. It considers how the FSA has reacted to dealing with the expectations and pressures of publicity which will lead to a change in the rules affecting confidentiality; the Court of Appeal’s ruling on the due process and safeguards within the enforcement process; and the implications for authorised firms arising from the largest disciplinary case of 2003, Lloyds TSB, which resulted in a settlement of approximately £100m.

To consider the recommendations made by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) enforcement process review (the review).

This paper has considered the concerns raised by the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal in the Legal & General case, the reaction of the FSA to those concerns and the terms of reference for the review, plus the impact of the review's 44 recommendations.

That the recommendations will bring greater transparency to the FSA's process of investigating regulatory breaches and taking enforcement action against firms and individuals, although it may take some time for the regulator and the city to adapt to the revised enforcement process.

This paper will be of interest to firms and individuals in the regulated sector and regulatory lawyers interested in the FSA's enforcement process.

This paper sets out some of the issues facing a firm in attempting to reduce the costs of compliance and concentrates on the operations performed by a firm's supervision teams and their interaction with the supervisors from the Financial Services Authority (FSA). It concentrates on those areas in which evidence suggests that the greatest opportunities for gain exist or where in fact firms permit the most significant inefficiencies to remain. The developments within compliance have been considerable over the last few years and while standards have risen so have the costs associated with demonstrating compliance with the relevant requirements. Firms must ensure that their supervision departments are operating efficiently and this means a return to basics. The compliance plan is an essential requirement but must be monitored and reviewed in order to ensure that targets are being achieved and resources concentrated upon the higher areas of risk. The greatest potential for additional cost has its origins in the visits undertaken by the inspectors from the FSA. Without careful planning, adequate resourcing and presentation of material it is very easy for the FSA to misconstrue the extent of a particular issue, or misunderstand the context in which the issue exists within the business. The opportunity for minimising additional costs arising from a routine visit from the FSA lies in the hands of the firm but many seemingly miss the warning signs. When things go wrong, firms often feel that they are at the mercy of the FSA. In fact there are a number of steps that a firm can take to either minimise the potential for escalation of an issue and to mitigate the costs even if a transfer to enforcement actually materialises.

The purpose of this paper is to report and comment on the High Court ruling on whether Financial Services Authority (FSA) disclosures are exempt from freedom of information requests.

The paper outlines the facts surrounding the case and comments on the decision.

The High Court allowed the FSA's appeal in respect of the Owen appeal and the second part of the Lewis appeal (that the names of the seven firms investigated by the FSA as a result of the mystery shopping should not be disclosed) but agreed with the Tribunal on the first part of the Lewis appeal, that the names of the firms subject to the mystery shopping exercise could be disclosed.

This appeal shows how two very differently motivated, yet equally well‐intentioned, regulatory regimes can come into conflict.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the implications of the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) January 25, 2011 discussion paper, DP11/1 Product Intervention.

The paper discusses the FSA's previous regulatory approach; the limited usefulness of disclosure in consumer protection; the impact of trends toward a direct adviser fee structure and the phasing out of commission‐based remuneration; the FSA's perceived need to become more directly involved in the product development process; various ways in which the FSA might intervene including product pre‐approval, product banning, and price intervention; and possible limitations on the FSA's power to intervene.

The key issues raised by the FSA discussion paper are a new interventionist stance taken by the FSA and prospectively by its successor the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA); the increased focus on the product itself (in addition to disclosure and point of sale); and the possible extension in the scope of the FSA's existing powers.

The paper provides practical insight from experienced financial services lawyers.

We develop and test an innovative approach to teaching financial statement analysis (FSA) and assessing student learning outcomes based on making complex stock investment decisions compared to professional analysts. We train students to apply FSA and emphasize interdisciplinary factors and high integrative complexity. Our innovative FSA teaching approach, which we apply in an MBA financial reporting course, involves the instructor lecturing on FSA as a tool for integrative and complex decision making, students researching and applying FSA to public companies, and presenting the rationale for individual and group stock investment decisions. The instructor gives high-quality and timely feedback on the students’ application of FSA with a focus on investment judgments involving critical thinking, problem-solving, and teamwork skills. Our detailed efficacy analysis shows that our FSA teaching approach is effective. Students who perceive a public company to have credible management, effective competitive strategy, and an acceptable level of financial flexibility make comparable individual and group stock investment decisions as professional analysts.

Traditionally, hiring indefinite duration contract employees has been the dominant method used by U.S. organizations to staff their labor needs. Indefinite duration contract employees, hereafter referred to as “regular” employees, have three defining characteristics: (1) they are hired directly as employees of the organization whose work they perform; (2) the duration of the employment relationship is unspecified, with a mutual expectation that it will continue as long as it is mutually satisfactory; and (3) the employment relationship provides ongoing – as opposed to intermittent – work. When their demand for labor increases, organizations staffed exclusively by regular employees can respond by having their employees work overtime or by hiring additional regular employees. Conversely, when their demand for labor decreases, such organizations can either maintain “inventories” of excess regular employees or reduce labor inputs by laying-off or reducing the work hours of regular employees.

Owing to the tremendously vast and unprecedented nature of the directly‐conferred statutory powers of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) (under the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000), there is need for ample accountability on its part. The paper aims to discuss the situation.

A critical analysis of the Combined Code on corporate governance. The paper argues in favour of obliging the FSA to adopt the Code as a way of making it accountable.

It is desirable that the FSA be accountable and that this can best be done via the imposition of corporate governance principles. The paper includes a suggestion of election of the FSA's governing board.

The wider re‐drafting (and construction), by Parliament, of section 7 is the most attractive mode of enforcing corporate governance as an accountability mechanism. This is so, as it will give it far greater force than at present by creating a mandatory regime to bind the FSA in this respect. What is required, therefore, is an amendment of s. 7 of the FSMA 2000 to establish a better accountability method to be imposed on the FSA.

The paper proposes, for the first time, the use of corporate governance (especially the Combined Code) to ensure the accountability of the FSA. The paper is valuable to academics, postgraduate research students and legal practitioners in the area of financial services regulation, corporate law and general public body accountability. It is also useful for those interested incorporate governance and the Combined Code on corporate governance.