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Following the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Basic, securities class plaintiffs can invoke the “rebuttable presumption of reliance on public, material misrepresentations regarding securities traded in an efficient market” [the “fraud-on-the-market” doctrine] to prove classwide reliance. Although this requires plaintiffs to prove that the security traded in an informationally efficient market throughout the class period, Basic did not identify what constituted adequate proof of efficiency for reliance purposes.

Market efficiency cannot be presumed without proof because even large publicly traded stocks do not always trade in efficient markets, as documented in the economic literature that has grown significantly since Basic. For instance, during the recent global financial crisis, lack of liquidity limited arbitrage (the mechanism that renders markets efficient) and led to significant price distortions in many asset markets. Yet, lower courts following Basic have frequently granted class certification based on a mechanical review of some factors that are considered intuitive “proxies” of market efficiency (albeit incorrectly, according to recent studies and our own analysis). Such factors have little probative value and their review does not constitute the rigorous analysis demanded by the Supreme Court.

Instead, to invoke fraud-on-the-market, plaintiffs must first establish that the security traded in a weak-form efficient market (absent which a security cannot, as a logical matter, trade in a “semi-strong form” efficient market, the standard required for reliance purposes) using well-accepted tests. Only then do event study results, which are commonly used to demonstrate “cause and effect” (i.e., prove that the security’s price reacted quickly to news – a hallmark of a semi-strong form efficient market), have any merit. Even then, to claim classwide reliance, plaintiffs must prove such cause-and-effect relationship throughout the class period, not simply on selected disclosure dates identified in the complaint as plaintiffs often do.

These issues have policy implications because, once a class is certified, defendants frequently settle to avoid the magnified costs and risks associated with a trial, and the merits of the case (including the proper application of legal presumptions) are rarely examined at a trial.

The economic doctrine of market efficiency plays an essential role in securities fraud litigation. In lawsuits alleging violations of SEC Rule 10b-5, the plaintiffs typically must argue that the market for the relevant security is efficient, and therefore that the “fraud on the market” doctrine applies. However, the term “market efficiency” is often applied imprecisely. In this chapter, we discuss properties of efficient markets that have been proposed in academic research, legal scholarship, and case law. We explore what must be assumed about capital markets for each of these properties to hold. We then ask how, in practice, each property could be rebutted.

Starting in the 1980s, financial liberalization and technological developments have enabled individual investors to participate in financial markets and carry out easy transactions. With these developments, academics began to wonder how the individual investors decide to invest and what factors affect these decisions.

According to traditional finance theory, it is suggested that markets are efficient and investors show rational behaviors in their financial purchasing decisions. However, in many studies conducted in recent years, it was determined that investors included emotional elements as well as rational elements in their decision-making process and therefore exhibited irrational behaviors by believing rumors instead of real information. It is thought that many factors such as personal characteristics, psychological factors, demographic and socio-economic factors play a role in the behavior of investors in purchasing a financial product.

In this study, the importance of herd behavior, which is one of the psychological factors that play a very important role in financial markets, on financial product purchasing process is examined in the light of the behavioral finance theory. It is thought that information included in the study will be useful for researchers who want to study herd behavior and for those who are interested in the subject.

Design/Methodology/Approach: This chapter applies tests associated with the adaptive market hypothesis (AMH) and Johansen cointegration test. AMH acknowledges the views of the efficient market hypothesis and behavioural finance approach.

Purpose: Cryptocurrencies are considered a new asset class by multiasset portfolio managers. Hence, we examine the AMH and cointegration in the cryptocurrency market to know whether select cryptocurrencies can be diversified.

Findings: We find that cryptocurrencies are efficient and there is a long-run relationship among constituent series, and there is no short-run causality derived from bitcoin, Ethereum and litecoin to bitcoin, while stellar and Dogecoin have short-run causality to bitcoin.

Originality/Value: This chapter is different from the existing one as this is the first study in which the AMH and Johansen cointegration test are applied to check the efficiency and relationship of Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Monero, Stellar, litecoin and Dogecoin.

This study uses an event study approach which is the development of the efficient market hypothesis theory. First, the random walk test was conducted on the Jakarta Composite Index (JCI) to test the efficiency in the weak form. Furthermore, event study analysis was carried out on JCI and nine sectoral indices to determine the impact of COVID-19 related events on price movements. The study found that JCI prices follow a random walk pattern so that the stock market in Indonesia is efficient, at least in a weak form. In the event study testing, only events related to the first confirmed case of COVID-19 and the implementation of large-scale social restriction in Indonesia affected the composite index. From a sectoral point of view, only the event of Jakarta’s call center had no impact on price changes in the sectoral index. Thus, each index had a different effect throughout the event. The reaction seen from the movement of prices for the composite and sectoral index to the public information explains that the condition of the Indonesian capital market is efficient, at least in semi-strong form.

We discuss the ways in which the tensions between deregulation and bailouts create fundamentally inefficient markets. Although there is an appetite for the rhetoric of a laissez-fair economic system in the United States, we do not have the political will to operate such a system, as there are always cries for bailouts when a crisis emerges. And bailouts rob markets of the crucial ability to discipline capital for risky behavior. Using the case of China as an example, we argue that the post-Cold War conclusion that state ownership is fundamentally inefficient is premature. The key issue is not state versus private ownership per se but, rather, how well aligned the incentives are within a given system. Some of the economic models we find in reform-era China are actually better aligned and perhaps as transparent as their counterparts in the market economies of the capitalist West. Finally, because China is not caught up on the categorical assumption that private firms are efficient while state-owned firms are inefficient, the country has been able to be an institutional innovator in the area of public–private partnerships, leading to radical new corporate forms.

This chapter investigates the relative magnitude of the benefits of global diversification from the viewpoint of domestic investors in various countries by forming time-rolling efficient frontiers. To enhance feasibility of asset allocation strategies, the constraints of short-sales and over-weighting investments are taken into account. The empirical results suggest that local investors in less developed countries, particularly in Latin America, East Asia, and Southern Europe, comparatively benefit more from global diversification. Investors in the countries of civic-law origin tend to benefit more from global investment than the ones in the common-law states. Although the global market has become more integrated over the past decades, diversification benefits for domestic investors declined but did not vanish. The results of this chapter are useful for asset management professionals to determine target markets to promote the sales of international funds.

Product intervention power is introduced under the markets in financial instruments regulation (MiFIR) and packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) Regulation for all EU Member States and gives National Competent Authorities (NCAs), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and European Banking Authority (EBA) powers to monitor financial products (and services) under their supervision and to “temporarily” prohibit or restrict the marketing, distribution, or sale of certain financial instruments, or to intervene in relation to certain financial activities or practice. This extends the supervisory measures defined in MiFID II to any PRIIPs (including insurance-based investment products “IBI products”) that would not otherwise fall under the scope of MiFID II. Product intervention power is given to the NCAs, and in order to use power, it requires to take the specifics of the individual case into account and a series of conditions, criteria, and factors to fulfill. Moreover, ESMA and the EBA have a type of control function and ability to override national regulators on product. The aim of product intervention powers is to ensure strengthening of investor protection, but given the potential significant impact of this power, calls into question of possibility to delay innovation and slow down product developments on the capital market.

This paper provided an overview of supervisory measures on product intervention, that is, scope of the product intervention power, criteria, factors, and risks which have to be taken into consideration when using this regulator’s tool.