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Eugene Meyer governed the Federal Reserve Board during most of the Great Contraction. Yet his role and import are almost unknown. He was not misguided by incorrect policy indicators or the real bills doctrine; the usual explanations for the failure of monetary policy. Meyer urged the adoption of expansionary policies and created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to assist banks, especially nonmembers. However, the diffusion of power enabled the district bank Governors to stifle his efforts, although an expansionary policy was finally adopted in 1932. His unquestioning commitment to gold and lack of operational authority are the reasons policy failed.

Social scientists have increasingly turned to constructivist models to explain when, and how, international and world-level social forces constrain the policy-making autonomy of national states. While constructivists have shown that international ideational processes matter for domestic policy making, they have had a harder time explaining why some ideas gain prominence in policy discussions while others do not. This chapter develops an institutionally centered materialist model of idea selection, arguing that international relations of dependency give actors who control vital financial resources a greater capacity to shape the ideational agenda. This model is explored through a case study of the international sources of American monetary policy in the early 1960s. A detailed examination of archival materials shows that European officials at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development were able to advance their own ideas for American monetary policy because the United States was dependent on European cooperation to help resolve its mounting balance of payments problems.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements, which includes information about the targeted Federal fund rate and revision to the future path of monetary policy on Southeast Asian stock market performance.

This paper has used a sample of five national equity market indexes over the period 1997-2013 that covers 132 scheduled FOMC meetings. The authors have developed the model of Wongswan (2009) and Kontonikas et al. (2013) to quantify target surprise and path surprise.

The results first show that all the stock markets examined do respond to information in FOMC announcements. Second, the target Federal fund rate has more impact on Southeast Asian stocks performance than information about the future path of monetary policy does. Third, different Southeast Asian equity markets respond similarly to targeting the Federal fund rate, while the responses to monetary policy differ from each other. Fourth, the response of each country to the FOMC announcement is not statistically different in the two periods of financial crisis.

Southeast Asian financial markets are increasingly highly correlated to the US market. The main channel in which FOMC announcement has impact on Southeast Asian stock markets is through US price transmission. This is the case of foreign firms borrowing from the US market. Then, an increase in interest rate, which means that the cost of financing increases, will lower firm equity value.

The understanding of the response of the Southeast Asian stock markets to target surprise and path surprise, and the impact of each surprise in different time periods, would be important to investors and encourage further discussion amongst academics in Southeast Asia, where stock markets have been emerging in recent years.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the events leading up to the Great Recession, the US Federal Reserve’s response to what it perceived to be a short-term liquidity problem, and the programs it put in place to address liquidity needs from 2007 through the third quarter of 2008.

These programs were designed to channel liquidity to some of the largest institutions, most of which were primary dealers. We describe these programs, examine available evidence regarding their effectiveness and detail which institutions received the largest amounts under each program.

We argue that increasing financial fragility and potential insolvencies in several major institutions were evident prior to the crisis. While it is inherently difficult to disentangle issues of illiquidity from issues of insolvency, failure to recognize and address those insolvency problems delayed necessary adjustments, undermined confidence in the financial system and may have exacerbated the crisis.

Disentangling issues of illiquidity from issues of insolvency is inherently difficult and so it is not possible to specify a definitive counterfactual scenario. Nonetheless, failure to recognize and address the insolvency problems in several major institutions until more than a year after the crisis had begun delayed the necessary adjustment and undermined confidence in the financial system.

This paper is among the first to analyze data showing the amounts of lending and the distribution of these loans across institutions under the Fed’s special liquidity facilities during the first 18 months of the financial crisis.

In this article, we survey experiments that are directly related to monetary policy and central banking. We argue that experiments can also be used as a tool for central bankers for bench testing policy measures or rules. We distinguish experiments that analyze the reasons for non-neutrality of monetary policy, experiments in which subjects play the role of central bankers, experiments that analyze the role of central bank communication and its implications, experiments on the optimal implementation of monetary policy, and experiments relevant for monetary policy responses to financial crises. Finally, we mention open issues and raise new avenues for future research.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the content of the statements that are released by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) after its meetings, identify the main textual associative patterns in the statements and examine their impact on the US treasury market.

Latent semantic analysis (LSA), a language processing technique that allows recognition of the textual associative patterns in documents, is applied to all the statements released by the FOMC between 2003 and 2014, so as to identify the main textual “themes” used by the Committee in its communication to the public. The importance of the main identified “themes” is tracked over time, before examining their (collective and individual) effect on treasury market yield volatility via time-series regression analysis.

We find that FOMC statements incorporate multiple, multifaceted and recurring textual themes, with six of them being able to characterize most of the communicated monetary policy in the authors’ sample period. The themes are statistically significant in explaining the variation in three-month, two-year, five-year and ten-year treasury yields, even after controlling for monetary policy uncertainty and the concurrent economic outlook.

The main research implication of the authors’ study is that the LSA can successfully identify the most economically significant themes underlying the Fed’s communication, as the latter is expressed in monetary policy statements. The authors feel that the findings of the study would be strengthened if the analysis was repeated using intra-day (tick-by-tick or five-minute) data on treasury yields.

The authors’ findings are consistent with the notion that the move to “increased transparency” by the Fed is important and meaningful for financial and capital markets, as suggested by the significant effect that the most important identified textual themes have on treasury yield volatility.

This paper makes a timely contribution to a fairly recent stream of research that combines specific textual and statistical techniques so as to conduct content analysis. To the best of their knowledge, the authors’ study is the first that applies the LSA to the statements released by the FOMC.

This chapter proposes a comparative analysis of the monetary policies undertaken by the Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank after the 2008 subprime crisis. We point out the twin nature of the financial crises in Europe in comparison with the US crises: in addition to the role of bank funding, the euro area countries have also experienced a structural problem of balance of payment disequilibria. This explains why in the early stages of the subprime crisis, the Fed has succeeded in tackling the illiquidity problems facing the banking sector, while the ECB did not. The Fed could then focus on tackling the recession in the real sector by adopting quantitative easing policies to exert downward pressure on the long-term interest-rate. In the euro area quantitative easing policies came later, in 2013. Even the forward guidance policies have been different between the two central banks. Unlike the ECB, the Fed has gone through diverse forward guidance policies: qualitative, calendar-based, and state-contingent. The chapter proposes a new survey of the monetary policies after the subprime crisis by comparing two strategies in different contexts: the United States and the euro area.

During the Greenspan‐Bernanke era, the responses of Federal Reserve officials to financial crises resulted in an extraordinary involvement of the US central bank in the non‐banking financial sector. The purpose of this paper is to examine the informal and evolving conceptual framework that allows Federal Reserve officials to pursue a strategy of “constrained discretion” in responding to financial disturbances.

Behavioural economics relies on designed psychological and economic experiments to predict behavioural biases at the group level. As an analogue applicable to understanding biases in the intuitive judgments of individual policymakers, a naïve behavioural economics approach relies on intuitive or naive psychology and the interpretation of historical events as natural experiments to explain why intuitive judgments of Federal Reserve officials will contain biases.

Under the Greenspan‐Bernanke conceptual framework, Federal Reserve officials exercise “constrained discretion” in responding to disturbances arising from macro structural changes in the financial sector. The two key concepts are the Greenspan‐Bernanke doctrine on how the Federal Reserve officials respond to financial asset price bubbles and their collapses, and Bernanke's financial accelerator. Several examples are cited in which policy errors made by Alan Greenspan were attributable to identifiable biases in his intuitive judgment. In addition, Bernanke's response to the financial crisis of 2007‐2009 was based on his interpretation of the Great Depression as a natural experiment. But that interpretation was heavily biased by the influence of Milton Friedman on Bernanke's intuitive judgment. While Federal Reserve officials will need to exercise discretionary judgment in responding to financial crises, the potential for errors due to biases in that judgment can be reduced through regulatory reforms that lessen the potential for financial crises to occur.

While quantitative analyses of the effects of the Federal Reserve's actions on non‐bank financial institutions and the financial markets are ongoing, little attention has been given to the psychological aspects of the intuitive judgment that influences the discretionary decisions of the policymakers.

This case presents financial and macroeconomic data for the United States between 2007 and 2013, a period covering the financial crisis and Great Recession of 2007–2009 and the slow economic recovery from 2009 onward. During this period, the Federal Reserve had set the federal funds rate, its primary monetary policy instrument, near zero and was using additional monetary policy tools to stimulate the economy. One of these additional tools was quantitative easing (QE).

Students will use the data provided in the case to examine how financial markets reacted to QE actions by the Federal Reserve and to analyze the potential impact of QE on the macroeconomy.

After reading and analyzing the case, students will be able to:

• Apply the event study methodology to analyze economic effects

• Recognize how macroeconomic news affects the prices of financial securities

• Describe the connections between the prices of financial securities and the macroeconomy

• • Debate the relative costs and benefits of quantitative easing and the optimality of Federal Reserve policy

Apply the event study methodology to analyze economic effects

Recognize how macroeconomic news affects the prices of financial securities

Describe the connections between the prices of financial securities and the macroeconomy

• Debate the relative costs and benefits of quantitative easing and the optimality of Federal Reserve policy