I test empirically the hypothesis that the monitoring role of the board of directors depends on the severity of the agency problems and the amount of information needed to monitor. I show that in high growth firms, where the agency conflicts are low and managers are likely to reveal more information to get advice, boards are more independent but less likely to monitor, while in low growth firms, boards are less likely to be independent, but the relationship between firm value and board independence is strong. Overall, boards become more independent but monitor less as firms’ growth opportunities increase, suggesting that managers trade off the amount of information released to the board to get a better advice and to mitigate the monitoring role of the board.
Lasfer, M.A. (2004), "ON THE MONITORING ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: THE CASE OF THE ADOPTION OF CADBURY RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE U.K.", Hirschey, M., and, K.J. and Makhija, A.K. (Ed.) Corporate Governance (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 9), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 287-326. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3732(04)09012-7Download as .RIS
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