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Drawing from knowledge-based view and balanced scorecard approach, this study seeks to develop an integrative model to examine the influence of two knowledge management (KM) strategies, codification KM strategy and personalization KM strategy, on the multi-stage KM evolution (KM adoption, implementation and institutionalization stages), which in turn affects balanced scorecard outcomes (financial performance, internal process performance, customer performance, and growth and learning performance).

Survey data from 244 managers (currently and directly in charge of KM activities) in large Taiwanese firms were collected and used to test the research model using the structural equation modeling (SEM) approach.

The results have revealed that both the codification KM strategy and personalization KM strategy are positive factors for stage-based KM evolution, but their relative importance differs across the three subsamples. Additionally, the results showed that the internal process and customer perspectives play a critical role in measuring performance during the earlier stages of KM evolution, while the financial and learning and growth perspectives emphasize the performance achievements from the latter stages.

Since KM implementation is an evolutionary process, using both financial and non-financial measures to assess organizational performance through KM efforts, such as the four balanced scorecard perspectives, can take full advantage of stage-based KM evolution. The results indicate that the time-lag effect is critical to distinguishing different forms of organizational performance.

Theoretically, this study aims to provide a research model that is capable of understanding the antecedents and consequences of staged-based KM evolution. From a managerial perspective, the findings of this study provide valuable guidelines to policy-makers and practitioners in accelerating KM evolution and achieving organizational performance.

Although green logistics has become a new focus of cooperation between government and enterprises under environmental constraints, how local governments formulate subsidy policies to effectively guide the green transformation of regional logistics and how to facilitate the reasonable cost-sharing are rather critical. This paper will deeply explore the dynamic process of the tripartite participation (government, platform, and logistics enterprises) in the selection of regional green logistics strategy, and reveal the evolutionary game relationship of the three parties.

To explore the dynamics involving the government, platform and logistics enterprises for the green logistic transformation, and reveal the evolutionary gaming among the three parties, based on the bounded rationality premise, this study constructs the tripartite asymmetric evolutionary game models, uses the stability theorem of differential equation to explore the evolution and stability strategy of the system in different cases and explicates the paths of influence on the tripartite behaviors via simulations.

Results of this study indicate that there exist stable equilibrium strategies among the three parties regarding the regional green logistics, and they are affected by different factors. The government's subsidy, subsidy intensity and the platform's cost-sharing proportion can generate positive effects, but the latter two can also impact negatively beyond the effective ranges. The findings provide a theoretical basis for local governments, platforms and logistics enterprises to formulate justifiable subsidy intensity and determine reasonable sharing proportion.

Firstly, considering the significant relevance of local government, it is included in the evolution model, and the tripartite game (among government, platform and enterprises) is explored; Secondly, by comparing the equilibrium results under different game conditions, this paper analyzes the evolution of each party's game strategy to achieve the optimal return under bounded rationality and the important factors determining the strategic selection; Finally, the key factor of platform cost sharing is involved, and to what extent the change of platform cost sharing ratio will influence the systematic stability is explored.

The thought and rationale of sustainable competitive advantage in strategy are significantly influenced by the Schumpeterian models of dynamic competition in IO and evolutionary economics. Yet, most analytical accounts of sustainable competitive advantage fail to explain how firms' investment choices influence, and are simultaneously influenced by, the co‐evolution of “external” industry competition and “internal” firm competences. This paper aims to contribute to the development of a theory of endogenous market structure in strategy.

Two alternative assumptions are developed – concerning temporally heterogeneous firm investment strategy – that lie central to a proposed behavioral theory of endogenous market structure. Additionally, a theoretical description is provided of the endogeneity of the demand‐side determinants of firm investment strategy and industrial market structure. Finally, guidelines are provided for empirical application of [incorporating] the alternative assumptions and theoretical arguments.

It is expected that the theoretical arguments in the paper will influence strategy scholars to develop dynamic models of firm performance that render themselves amenable to sound empirical analyses.

The paper contributes towards developing a theory of endogenous market structure in strategy.

The operation of water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP) is crucial to the project effectiveness. However, there are often problems in projects that attach importance to construction and neglect operation management, which seriously affect the project operation effect. To ensure the good operation effect of the WETP-PPP, an evolutionary game model of the regulation strategy during the operation period of WETP-PPP is constructed.

An evolutionary game model of regulation is established which considers the government, the project company and the public in water environment treatment Public-Private Partnership projects (WETP-PPP). Five scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. Finally, through the simulation, the influence of different factors on the choice of the three-party strategy is analyzed.

First, the key factors that affect the evolution game are the regulation costs and performance rewards of the government, the project company's operation costs and penalties for opportunism and the public supervision costs and rewards. Second, in order to ensure the operation effect, the government needs the performance incentive from the superior government. Third, the public's supervision enthusiasm needs to be mobilized by the government. Last, the penalty strength of speculative operation should be strong enough to play a deterrent role.

The theoretical research in this paper has some limitations. Initially, due to the large number of participants in WETP-PPP, in addition to the government department, the project company and the public studied in this paper, it also involves the consulting industry and financial institutions. In the future, more participants can be added to form four-party interest relationships and conduct four-party evolutionary game research. Second, the operation environment of WETP-PPP is complex and changeable, and various influencing factors are intertwined, the number of parameters involved in this paper is limited, and further detailed research is needed in the future.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this article discusses the evolution law of the tripartite game behavior of the government department, the project company and the public, which is helpful to clarify the strategy evolution path of the tripartite in the WETP-PPP, and the generation condition and evolution mechanism of the equilibrium strategy of the tripartite game. The key parameters affecting the tripartite strategy selection are analyzed through simulation, which can provide reference for the government department to formulate relevant measures. At the same time, it broadens the application field of evolutionary games and supplements the research on the management mechanism of WETP-PPP during the operation period.

Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper introduces the supervision behavior of the public, which can provide a new perspective for researchers to conduct relevant research. Secondly, for the regulation during the operation of WETP-PPP, this paper can provide reference for the government department to establish a scientific public supervision system, improve the government supervision mechanism and other relevant measures, which can help promote the public supervision willingness, improve the regulation efficiency of the government and guide the project company to reduce speculation, so as to ensure the effect of water environment management.

This paper focuses on the regulation of WETP-PPP during the operation period to research interactions among the government, the project company and the public. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, some suggestions are put forward, such as perfecting the government regulation mechanism, optimizing the reward and punishment system for the project company and broadening the channels of public supervision. The research results of this paper can provide support for the government's regulation of WETP-PPP and ensure the project operation effect.

This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports and uses the system dynamics model to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, aiming to promote the development of foreign trade of film copyright and innovation and development of the film industry so as to improve the overall social benefits of the film industry and provide policy enlightenment for enhancing the import power of foreign core enterprises to introduce domestic film copyrights.

In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports is constructed, the evolution process of cooperation strategy is derived, the impact of innovation income coefficient, mixed incentive policy and single incentive policy on the evolution results is analyzed, and the system dynamic model is used to simulate to find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.

The results show that export-oriented core firms are more sensitive to mixed incentives, while import-oriented core firms respond more quickly to single incentives. The large innovation income coefficient has a negative impact on the willingness of import-oriented core enterprises to cooperate. The study proposes measures to increase the willingness of core companies to participate.

Due to the fact that numerical simulation is based on simulation, there may be a certain gap between it and the actual situation. Therefore, it is necessary to further use actual data to conduct empirical analysis on the theoretical model.

This article mainly focuses on analyzing the impact of strategy choices and related parameters of various entities on the incentive mechanism and studying the foreign trade cooperation strategies of film copyright export enterprises under policy support from a theoretical model perspective. Furthermore, research has proven that in order to effectively enhance the willingness of foreign import core enterprises to participate in the foreign trade of domestic film copyrights, the government needs to coordinate the use of single incentive policies and mixed incentive policies. This study provides a major contribution for policymaker to develop film copyright import and export trade.

Based on the research conclusions, this paper puts forward management countermeasures to further improve the development of the film copyright import and export trade. The first is to enrich government incentive methods and stimulate the vitality of film copyright and foreign trade market entities. The second is to guide the core enterprises of film copyright export to increase investment in innovation and stimulate the endogenous driving force of industrial development. Finally, lengthen the foreign trade industry chain of film copyright and increase the income of film derivatives.

Firstly, this paper applies the research methods of evolutionary game and system dynamics simulation to the field of foreign trade research on film copyright and expands the research perspectives and methods of the film industry. Secondly, by analyzing the “cost-benefit incentive” relationship of the evolutionary game of government export-oriented core enterprises and importing core enterprises, an evolutionary game model is constructed, the quantitative point of tripartite interest decision-making is solved and the research object of the evolutionary game method is expanded. Finally, the system dynamics model is used to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.

The extant “supply‐side” frameworks of industry evolution fail to predict the evolutionary patterns in industries based on systemic technologies. This paper aims to describe the complex demand environment in industries based on systemic technologies and to explain how the continuously evolving demand structure influences the choice and level of firm investments in the above context.

The paper identifies a conceptual gap in the “technology‐centric” literature on industry evolution by conducting a detailed interpretive survey of the literature that focuses on the demand‐side determinants of firm‐ and industry‐level technological processes underlying industry evolution, and co‐evolution of the technological system underlying an industry and the consumer applications based on the same.

The paper provides a set of empirically verifiable mechanisms to explain competing firms' choice and level of investment under conditions of technological and demand uncertainty in industries based on systemic technologies. On one hand, firms' investments influence the evolution of both the technological system(s) and their constituent components that underlie such industries and, on the other, firms' investments influence the consumption of the array of consumer applications that are generated in these industries.

The theoretical explanation provided herein not only enhances the understanding of the role of demand‐side factors as determinants of rate and direction of technological advances but also lies central to the understanding of the evolution of industries based on systemic technologies. More specifically, the paper explains how the interaction between continuously evolving demand structure in the downstream market(s) for consumer applications and the technological components comprising the technological system influences competing firms' choice and level of investments.

The objective of this paper is to investigate the efficiency of hybrid solution methods when incorporated into large‐scale optimization problems solved by evolution strategies (ESs) and to demonstrate their influence on the overall performance of these optimization algorithms. ESs imitate biological evolution and combine the concept of artificial survival of the fittest with evolutionary operators to form a robust search mechanism. In this paper modified multi‐membered evolution strategies with discrete variables are adopted. Two solution methods are implemented based on the preconditioned conjugate gradient (PCG) algorithm. The first method is a PCG algorithm with a preconditioner resulted from a complete Cholesky factorization, and the second is a PCG algorithm in which a truncated Neumann series expansion is used as a preconditioner. The numerical tests presented demonstrate the computational advantages of the proposed methods, which become more pronounced in large‐scale optimization problems and in a parallel computing environment.

This study aims to specify whether heterogeneous reference-point-based aspirations are related to the cooperation levels of R&D alliance portfolios in a positive or negative (or nonlinear) way, and to unveil how cooperative behaviors evolve in recurrent project cooperation.

This study establishes a network containing a cooperation subnetwork and a project subnetwork based on patent data in the “deep learning” field to investigate how cooperative behaviors evolve in R&D alliance portfolios. A model of evolutionary games on complex networks is constructed to gain insight into the dynamic evolution of DMs’ strategies.

First, the heterogeneous aspirations of DMs can improve the cooperation level in R&D alliance portfolios. Second, compared to prudent DMs, aggressive DMs are more likely to choose the cooperation strategy, implying that an appropriate aspiration level nurtures cooperative R&D endeavors with partners. Third, the effects of effort complementarity, knowledge reorganization capabilities and cooperation supervision on cooperation are contingent on the distribution of DMs’ aspiration types.

Policymakers should identify aspiration types of DMs when screening partners. They can encourage partners to focus more on historical payoffs and establish relatively higher aspiration levels to improve the cooperation level. Developing highly detailed contracts becomes crucial when cooperating with firms that possess extensive knowledge reorganization capabilities.

This work contributes a theoretical framework for investigating cooperation in R&D alliance portfolios through the lens of evolutionary games on complex networks, thus revealing the effects of heterogeneous reference-point-based aspirations of DMs on R&D cooperation.

This paper presents the application of Differential Evolution (DE), an evolutionary computation technique for the optimal design of gas transmission network. As a gas transmission system includes source of gas, delivery sites with pipeline segments and compressors, the design of efficient and economical network involves lot of parameters. In addition, there are many equality and inequality constraints to be satisfied making the problem highly non‐linear. Hence an efficient strategy is needed in searching for the global optimum. In this study, DE has been successfully applied for optimal design of gas transmission network. The results obtained are compared with those of nonlinear programming technique and branch and bound algorithm. DE is able to find an optimal solution with a cost that is less than reported in the earlier literature. The proposed strategy takes less computational time to converge when compared to the existing techniques without compromising with the accuracy of the parameter estimates.

The present study reviews the literature on the history and evolution of investment strategies in the stock market for the period from 1900 to 2022. Conflicts and relationships arising from such diverse seminal studies have been identified to address the research gaps.

The studies for this review were identified and screened from electronic databases to compile a comprehensive list of 200 relevant studies for inclusion in this review and summarized for the cognizance of researchers.

The study finds a coherence to complex theoretical documentation of more than a century of evolution on investment strategy in stock markets, capturing the characteristics of time with a chronological study of events.

There were complications in locating unpublished studies leading to biases like publication bias, the reluctance of editors to publish studies, which do not reveal statistically significant differences, and English language bias.

Practitioners can refine investment strategies by incorporating behavioral finance insights and recognizing the influence of psychological biases. Strategies span value, growth, contrarian, or momentum indicators. Mitigating overconfidence bias supports effective risk management. Social media sentiment analysis facilitates real-time decision-making. Adapting to evolving market liquidity curbs volatility risks. Identifying biases guides investor education initiatives.

This paper is an original attempt to pictorially depict the seminal works in stock market investment strategies of more than a hundred years.