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Using data from a top-five global executive placement firm, the authors explore how an organization's financial misconduct may affect pay for former employees not implicated in wrongdoing. Drawing on stigma theory, they hypothesize that although such alumni did not participate in the financial misconduct and they had left the organization years before the misconduct, these alumni experience a compensation penalty. The stigma effect increases in relation to the job function proximity to the misconduct, recency of the misconduct, and an employee's seniority. Collectively, results suggest that the stigma of financial misconduct could reach alumni employees and need not be confined to executives and directors that oversaw the organization during the misconduct.

We document three new facts about gender differences in executive compensation. First, female executives receive lower share of incentive pay in total compensation relative to males. This difference accounts for 93% of the gender gap in total pay. Second, the compensation of female executives displays lower pay-performance sensitivity. A $1 million dollar increase in firm value generates a $17,150 increase in firm-specific wealth for male executives and a $1,670 increase for females. Third, female executives are more exposed to bad firm performance and less exposed to good firm performance relative to male executives. We find no link between firm performance and the gender of top executives. We discuss evidence on differences in preferences and the cost of managerial effort by gender and examine the resulting predictions for the structure of compensation. We consider two paradigms for the pay-setting process, the efficient contracting model and the “managerial power” or skimming view. The efficient contracting model can explain the first two facts. Only the skimming view is consistent with the third fact. This suggests that the gender differentials in executive compensation may be inefficient.

The chapter builds on the literature of Agency and Signalling Theories to analyse the corporate governance factors associated with the voluntary decision to prepare an Integrated Report according to the <IR> International Framework promoted by the IIRC.

The chapter is based on the results of a probit regression run with regard to a sample of 35 companies that joined the Pilot Programme in 2011 and 137 similar companies that did not.

The analysis of two samples of European companies reveals that adhesion to the IR Pilot Programme is positively related to the gender diversity and size of the board.

Further research is required in order to study the differences between listed and non-listed companies in terms of variables affecting the adoption of the <IR> Framework and to increase the time range of our study. In addition, it would be interesting to include other variables capturing different aspects other than corporate governance, since the decision to join the Programme, as the results of our analysis have shown, may also be influenced by other factors, such as strategy decisions and communication policies.

The chapter adds to the existing literature by showing the main governance characteristics that impact the decision to adhere to the IR Pilot Programme. It is also important to the existing literature regarding the role played by gender diversity in corporate governance mechanisms and CSR policies.

I test empirically the hypothesis that the monitoring role of the board of directors depends on the severity of the agency problems and the amount of information needed to monitor. I show that in high growth firms, where the agency conflicts are low and managers are likely to reveal more information to get advice, boards are more independent but less likely to monitor, while in low growth firms, boards are less likely to be independent, but the relationship between firm value and board independence is strong. Overall, boards become more independent but monitor less as firms’ growth opportunities increase, suggesting that managers trade off the amount of information released to the board to get a better advice and to mitigate the monitoring role of the board.

This paper takes a unique approach to provide additional insight into the agency view of tax avoidance. We directly investigate the association between the presence of agency conflicts and corporate tax avoidance. Using a measure of CEO centrality, developed by Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011), we identify settings in which agency conflicts are likely to be high. In contrast to prior literature, our primary tests do not rely on the inferences of market participants regarding tax avoidance. We find that CEO centrality is positively and significantly associated with tax avoidance. Additionally, we analyze the mediating role of monitoring by institutional investors in our setting. We find that the relation between tax avoidance and the existence of agency conflicts is strongest for firms with low levels of CEO monitoring. We also add to prior literature by investigating the implications of our setting on future accounting performance and future firm value.

This chapter focusses on whether women heads of states and governments use their powers of selection to empower women. Compared to their male counterparts, do they appoint greater quantities of women to cabinet positions and to more prestigious posts? Examining Germany and Brazil, two countries constituting diverse cultural and institutional settings, this chapter provides in-depth analysis of cabinet appointments and regional breadth. It confirms that women executives do indeed promote more women to their cabinets overall and to higher powered portfolios. This stands in contrast with prevailing findings from within the global literature but generally reinforces those derived from single country and regional explorations.

Many global organizations have identified limited availability of global talent as the primary limitation to their growth in key markets. At the same time, there is growing resistance to standard outsourcing arrangements among high-potential individuals, in locations such as India, who are no longer content serving as low-cost talent to perform narrowly circumscribed tasks that are “thrown over the wall” to them via e-mail. Rather than being second-class corporate citizens, these employees are looking for opportunities to rise into broader management and leadership roles, and are willing to move to a different employer if such possibilities for career growth are unavailable in their current workplace. They aspire to career paths that may include end-to-end responsibility for projects, including direct interface with internal or external customers, and comprehensive ownership of project scoping, implementation, and results. Organizations seeking to fully leverage their global talent must build skill sets among their employees that can enable them to move successfully beyond traditional outsourcing arrangements. Employees who have previously been in outsourcing roles often need to acquire capabilities such as executive presence, fluency in both micro- and macro-management practices, and leading with an agile style that adapts to different global market circumstances. Meanwhile, leaders from established markets must learn to apply a truly global perspective to tasks such as talent recruitment, performance management, and succession planning.