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This paper takes a unique approach to provide additional insight into the agency view of tax avoidance. We directly investigate the association between the presence of agency conflicts and corporate tax avoidance. Using a measure of CEO centrality, developed by Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011), we identify settings in which agency conflicts are likely to be high. In contrast to prior literature, our primary tests do not rely on the inferences of market participants regarding tax avoidance. We find that CEO centrality is positively and significantly associated with tax avoidance. Additionally, we analyze the mediating role of monitoring by institutional investors in our setting. We find that the relation between tax avoidance and the existence of agency conflicts is strongest for firms with low levels of CEO monitoring. We also add to prior literature by investigating the implications of our setting on future accounting performance and future firm value.

This study aims to examine the impact of a chief executive officer (CEO) social network centrality on corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance.

This study carries out a multivariate linear regression analysis on a panel data sample of 11,507 firm-year observations (representing 1,386 unique US firms) from 2004 to 2014.

This paper finds a significant negative relation between CEO network centrality and irresponsible CSR performance (measured as CSR concerns). The findings suggest that better-connected CEOs can better mitigate CSR concerns or weaknesses, leading to improved overall CSR performance of a firm.

This is the first study that directly examines the empirical link between CEO centrality and CSR performance.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the engagement of chief executive officers (CEOs) in corporate communication and focus on how their approach to communication develops in relation to the longevity of their tenure. The paper also explores how founder centrality is linked to the objectives of CEO communication and the CEOs’ use of personal social media.

The paper brings together the relevant literature from different disciplines, related to leadership communication, CEO longevity and founder centrality, and reveals a number of unexplored issues. Four research questions were defined and an exploratory survey was carried out, involving 93 CEOs from large companies located in Italy.

The results show that CEOs are strongly engaged in institutional communication. Short-tenured CEOs seem more engaged in building and consolidating relationship networks with specific stakeholders (customers and employees), while long-tenured CEOs tend to be more involved in institutional and financial communications.

Due to the exploratory research design and the circumscribed sample from a single country (Italy), further cross-national evidence is needed to substantiate the suggested links between engagement in communication activities and longevity. The study highlights the managerial and communication skills that CEOs must be provided with during their corporate tenure, thus suggesting the need to further examine the “life cycle” of CEO communication activities.

The paper sheds light on CEO communication dynamics. It is the first of its kind in the Italian context, where some factors, such as longevity of tenure, seem to play an important role in shaping corporate communication objectives and activities.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether CEO pay is related to stock price crash risk, and how ownership concentration mediates this relationship.

The authors hypothesize that companies who disclose CEO pay would experience lower stock price crash risk than their non-transparent peers. For companies whose CEO pay is published, the authors conjecture that the CEO pay slice is positively related to stock price crash risk. The authors also investigate whether the impact of CEO pay on crash risk would be weaker or stronger under a concentrated ownership structure and a mutual fund ownership structure. This study relies on 14,499 firm-year observations from the Chinese capital market to shed light on these questions.

The authors demonstrate that the magnitude of CEO pay slice has little effect on stock price crash risk. However, whether CEO pay is disclosed at all is a strong indicator for stock price crash risk.

The paper expands on the literature by adding a new factor to explain the stock price crash risk, which is vital to investor protection and the stability of the financial market. The research also adds to the sparse literature on CEO centrality and has implications for corporate governance and public policy.

Although management scholars have displayed a strong interest in top management teams, surprisingly little research has been devoted to the international dimensions of top management teams including their international diversity and their societal and cultural underpinnings. This paper provides a recent overview of empirical studies addressing the international dimension of top management teams and identifies avenues for future research. Particular attention is paid to the role of the institutional and cultural societal context in shaping the configuration of top management.

The purpose of this paper is to study bank executive compensation and securitization, two important strategic developments in finance that are central to the debate on the cause of the crisis.

We study the relationship between securitization and executive pay in a sample of US banks from 2001 to 2010, using a series of multivariate regression models to test our hypotheses.

Bank Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay exhibits a positive pay-for-performance relationship. Since the crisis, this relationship is weakened. For banks that securitize, we find that prior to the crisis, higher securitization activity led to higher CEO compensation levels. While we do not find that securitization is related to bank CEO pay gap (the difference between CEO and the next-highest paid bank executive), we do see that bank ratings are a factor in pay gap and compensation level.

Bank regulatory ratings influence the relationship between compensation and securitization. Also, the relationship differs pre- and post-crisis.

Our study is unique for several reasons. First, we look at the relationship between compensation and securitization over a time period that includes the recent financial crisis. Second, we include an analysis of pay gap. Third, we include bank regulatory ratings, which are proprietary and therefore not available for use in many banking studies.

This paper aims to explore the effects of director network on open innovation. As an informal institutional arrangement, the director network is an important source for the enterprise to obtain external information, which provide resource basis for open innovation. Chief Executive Officer (CEO) as the top of management team could make short-sighted decisions for personal interests; this paper also investigates the moderating role of CEO short-sightedness between director network and open innovation.

This paper takes 4,102 Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as the research sample. By introducing network centrality and structural hole to measure director network and using data mining to extract key words related to CEO short-sightedness from annual reports, this paper constructs several multiple linear regression models to analyze the impact of director network on open innovation and the moderating role of CEO short-sightedness.

The analysis finds that director network can facilitate corporate open innovation. Enterprises can acquire more external resources in high centrality and structural hole of director network and promote ability for corporate open innovation. The relationship between director network and open innovation is negatively moderated by CEO short-sightedness. When the level of corporate governance and analyst attention is high, the negative effect of CEO short-sightedness on the innovation effect of directors’ networks is suppressed.

This is the first empirical paper to investigate the promotion effect of director network on open innovation as well as the negative moderating role of CEO short-sightedness. The findings bring new perspectives to the open innovation and enlightenments for practical activities from social relationship aspect.

Acknowledging the importance of work–family practices that extend beyond what is legally mandated and that cover the needs of a diverse workforce, this paper offers a conceptual model that explores the factors that can influence the provision and inclusiveness of work–family policies in organizations.

The conceptual model is based on a thorough literature review of relevant articles in the fields of management and political science.

In line with the upper echelons perspective, chief executive officers’ (CEOs') political ideology is a multidimensional concept, comprising two main dimensions (financial and social) that can influence the provision and inclusiveness of work–family practices. Moreover, the proposed conceptual model considers other important factors, such as the centrality of the CEO's political ideology, as potential moderating factors, as well as the conditional role of institutional pressures. Finally, the proposed model takes into account the important role of line managers/supervisors in the implementation of work–family policies and shows the importance of the provision and inclusiveness of work–family practices for critical organizational outcomes (organizational attraction and turnover).

The proposed conceptual model offers a more in-depth understanding of the factors that influence the provision and inclusiveness of work–family policies.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the relationship between founder-chief executive officers (CEOs) and firm performance. Specifically, the paper explores two opposing arguments on the performance implications of founder-CEO leadership. The first theoretical perspective argues that founder-CEOs positively contribute to firm performance since they bring passion, vision, and external legitimacy to the organization. The contrary resource-based perspective, argues that while founder-CEOs help in the early years of the firm, they become less effective as the firm evolves into a complex bureaucracy since they lack the necessary managerial skills.

In order to test these perspectives, the paper develops a matched sample of 82 US manufacturing firms and compared their performance using both accounting and market-based measures. Independent sample t-tests and analysis of variance were used to empirically test the opposing predictions. Data were obtained from the Mergent Online database as well as official proxy filings of sample firms.

The results of the data analysis indicate that there is a statistically significant performance difference between founder-led and non-founder led firms. Such performance difference is especially evident when the paper focusses on accounting-based firm performance measures such as return on assets and return on investment. Surprisingly, founder-led firms performed worse than those led by non-founder CEOs. The follow-up analysis indicates a significant difference in age and size among sample firms led by founders and non-founders such that founder-led firms tend to be younger and smaller in size.

Unlike other studies in the literature that found a strong positive impact of founder-CEOs, the findings of the study provided empirical support for the resource-based explanation of founder-CEO impact on firm performance. Specifically, the findings reported here contribute to understanding the role of founder-CEOs in the context of executive succession, strategy selection as well as organizational evolution.

This study makes original contribution to the on-going research on strategic leadership by exploring the performance effect of founder-CEOs and the corresponding alternative theoretical explanations. In addition, the inclusion of both accounting and market-based (Tobin's Q) dependent variables provide a broader measure of firm financial performance.

The paper aims to examine the effect of CEOs' social networks on capital structure complexity (CSC) and firm performance.

Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) and Generalized method of moments (GMM) regression results estimate the effect of CEOs' (Chief executive officer) social networks on capital structure complexity and firm performance. The number of sources of capital (NSC) and concentration ratio estimate the capital structure complexity for the sample firms.

The results show that CEOs' social networks significantly influence CSC. We suggest that the CEOs' social networks encourage them to make more complex capital structure decisions. This behavior deteriorates firm performance.

There is a lack of systematic conceptual reason for measuring CEO social network. Future research should use other measures of the social network to estimate the relation of the CEO's social network with CSC and firm performance.

The findings support the managerial power approach and social network theory that the observable characteristics of CEOs influence CSC. The results are robust for an alternative explanation.

By investigating the impact of the influence of CEOs' social networks on CSC and performance, the authors extend research on strategic leadership and capital structure and firm performance.