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Null-hypothesis significance tests (NHST) are a very troublesome methodology that dominates the quantitative empirical research in strategy and management. Inherent limitations and inappropriate applications of NHST impede the accumulation of knowledge and fill academic journals with meaningless “findings,” and they corrode researchers' motivation and ethics. Inherent limitations of NHST include the use of point null hypotheses, meaningless null hypotheses, and dichotomous truth criteria. Misunderstanding of NHST has often led to applications to inappropriate data and misinterpretation of results.

Researchers should move beyond the ritualistic and often inappropriate use of NHST. The chapter does not advocate a best way to do research, but suggests that researchers need to adapt their methods to reflect specific contexts and to use evaluation criteria that are meaningful for those contexts. Researchers need to explain the rationales that guided the selection of evaluation measures and they should avoid excessively complex models with many variables. The chapter also offers four more focused recommendations: (1) Compare proposed hypotheses with naïve hypotheses or the outcomes of alternative treatments. (2) Acknowledge the uncertainty that attends research findings by stating confidence limits for parameter estimates. (3) Show the substantive relevance of findings by reporting effect sizes – preferably with confidence limits. (4) Use statistical methods that are robust against deviations from assumptions about population distributions and the representativeness of samples.

The need to make a “theoretical contribution” is a presumed mandate that permeates any researcher’s career in the Social Sciences, yet all too often this remains a source of confusion and frustration. The purpose of this paper is to reflect on, and further develops, the principal themes discussed in the “OM Theory” workshop in Dublin in 2011 and the special sessions at the 2011 and the 2013 EurOMA Conferences in Cambridge and Dublin.

This paper presents six short essays that explore the role and use of theory in management research, and specifically ask what is a good or meaningful contribution to theory. The authors comment on the current state of theory in Operations Management (OM) (Harry Boer), the type of theories the authors have in OM (Chris Voss), the role of theory in increasing the general understanding of OM problems (Roger Schmenner), whether the authors can borrow theories from other fields or actually have theory “of our own” (Matthias Holweg), the different ways in which a contribution to theory can be made (Martin Kilduff), and how to construct a theoretical argument (Mark Pagell).

The authors argue that theory is fundamental to OM research, but that it is not the inevitable starting point; discovery and observation are equally important and often neglected avenues to contributing to theory. Also, there is no one right way to making a contribution, yet consistency between ontology, epistemology, and claimed contribution is what matters. The authors further argue that the choice of theory is critical, as a common mistake is trying to contribute to high-level theories borrowed from other fields. Finally, the authors recommend using theory parsimoniously, yet with confidence.

The paper presents a collection of viewpoints of senior scholars on the need for, and use of, theory in OM research.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze long-term institutional causes and consequences of preference falsification by studying the evolution of China’s patriarchal clan system.

The historic study shows that although the clan system was abolished in the Qin dynasty, it re-emerged among high-standing families in the Han dynasty and spread to common people after the Tang dynasty.

The author submits that the clan system was an institutional response to the preference falsification problem that arose due to the dictatorial political institutions first established in the Qin dynasty. It helped people to take collective action by themselves and also opened a back door to influence government decisions. A piece of clear evidence is the co-evolution of the clan system and government personnel system.

In this sense, the clan system probably also helped to prolong the political institutions for 2,000 years.

This is the first institutional study on the clan system in China.

This essay raises a concern about the trajectory that new institutionalism has been following during the last decades, namely an emphasis on heterogeneity, change and agentic behavior instead of isomorphism and conformist behavior. This is a crucial issue from the perspective of the philosophy and methodology of science since a theory that admits both change and stability as a norm has less scientific weight then a theory that predicts a prevalence of passivity and isomorphism over change and strategic behavior. The former provides explanations and predictions while the latter does not.

The paper offers an analysis of the nature, characteristics, functions and boundaries of institutional theories in the spirit of philosophy and methodology of science literature.

The power of the former institutional theory developed by Meyer, Rowan, DiMaggio and Powell lies in its generalization, explanation and prediction of observable and unobservable phenomena: as a typical organizational theory that puts forward directional predictions, it explains and predicts the tendency for organizations to become more similar to each other over time and express less strategic and interest-driven behavior, conforming to ever-increasing institutional pressures. A theory of isomorphism makes scientific predictions while its modern advancements do not. Drawing on Popper's idea of the limit of domains of explanation and limited domains of theories we present two propositions that may direct our attention towards the strength or weakness of institutional theories with regard to their explanations of organizational processes and behavior.

The paper draws implications for further theory building in institutional analysis by suggesting the nature of institutional explanations and the place of institutional change in the theoretical apparatus. Once institutional theory explains the tendency of the system towards equilibrium, there is no need to explain the origins and causes of radical change per se. Institutional isomorphism theory explains and predicts how even after radical changes organizational fields will move towards isomorphism, that is, institutional equilibrium. The task is, therefore, not to explain agency and change but to show that it is natural and inevitable processes that organizational field will return to isomorphic dynamics and move towards homogenization no matter how much radical change occurred in this field.

The paper discusses the practical problems with instrumental utility of institutional theories. In order to be useful any theory must clearly delineate its boundaries and offer explanations and predictions and it is only the former 1977/1983 institutional theory that satisfies these requirements while modern advancements merely offer ambiguous theoretical umbrellas that escape empirical tests. For researchers therefore it is important to recognize which theory can be applied in a given limited domain of research and which one has little or no value.

No scholar or researcher is able to provide robust evidence that counters the scant reflection on metatheory – mostly ontology and epistemology – underlying management studies in general, and industrial marketing and purchasing research in particular. This paper is a contribution to the indispensable discussion of metatheoretical alternatives in research, and most importantly, the strengths and shortcomings thereof, and respective implications on research questions, objectives, and findings.

The purpose of this paper is the conceptual expansion of the science-theoretical foundations of information science, i.e. to develop new thought schemes for information science.

The design of the paper is as follows: first, the paper will discuss the foundation of the systemic paradigm (SP). Then the authors will consider the history of information science related to the philosophy of science. In the remaining part of the paper, the authors will investigate information science and its relation to the philosophy of science, focusing on SP.

In conclusion, the authors will summarise the seven criteria for the application of SP in information science.

Paradigms in information science have rarely reflected upon the use of a SP in information science.

The practical use of the seven criteria in information science Criterion 1: make your premises, suppositions, prerequisites and motives explicit. Criterion 2: make your moral/ethical results and consequences explicit. Criterion 3: research should be evaluated in relation to the transcendence of knowledge. Criterion 4: emphasise methodical pluralism, i.e. empirical generalisations and conceptual generalisations. Criterion 5: emphasise proximity and in-depth studies. Criterion 6: look for patterns and patterns which combine. Criterion 7: look for the power behind the patterns.

The opinion is that scientists to a great extent should seek knowledge on the basis of a belief, a specific way of thinking, and by means of specific methods. To make the authors belief explicit makes the way of thinking visible. What the authors achieve, and possibly the only thing the authors can achieve, is to reaffirm the conscious belief. This does not make reality more real, but it could put the authors in a better position to see through the authors way of thinking when faced with scientific problems. This indicates that a scientific study should emphasise all three entities: “The Context of Discovery”, “The Context of Justification” and “The Context of Solution”. These three entities, according to SP, make up the unity of the scientific process.

The seven criteria entail that Kuhn’s argumentative chain (where he tries to find out why theory A is preferred to theory B on a rational pretext) does not concur with SP. This indicates that a scientific study should emphasise all three entities: “The Context of Discovery”, “The Context of Justification” and “The Context of Solution”. These three entities, according to SP, make up the unity of the scientific process.

Applies the analytic‐synthetic dichotomy of hemispheric functioning suggested by Levy‐Agresti and Sperry to explain the chunking theory of Miller. Constructs a theory of cognition, based on cerebral functions which were discovered through hemispheric differences. Shows that all the arguments of Efron against the hemispheric paradigm are merely “puzzles” that can be solved within this paradigm. New findings of Efron and Yund were, in fact, predicted by a component of this theory.

Notes that a recent survey found many scholars who believe, incorrectly, that history is not random enough, large enough, or controlled enough for science. Reiterates why science is not dependent on randomization, size, or control, but does require comparison. Posits that the most powerful feature of scientific validation is the comparative measurement of argument (CMA). Specifically illustrates how and why comparison inexpensively elevates any history into an excellent vehicle for relevant, credible, scientific scholarship. Concludes that the best method of CMA is not always obvious, but researchers should always try CMA because they will find that any use of it will produce some recognizable value and provide discipline to unmanageable data sources such as history.

Since its resurrection during the 1980s, comparative-historical sociology has been repeatedly critiqued on two fronts. Quantitative methodologists have argued that its “causal inferences” are unreliable due to its “small n.” And methodological individualists have argued its explanatory accounts are unacceptable because they do not specify “microfoundations.” But these critiques are built on faulty foundations, namely, a regularity theory of causation and a reductionist social ontology. In this article, I propose an alternative foundation derived from Critical Realism: a production theory of causation and an emergentist account of social structure.