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This paper aims to examine the equilibrium limit price charged by a producer trying to deter the entry of a firm that can choose one of the two markets of complementary goods.

The authors model a dynamic game of incomplete information solved using a “perfect Bayesian equilibrium” approach.

It is shown that an incumbent will be willing to spend more resources – i.e. charge a lower limit price – to deter entry into its market as products become more complementary. This is because additional benefits are gained from entry deterrence by facing a more competitive market in the complementary product. The additional benefits of entry deterrence are shown to be a function of the degree of complementarity between goods.

A managerial implication of this article is that firms are willing to compete more fiercely to send an entrant to the other's incumbent market as the degree of complementarity between goods increases. An interesting conclusion that is derived from the above analysis is that managers should invest to understand the interdependences (e.g. complementarities) of the goods they sell, since the strategic variables chosen to compete may be affected by them, in some cases in a non‐trivial way.

From a public policy perspective, the main contribution of this paper is to point out that regulators who analyze predatory pricing, or other (probably) illegal “low‐price strategies”, should consider the degree of complementarity between goods and its effect on pricing.

As far as the authors' knowledge goes, there are no other papers that analyze entry decisions involving multiple markets of complementary goods.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the labor market outcome when there are two unions in the industry, representing heterogeneous workers – substitutes or complements in production – and using wage strategies, in the presence of minimum wage regulation.

Three strategic environments are considered: symmetric Bertrand‐Nash duopoly, Stackelberg duopoly, and efficient cooperation between the two unions.

Usually, minimum wage legislation (floor) would decrease employment; it is shown that in Stackelberg environment, minimum wage legislation may induce an increase in total employment. Wage‐pushing strategies by a leader may also arise; and if workers are substitutes, entry deterrence strategies by the leader may be observed.

This paper analyses the impact of minimum wages in duopoly scenarios in an extensive way.

In 1933, Edward H. Chamberlin published the Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1962). The work, based upon a dissertation submitted for a PhD degree in Harvard University in 1927 and awarded the David A. Wells prize for 1927–28, has since become a milestone in the development of economic thought. Its impact on industrial organisation theory, general equilibrium and welfare economics, international trade theory and, to a greater or lesser degree, all other branches of economic analysis, has been pervasive and enduring. The ideas set out in the book have been developed, expanded and refined in ways too numerous to be identified precisely, and the books and articles which take Chamberlin's contribution as a starting point arguably exceed in number those on any other single subject in the lexicon of economics.

Barriers to entry and entry deterrent strategies are widely discussed elements of the strategic literature and help define the attractiveness of an industry. The channel structure of the pharmaceutical industry, in part because of the level of regulation applicable to it, has the potential for idiosyncratic strategic behaviour. The purpose of this paper is to explore the applicability of traditional approaches to entry barriers and entry deterrence in the Australian retail pharmacy industry facing the threat of a major entry by examining the perceptions of incumbent retail pharmacists regarding the strength of potential barriers to entry into the industry, and their likely response to entry.

The paper uses both qualitative and quantitative methodology to categorise potential barriers to entry in terms of their perception by incumbent players. More than 20 in‐depth interviews are conducted with a range of stakeholders and 132 retail pharmacists completed questionnaires.

The paper suggests that this industry is relying on barriers which, while arguably effective, are outside the industry's control, and do not justify the apparent complacency among retail pharmacists.

This research is of significant managerial relevance since it demonstrates that the incumbents are unprepared for potentially devastating impacts if supermarkets or other new competitors were to enter the market.

The authors propose and utilise a novel framework for entry barrier analysis which includes the perceived locus of control for each entry barrier. The contribution of the paper is therefore in its treatment of the traditional arena of entry barriers and deterrence.

Although the benefits of strategic alliances are well documented, whether strategic alliances can be a viable entry strategy option for small and medium‐size enterprises (SMEs) to successfully penetrate markets held by major incumbent suppliers is less clear. In this paper, strategic alliances are shown to be an effective entry‐cum‐deterrence strategy for SMEs to successfully penetrate markets that are well established and dominated by major corporations. In addition, the conditions under which SMEs can use strategic alliances as an entry strategy without restricting themselves to target only those markets ignored by bigger firms are identified. In terms of methodology, this paper follows a deductive approach – one based on game theory, to examine explicitly the reactions of bigger firms to the entry of SMEs into their markets, specifically taking into account the resource limitations faced by SMEs. To verify that the theoretical arguments presented are consistent with practice, two cases of the use of strategic alliances by SMEs as an entry strategy to penetrate markets dominated by major corporations are examined. The practices and experiences of these SMEs were found to be consistent with the theoretical arguments presented here.

The fragmentation can either lead to an all-out civil war as in Sri Lanka or a frozen conflict as in Georgia. One of the main characteristics of fragmentation is the control of group members by their respective leaders. The chapter applies standard models of non-cooperative game theory to explain the endogenous fragmentation, which seeks to model the equilibrium formation of rival groups. Citizens become members of these rival groups and some sort of clientelism develops in which political leaders control their respective fragments of citizens. Once the divisions are created, the inter-group rivalry can trigger violent conflicts that may seriously damage the social fabric of a nation and threaten the prospect of peace for the people for a very long time. In other words, our main goal in this chapter is to understand the formation of the patron–client relationship or what is called clientelisation.

The purpose of this study is to develop a conceptual framework for defensive strategy by integrating market entry modes and the typology of firms suggested by Day and Nedungandi, and to attempt to propose how local incumbent firms utilize their mental models in order to react against market entry of new competition in global markets.

The theoretical perspective adopted in the study is how mental models used by incumbent firms influence their reaction to market entry of new competition in developing defensive strategies to defend their markets.

Mental models of incumbent firms, categorized as self‐centered, competitor‐centered, customer‐oriented, and market‐driven firms, impact their reaction and the development of defensive marketing strategies against market entrants using a variety of market entry modes in global markets.

The paper presents an extensive review of the defensive marketing and mental models literature and shows how the way in which incumbent firms react to market entry of new competition contributes to understanding of incumbent reaction to market entry of new competition in global markets. Research directions for future research and managerial implications are also provided.

Proposes a model which shows that Stackelberg competition is not necessarily welfare‐ enhancing compared with Cournot competition. Shows that, although in a simple duopoly model prices in a Stackelberg equilibrium are lower than in a Cournot equilibrium, this is not necessarily true in an entry‐deterrence framework, where post‐entry competition is Stackelberg rather than Cournot. Derives conditions under which in this framework Stackelberg competition leads to lower expected welfare, in the case where demand is linear.

This research aims to provide an empirical comparison of the results of three brands' marketing defence strategies used in advance of generic brands entering the market. By reviewing the effectiveness of these strategies, this research looks to extend the research on marketing defence strategies into the importance of anticipating competitor launches.

A data set containing 243 weeks of scanned sales for 21 generic brands was used in a regression model aimed at measuring the effectiveness of each brand's defence strategies in deterring entry and limiting the market share of these generic brands.

The analysis shows that several marketing mix components were effective in limiting the impact of generic brands. What was critical to each component's success was ensuring that they were implemented before the launch of the generic brands.

This research has the limitation of being confined to a category of pharmaceutical allergy brands, which limits generalisation of the findings.

The managerial relevance of this research has two parts. First, it will encourage managers to move from implementing strategies in reaction to a competitor launch to implementing strategies in advance of their entry. Second, it provides insights into the effectiveness of several strategic options for brands facing the entry of generic brands.

This study brings together literature regarding entry deterrence and market share loss prevention to help highlight the importance of proactive marketing defence strategies in reducing both the number of entrants and the amount of market share lost. It uses a data set to provide an empirical review of a range of marketing mix components used by pharmaceutical brands against low‐price generic brands.