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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of agricultural credit rationing by formal lenders in Ghana.

This study employed descriptive statistics, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Heckman's two-stage regression model to identify types of rationing faced by farmers and investigate factors that influence agricultural credit rationing by formal financial institutions. Data used in this study are gathered through a survey of 595 farmers in seven districts within Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana.

The result reveals that farmers face three types of rationing. Evidence from the Heckman two-stage models shows that engagement in off farm income generating activities, increase in farm size, positive balances on accounts and commercial orientation of the farmers has the potential to reduce rationing of credit applicants by formal lenders.

The results provide information on the factors that need to be considered as important in an attempt to reduce agricultural credit rationing by formal lenders.

The value of this study is that farmers would use the results of this study to improve access to required amount of agricultural credit from formal financial institutions. The information would also benefit stakeholders in the agricultural sector, particularly youth in agriculture program organized by Ministry of Food and Agriculture in Ghana as how to improve access to credit and reduce rationing of program participants by formal financial institutions.

The dependence of farmers on money lenders for agricultural credit despite the penetration of the formal financial sector with subsidized interest rates remains an economic puzzle. The purpose of this paper is to revisit the relationship between money lenders and farmers in the presence of trade-loan nexus.

The study provides a theoretical framework supported by empirical evidence. It uses primary survey data of farmers in a major potato producing district of West Bengal, India. For the empirical analysis, apart from descriptive statistics, the authors use a logit regression model to derive insights from some testable hypotheses.

The study finds that trade-loan nexus increases defaults on agricultural loans through two channels: first, by increasing loan requirement and repayment obligations through high input prices and interest rates, respectively; and second, by reducing income of farmers by setting low prices for the output.

The functioning of money lenders in rural areas, including their sources of finance and political control over local economy, and the existing social hierarchies in the rural context will have to be studied in detail to understand the complexities of the issue.

The findings of the study underline the need for policy initiatives to break the trade-loan nexus to reduce the dependence of farmers on money lenders.

The higher defaults help the money lender to sustain in the rural agricultural loan market as the formal sector becomes reluctant to lend in the presence of pervasive defaults.

The study is entirely original based on primary survey data of seven blocks of a major potato producing district in West Bengal, India. It could be the first such study on the subject. The findings are fresh and expected to contribute to development economics and agriculture finance literature and policy making.

The purpose of this study is to propose a model of competition between a formal lender (bank) and an informal lender (moneylender) with informational asymmetry between these two lenders. Further, the authors introduce capacity constraint on the lending capacity of the moneylender and assume that borrowers differ in risk and wealth.

The solution concept of Nash equilibrium has been used to derive the optimal strategies of the lenders.

The equilibrium strategies in most of the results depend on the difference between the expected returns from risky and safe projects where the risky project has higher expected returns. The credit market is segmented in terms of risk and wealth levels. Rationing of poor safe borrowers from the credit market is inevitable when the moneylender's capacity is sufficiently small, suggesting a low-income trap for them. Further, when moneylender has capacity constraint of some form, a zero-profit outcome is never a Nash equilibrium outcome.

There is a possibility of collusion between the lenders. However, the authors do not derive all possible outcomes under capacity constraint

When the informal lender has limited capacity, competition between formal and informal lenders may not alleviate credit rationing, instead aggravate the problem. Thus, the government should devise policies to ensure credit availability to resource poor households

While the literature models strategic interaction between lenders under the assumption of zero-profit (Bertrand Paradox) condition, this study shows that zero profit is not the only outcome under such a set-up. Also, in presence of capacity constraint of the moneylender, a zero-profit outcome is never a Nash equilibrium outcome for the lenders. There is an optimal contract at which the lenders differentiate in terms of repayment and collateral and earn positive profits under certain conditions.

The purpose of this study is to examine the demand for credit and credit rationing conducted by formal, informal and emerging microfinance lenders in the four poor counties of China.

This paper extends the existing studies on credit rationing in rural China by comparing the determinants of credit rationing by three different lenders, the formal lenders rural credit cooperatives (RCCs), the informal lenders and the new microfinance institutions (MFIs).

MFIs are capable of reaching out to the even poorer households if they develop the loan products based on the income and expenditure flows of these households.

The determinants of credit rationing by three types of institutions are estimated separately.

RCCs in China shall change their policy of discrimination against female-headed households. RCCs shall also simplify the loan application procedures and assess the clients based on their repayment capacities rather than the age or assets alone. RCCs could learn from MFIs to use incomes from migrant workers as a criterion to assess the loan applicants.

gender equity for loan access.

This paper extends the existing studies on credit rationing in rural China by comparing the determinants of credit rationing by three different lenders, the formal lenders (RCCs), the informal lenders and the new MFIs.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how shocks suffered by rural households in Ethiopia influence their decision to borrow and the source of credit.

First, suppose a household faces a set of four borrowing alternatives: only formal borrowing, only informal borrowing, both formal and informal borrowing, and non-borrowing. Second, the paper assumes that the random component is independently and identically distributed in accordance with the extreme value distribution. These assumptions lead to the multinomial logit model. The paper estimates the model using data from a survey of 350 rural households in Southern Ethiopia.

The paper finds that shocks are important factors in explaining both the decision to borrow and the source of credit. In particular, negative shocks that affect household's assets, such as the seizing of farmland and theft, or human capital, such as the death of the family head, reduce the probability of borrowing from formal lenders or from both formal and informal lenders at the same time. The study supports only to some extent the assumption that informal credit contributes to smooth consumption. Last, networking effect is very significant and demonstrates how the two markets interact.

A model that would consider dynamic consumption patterns would have been more appropriate. In fact, one of the limitations of the study is the reliance on a cross-section analysis and the data is limited to just one village. Further research would extend the data set geographically and across time.

The formal lenders are not willing to provide contingent loans, maybe because of a limited ability to assess and diversify risk. Besides, the available formal credit products are not proper to finance long term risk management strategies but pesticides, fertilizers and improved seeds that are entirely used in every agricultural cycle. In this regard, proper risk transfer strategies and instruments, as well as better tailored loan products, are needed in order to increase outreach into the rural areas.

To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper that investigates how shocks influence the decision to borrow and the source of credit in Ethiopia.

Based on a survey of 897 farm households, the purpose of this paper is to build a framework using cluster analysis to explain how farmers make decisions on joining group guarantee, and analyzes factors influencing their decisions using multinomial and binary Logit regressions.

The approach of combining cluster analysis with Logit regression is an innovative approach to survey assessment. In addition, by design the authors have identified the four mutually exclusive groups of borrowers combining Group Guarantee membership and actual formal borrowing.

An extremely important observation according to the data is that most farmers appear to be part of group guarantees only because they have to in order to get access to formal credit products. 87.21 percent of the people who belong to groups and utilize the formal credit products belong to this category because their lenders have made participation in groups compulsory for access to credit. This may ration farmers’ willingness to even apply for credit. It also indicates a preference on the part of older and more risk-averse respondents to avoid participation in group guarantees. Out of financial characteristics the total loan holdings appears to be the only significant indicator of participation in group guarantees. Furthermore the results indicate that informal and formal credit appear to be replaceable for farmers.

The survey is confined only to the counties investigated. China is very diverse in its agricultural economies and many RCCs operate under different guidance and rules from those investigated here. Hence, while the authors can claim that the results are indicative, the authors cannot claim that they will hold generally.

Based on group guarantee loan mechanism and survey data analysis of 897 farm households, this paper analyzes influencing factors affecting farmers’ participation in group guarantees from microcosmic level, so as to provide some reference to further perfect micro credit operation mode and mechanism.

The results indicate that the Group Guarantee mechanism, while beneficial to some, may not hold global appeal for Chinese farmers. In the future RCCs may want to consider alternative approaches to loan security than placing the burden of guarantee on farmers’ family and friends.

The approach of combining cluster analysis with Logit regression is an innovative approach to survey assessment. In addition, by design the authors have identified the four mutually exclusive groups of borrowers combining Group Guarantee membership and actual formal borrowing.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which individual risk attitude determines a Cambodian smallholder's choice between a commercial informal loan and a credit from a licensed microfinance institution.

The paper analyzes a sample of smallholder farmers in the Ratanakiri province in northeastern Cambodia, a country with a long history of microfinance and a saturated microcredit market. Employing a binary and a multinomial logit model, this paper assesses the effect of individual risk attitude on the choice of a financial instrument.

The results reveal a statistically significant relationship between the choice of a credit source and an individual's risk attitude: On average (c.p.) the less risk averse the smallholder is, the more they tend to prefer an unlicensed commercial lender.

The findings suggest that less risk-averse individuals tend to take up riskier and generally more expensive informal loans. Measures to increase the safe access to financial services for less risk-averse borrowers as well as improvements in financial literacy should be undertaken to protect smallholders from taking risky choices.

Although existing studies have examined the importance of risk attitudes between credit provider and borrower, they focus mainly on the lender's perspective. This paper provides new insights on how risk attitude influences the borrower's choice in Cambodia. Thus, this study is relevant for policymakers in countries with oversaturated microcredit markets and a high prevalence of informal lenders.

The purpose of this article is to examine the effects that dynamic incentives and the borrowing histories of clients of informal lending institutions have on loan repayment performance, in particular, the extent to which multiple borrowing and progressive lending affect the repayment of loans.

The paper uses a data set of 835 borrowers drawn from an informal lending institution in Tanzania. Descriptive analysis and econometric models are used to test the developed hypotheses.

Whereas clients with multiple loans are associated with poor loan repayment, progressive lending contributes to positive repayment outcomes. Multiple borrowers face increased debt levels and thereby an increased inability to meet their repayment obligations; in contrast, progressive lending by building up a lender–client relationship helps clients to obtain higher loans with a minimum amount of screening.

This was a cross-sectional study based on a sample of individual clients drawn from a single institution. However, since the majority of clients had also taken out loans with other financial institutions, the sample is considered to be representative.

A client’s past repayment performance and multiple loan history must be assessed so that multiple borrowing can be prevented and credit absorption capacity can be gauged more accurately. The repeated nature of the interactions and the threat to cut off any future lending (if loans are not repaid) can be exploited to overcome any information deficit.

This study was conducted in a context in which the degree of information sharing was low and institutional access to clients’ credit histories was limited. It contributes knowledge on how lenders minimise the risk flowing from the ex ante information gap and moral hazards arising from the ex post information gap.

The purpose of this paper is to identify factors affecting formal credit constraint status of rural farm households in Vietnam’s North Central Coast (NCC) region.

Using the direct elicitation method (DEM), the authors consider both internal and external credit rationing.

Empirical evidences confirm the importance of household head’s age, gender and education to household’s likelihood of being credit constrained. In addition, households who have advantages in farm land size, labour resources and non-farm income are less likely to be credit constrained. Poor households are observed to remain restricted by formal credit institutions. Results from the endogenous switching regression model suggest that credit constraints negatively impact household’s consumption per capita and informal credit can act as a substitute to mitigate the negative influence of formal credit constraints.

One limitation arises from the usage of the DEM to identify credit constrained households. The method cannot detect effective and ineffective constraints. Another limitation is the inability of cross-section data to capture long-term impacts of credit constraints on household welfare. Finally, causes of credit constraints from the lender’s view cannot be observed.

The results suggest that it is necessary to enhance the credit allocation regime to reduce the transaction cost and provide target households with sufficient credit. It should be emphasized that high transaction cost and the mismatch between credit demand and supply stemming from information asymmetry. The government can help formal financial institutions to reduce information cost by encouraging the active role of social organizations such as Women Unions, Youth Unions and Veteran Unions in bridging rural farm households with formal lenders.

There are limited studies focusing on determinants of credit constraints and their impacts on rural farm households. To the best of the knowledge, there is no study evaluating the impact of credit constraints on rural farm household welfare particularly in Vietnam. In addition, the studies related to credit constraints only considered full quantity rationing (households applied for the loan but were rejected), omitting the case of partly quantity rationing (loan obtained by the borrowers is less than their demand) and self-rationing.