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Press reports have indicated that firms frequently underprice restricted stock and employee stock options. I test for underpricing of stock and options.

I examined a sample of 5,333 private firm stock and option issuances between 1985 and 2017. I tested for underpricing using two approaches: assuming investors have no special market-timing ability and assuming instead they have perfect market-timing ability.

I find evidence of widespread stock and option underpricing by private firms before they go public reflecting large discounts that exceed reasonable compensation for lack of marketability. Unreported underpricing is more frequent in the last pre-IPO private equity transactions that offer the last opportunity to give such discounts before the stock is publicly traded, but the discounts are greater in the earlier pre-IPO transactions where unreported discounts are presumably tougher for the SEC to detect. Underpricing is still detected even when the actual DLOMs are tested against a benchmark that assumes investors have perfect market-timing ability.

Firms frequently underprice restricted stock and employee stock options. Firms tend to underprice stock options more frequently than restricted stock, but restricted stock tends to be priced at deeper discounts when recipients are assumed not to have any special market-timing ability.

Private firms issue restricted stock and options as incentive compensation. Lowballing the valuation transfers wealth from outside stockholders to employees/insiders. Wealth transfers take place through the issuance of equity claims to employees/insiders before firms go public. I found that more than a quarter of the DLOMs exceed the theoretical maximum by, on average, between 16% (median) and 20% (mean). This finding raises two questions worthy of investigation. First, to what extent do the frequency and magnitude of DLOMs above the theoretical maximum depend on whether a board of directors obtains an independent appraisal of a stock’s fair market value? Second, if DLOMs above the theoretical maximum are observed even when the stock is independently appraised, how do appraisers justify such large DLOMs?

The wealth transfers that take place through the issuance of equity claims to employees/insiders before firms go public benefit employees/insiders at the expense of outside shareholders.

My paper is the first to furnish evidence of widespread stock and option underpricing by private firms before they go public; demonstrate that the unreported underpricing is more frequent in the last pre-IPO private equity transactions that offer the last opportunity to give such discounts before the stock is publicly traded and show that the discounts are greater in the earlier pre-IPO transactions where unreported discounts are presumably tougher for the SEC to detect.

Employee Stock Options [ESOs] have been used widely as a component of employees' compensation. To maximise the incentive effect of these options it is very important to understand the exercise decision of the employees. This is an important financial decision that is dependent on both rational and psychological factors. This paper aims to study the mediating role of Herding Bias on Personality Traits and the employees' decision to exercise ESOs.

The data were collected through a self-structured questionnaire from 210 employees of Banks and NBFCs [Non-Banking Financial Companies] who have received and exercised the ESOs. SPSS MACRO version 25 was used to understand the mediational effect of Herding Bias on Personality Traits and Employees' decision to exercise their ESOs.

The results showed that Personality Traits affect the employees' decision to exercise their ESOs. The study also shows a partial negative mediating effect of Herding Bias on Personality Traits and employees' decision to exercise ESOs.

Limited study has been conducted on how the employees make their decision to exercise ESOs. Although extant studies have touched upon the importance of including behavioural biases in ascertaining the exercise decision of the employees, the predictors of the behavioural biases have not been studied under this context. To the best of the author's knowledge, this study is the first in itself to study the inter-linkage between Personality Traits, Herding Bias and employees' decision to exercise ESOs.

As this article reports, in recent years most legislative activities focused on start-ups, with as many as 12 European Union (EU) Member States having introduced tax incentives for employee share ownership (ESO) in this type of small and middle-sized enterprise (SME). But incentivising ESO in SMEs should be extended to all SMEs, the engine of the European economy, including those from the social economy, having shown their crucial function for the resilience of our societies during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Against the background of this recent and very dynamic development this article, it provides an overview of the start-up business segment in comparison to other types of companies, particularly focusing on differences with the SME sector; examines the legal regulations that hinder a broader adoption of ESO in European start-ups; presents best-practice examples to demonstrate the favourable conditions already established in some EU Member States and discussed whether these reforms and best practice examples could be extended and – as is already the case in some countries – applied to the whole SME population including social economy enterprises.

Since the European Commission launched the 2011 Social Business Initiative (SBI) followed by the 2016 Start-up and Scale-up initiative, many actions to support social enterprises in view of their potential to address societal challenges and contribute to sustainable economic growth have followed. Most recently, the 2021 Social Economy Action Plan of the European Commission gave important impulses. The potential of employee buyouts offering a continuation perspective to SMEs owners looking for successors was highlighted in the 2022 EC report “Transition Pathway for Proximity and Social Economy,” calling for the implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs).

The situation of employee share ownership in start-ups has some parallels with that in traditional SMEs, but in many respects, they differ fundamentally. Although, on the other hand, social enterprises may also have to compete with large firms for qualified staff and face challenges when growing or scaling their activities, the reason why ESO in this enterprise segment is not widespread in the EU is altogether different. In the absence of a prescribed legal form of incorporation, social enterprises operate in various forms (be it for profit or non-profit), e.g. cooperatives, closely held limited liability companies, mutuals, associations, voluntary organisations or foundations. Therefore, this article looks into the extension of the incentives for ESO to social enterprises inasmuch as they are organised in legal forms allowing for share ownership, above all in the form of limited liability companies.

Outstanding unexercised stock options can motivate managers to engage in actions that increase the value of their company’s stock, including buying back their firm’s stock. The objective of granting stock options to managers is to align their interests with stockholders by tying a portion of their compensation to the company’s stock performance. However, unexercised stock options may have unintended consequences by providing managers with a vested interest in artificially boosting stock prices via stock buybacks. The primary objective of this research is to study the main factors that influence firms' buyback decisions amongst hospitality firms at a time when these firms were clamoring for taxpayer bailouts. Results from logistic regression seem to suggest that outstanding executive stock options are a major contributory factor in a firm’s buyback decision. Estimates also indicate that larger, more profitable firms will likely engage in stock buybacks. These findings survive a battery of tests.

The authors use logistic regression to predict the probability of a firm’s buyback decision based on a given set of exogenous explanatory variables.

The paper supports the hypothesis that buyback decisions are guided by the motive to prop support stock prices in the presence of outstanding restricted stock options/warrants granted to firms' executives.

The paper focuses on the buyback decision of U.S. hospitality firms. The results, therefore, might not be generalizable to firms in other industries or countries.

U.S. share repurchase corporate policy and government regulation needs to be revisited given the economic imperative for firms to invest in activities to restore employment and put them in a position for economic recovery.

Public criticism of the size, structure and form (i.e. loan vs grant) of COVID-19 bailouts warrants an examination of whether the factors that drive hospitality and tourism firms to repurchase shares support economic recovery.

Consistent with agency theory, the authors find a significant positive association between outstanding restricted stocks and a firm’s decision to support the stock prices by buying back shares.

Drawing on bargaining power and the inequality aversion perspective, this study aims to probe employees’ influence on addressing income inequality between top executives and nonexecutive employees. Meanwhile, it examines the moderating role of employee-related factors and plan attributes.

This study uses a staggered difference-in-differences design with a propensity scoring match approach and verification of the parallel trend assumption to test the hypotheses.

The results support the hypothesis that employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) significantly reduce within-firm income inequality. The negative effect is amplified by both the presence of trade unions and the unemployment rate at the regional level, as well as the duration of the lock-in period and the scale of participants within the stock ownership plan.

This study has implications for income inequality research and ESOP design and provides theoretical support for policymakers and corporate governance.

This study contributes to the literature on income inequality by examining the implementation of ESOPs from the employee perspective. Furthermore, it extends the current literature by investigating the strengthening effects of regional factors and ESOP attributes on the relationship between ESOPs and income inequality. The conclusions provide new empirical evidence to promote the effective implementation of ESOPs by combining internal and external factors.

This viewpoint will present some statistical information about employee ownership in the US and interpret and analyze this information in order to address the barriers question using material from qualitative interviews that the authors have conducted over the last ten years with practitioners in the field. There have been few actual empirical studies that sort out the different barriers to employee ownership. The authors have chosen to focus on employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) in the US because this is the principal example from which people could learn from, and the high prevalence of ESOPs plays an important role in the US. This overview will present interpretations of these interviews with conceptual arguments that cannot always be supported with either overwhelming empirical studies or arguments that conclusively eliminate one or other explanation. This is an initial attempt to bring some comprehensive treatment and data to this incipient discussion. This is based on an interpretive analysis of qualitative interviews without quantification or social survey methods used for measurement. The advantage of this approach is that it lays out a completely different level of analysis of the barriers to employee ownership in the US that is “closer to the ground” and more based in the views of front-line practitioners who are actually implementing it.

Analysis and interpretation of qualitative interviews.

The list of barriers that has been identified is not exhaustive. The preliminary conclusions are that (not necessarily in this order) limitations of investment banking models, poor supportive infrastructure, complexity and cost and regulatory issues, the lack of support by political parties and social movements, the sale of companies due to financial considerations and legal complexities and lack of clarity and resistance by Federal agencies are major barriers in the US. Various sectors of Wall Street has been amenable to employee ownership with the proper government and private sector support. What is needed now is a series of quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews of retiring business owners in closely held companies and of CEOs and CFOs in stock market companies in order to gauge the barriers that they believe are blocking their own action in the employee share ownership area. The Rutgers Institute for the Study of Employee Ownership and Profit Sharing is working on such a research agenda at this time. In addition, with the future size of the US employee ownership sector at stake, a more intensive one-year interview project would make sense in order to present these different explanations to key actors and practitioners and ask them to provide evidence to prove or disprove the relevance of the different barriers.

Empirical research which can resolve which barriers are more important than others is presented, when possible; however, studies that provide metrics to compare different barriers are not available and need to be carried out.

Other countries considering employee ownership policies can learn from the US experience. US policymakers and legislators can learn from an original, recent discussion of barriers.

If employee ownership sectors are to be developed, a careful discussion of barriers is most relevant.

Original document by the authors based on original interviews.

This paper aims to identify the key lessons to learn from the US employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)-model. The lessons are, broad-based employee ownership is difficult to attain and sustain if employees have to use their own money to purchase shares. The paper works better when the shares are held in trust rather than being held individually. Broad-based employee ownership improves corporate performance and employee financial security. Employees care more about how employee ownership affects the stability of their jobs and retirement than having governance rights. If laws require democratic governance there will not be widespread employee ownership. Tax incentives are critical to induce companies and their owners to share ownership.

This paper is based on results from National Center for Employee Ownership research, a review of other research in the field, and the author’s own 45 years of experience in this field.

About one-quarter of the private sector workforce in the USA participates in some kind of employee ownership plan. There are 6,700 ESOPs in the USA with 14 million participants. The ESOPs hold over $1.4 trillion in assets. About 6,000 of these plans are in non-listed companies and the companies employ about two million people. Public companies ESOPs generally own under 10% of company stock; private company ESOPs usually own at least 30% of the stock and a majority of the plans own 100% of the stock. Most of these companies have between 20 and 500 employees.

The article gives a practitioner's overview over the main reasons behind the success of the ESOP model in the USA.

“The latest available cross-country data presented in the PEPPER V Report (Lowitzsch and Hashi, 2024) can be viewed by examining EFP in and of itself as an isolated subject or it can be viewed in a much wider set of contexts. Widening the lens in order to examine EFP in the context of the concentration of capital ownership and the concentration of capital income can help observers establish EFP’s span of relevance. In particular US data on capital income show that policy makers need to be aware that EFP can have an important role in narrowing the income and wealth gap for the working middle class when the concentration of capital ownership and capital income is high and when real wage growth is low.”

“Against this background, this article makes a very straightforward observation that the relevance of EFP in an economic system, in a country, and for the average employee in a country is related to the trend in the concentration of capital ownership and capital income. Interest in the idea is potentially increased or decreased by trends in real wages. Atkinson, who many consider the founder of modern wealth concentration scholarship, “focuses on the increasing share of capital incomes a source of income inequality among individuals” (Cirillo et al., 2017, p. 1). Indeed, we consider the difference between labour’s share and capital’s share to be a critically important fundamental problem of political economy. This essay asserts that when this concentration is high and real wages are flat, other things being equal, EFP may be more relevant. When the concentration of capital ownership and capital income is high, this means that ownership and income on that ownership is thinly spread in the population. When real wages are flat, this means that the rate at which fixed wages can replenish wealth is decreasing. As a result, both trends would make EFP more relevant.”

The conceptual model suggested for this article asserts that the relevance of EFP can be viewed as a function of narrowing income and wealth options for the working middle class when the concentration of capital ownership and capital income is high and when real wage growth is low. Does this relevance change across economic systems? There is no question that the future understanding of these issues requires adding metrics to the statistical methodologies of different regions and countries and adding to existing reports and analyses that focus on both the dynamics of and trends in capital income (property income in the EU) and on the EUR and USD value of EFP at the mean and at the median for different income levels of the population

This article presents – for the first time – a society-wide measure of the impact of EFP on one economy, namely, the US For further research, it makes sense to build on the comparable data available on the distribution of capital ownership and have similar research on the distribution of capital income for both the EU and the US along with measures of the EUR and USD values of EFP.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between stock options compensation and firm strategic risk-taking, employing a quantile regression (QR) model. This study aims to analyze whether the impact of stock options on firm strategic risk-taking changes across various quantiles and investigates the moderating role of firm performance.

This study is based on a sample of 90 French firms for the period extending from 2008 to 2019. To deal with the non-uniform association, the authors use a panel quantile method.

The results reveal that the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) stock options on firm strategic risk-taking varies across risk-taking quantiles. More specifically, the study’s results show a positive association at low quantile levels of strategic risk-taking, measured by research and development (R&D) and a negative linkage at high levels. The authors also find that firm performance moderates the impact of CEO stock options on strategic risk-taking.

The non-uniform relationship between CEO stock options and firm strategic risk-taking shows that the weight of CEO stock options in the total compensation can be a major determinant of the firm's strategic risk-taking attitude.

This study extends existing research on executive compensation and strategic risk-taking. Thus, this study has the potential to help stakeholders, board of directors and regulators, who are attempting to understand how the compensation contract – in particular, stock option pay – is related to the risk behavior of the agents and guide them to structure the executive compensation in an optimal way.