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The aim of this paper is to show evidence and to quantify with forensic econometric methods the impact of the missing trader fraud (MTF) on European carbon allowances markets. This fraud occurred mainly between the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009. In this paper, the financial mechanisms of the fraud are explored and the impact on the market behaviour, as well as the consequences on its econometric features.

In a previous work, the first and second authors showed that the European carbon market is strongly influenced by fundamentals factors as oil, energy, gas, coal and equities. Therefore, the authors calibrated arbitrage pricing theory‐like models. These models enabled the impact of each factor on the market to be quantified. In this study, the authors focused more precisely on spot prices quoted on Paris‐based Bluenext market over 2008 and 2009. During this period, a significant drop in performances and robustness of the model and a reduced sensitivity of carbon prices to fundamentals was observed.

The authors identify the period where the market was driven by MTF movements and were able to measure the value of this fraud. Soon after governments passed a law that cut the possibility of fraud occurrence the performance of the model improved rapidly. The authors estimate the impact of the value added tax extortion on the carbon market at €1.3 billion.

This paper describes the first study that attempts to prove and quantify scientifically the MTF on emission markets.

A private right of action is not expressly mentioned in either §10(b) or Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and hence such a right must be implied. To justify a reasonable cause of action, the plaintiff must prove: (1) a material omission or misstatement; (2) made by the defendant with “scienter” (defined later); (3) which was the actual and proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff; (4) and was relied upon by the plaintiff.³ To reach the issue of damages, defendants’ liability in terms of satisfying the above four elements must be assumed.

Following the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision in Basic, securities class plaintiffs can invoke the “rebuttable presumption of reliance on public, material misrepresentations regarding securities traded in an efficient market” [the “fraud-on-the-market” doctrine] to prove classwide reliance. Although this requires plaintiffs to prove that the security traded in an informationally efficient market throughout the class period, Basic did not identify what constituted adequate proof of efficiency for reliance purposes.

Market efficiency cannot be presumed without proof because even large publicly traded stocks do not always trade in efficient markets, as documented in the economic literature that has grown significantly since Basic. For instance, during the recent global financial crisis, lack of liquidity limited arbitrage (the mechanism that renders markets efficient) and led to significant price distortions in many asset markets. Yet, lower courts following Basic have frequently granted class certification based on a mechanical review of some factors that are considered intuitive “proxies” of market efficiency (albeit incorrectly, according to recent studies and our own analysis). Such factors have little probative value and their review does not constitute the rigorous analysis demanded by the Supreme Court.

Instead, to invoke fraud-on-the-market, plaintiffs must first establish that the security traded in a weak-form efficient market (absent which a security cannot, as a logical matter, trade in a “semi-strong form” efficient market, the standard required for reliance purposes) using well-accepted tests. Only then do event study results, which are commonly used to demonstrate “cause and effect” (i.e., prove that the security’s price reacted quickly to news – a hallmark of a semi-strong form efficient market), have any merit. Even then, to claim classwide reliance, plaintiffs must prove such cause-and-effect relationship throughout the class period, not simply on selected disclosure dates identified in the complaint as plaintiffs often do.

These issues have policy implications because, once a class is certified, defendants frequently settle to avoid the magnified costs and risks associated with a trial, and the merits of the case (including the proper application of legal presumptions) are rarely examined at a trial.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature and perception of corporate frauds in India and their consequences in the business and economic systems, and it highlights the emerging issues so that existing legal and regulatory obligations can be redefined and structured.

An exploratory research was conducted through a combined mode of literature review; case studies; structured questionnaires from 346 sample companies; and 43 interviews with the corporate professionals, management, investors, government offices and authorities having wide experience.

It was found that the regulatory system is weak, and there is dire need to redefine the role of auditors. Coordination among different regulatory authorities is poor, and after every scam, there is a blame game. Reporting of fraud and publication of fraud prevention policy are missing. Banks and financial institutions are ineffective on due diligence, and there is a lack of professionalism on the board and other executive levels in companies.

This study assumes that fraud could be mitigated by proactive and conscious action by auditors, and corporate executives are willing to avoid perpetrating financial fraud despite pressures from investors, government securities regulators and exogenous market fluctuations. The authors relied on the honesty of the respondents during the sample collection and recorded semi-structured interviews. A minimum level of five years’ work experience relative to preventing, detecting or investigating fraud has been considered a valid determinant in selecting the purposive sample.

The study suggests mandatory publication of fraud prevention policy; constitution of special purpose corporate offence wing; recognition to companies for improved corporate governance; true adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards; due diligence by banks and financial institutions; compulsory appointment of professionals by shareholders and fixation of responsibility on independent professionals; intellectualisation of audit committee; and more powers to the regulators, especially Securities and Exchange Board of India.

Prevention of corporate frauds reduces anxiety, improves corporate image and builds up confidence of the investors, which is essential for resource channelling in financial markets.

The research work is based on a thorough analysis of regulatory framework and fraud case studies and primary data collected from companies, banks and other government and developmental institutions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the hypothesis that a period of sustained supernormal firm performance (for up to five years before fraud commission) creates financial pressure on actors/agents so they have a propensity to behave fraudulently to keep the good times (apparently) rolling.

Applying the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model using a range of calendar time portfolio methodologies, the authors measure abnormal drifts in stock performance in periods up to five years before alleged fraud commission dates. The authors examine a sample of 561 US firms subject to enforcement actions initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) over 1968-2009.

The authors find that sustained firm-specific positive stock price performance for up to five years followed by the almost inevitable adverse shock, which eventually brings the good times to an end, generally precedes corporate fraud. Fraud occurs when firm managers engage in misconduct in a misguided attempt to keep the good times (apparently) rolling despite the negative shock.

The sample is restricted to firms with trading histories on the stock market prior to the misconduct, and to firms contained in the Federal Securities Regulation database of US firms subject to enforcement actions initiated by the SEC and the DOJ over 1968-2009.

The desire to keep the good times rolling appears to be a very important driver of fraudulent behavior, even after controlling for the executive compensation incentive effects and business cycle effects emphasized in prior studies. The robust findings of positive abnormal returns for up to five years preceding initial fraud commission suggest that regulators and investors would be well-advised to scrutinize the behavior of firms that exhibit surprisingly persistent superior performance over an extended period. If the financial results appear too good to be true, a closer examination might just reveal that they indeed are.

While most investors generally like to see the “good times keep rolling” this pressure can create ethical dilemmas for managers.

Unlike most other papers in this area of the literature, which concentrate on the pre-fraud disclosure, the authors investigate the firm’s performance in the pre-fraud commission period. The authors find that the commission of the alleged fraud is preceded by a sustained period of surprisingly good performance of up to five years in length. The authors believe that the paper provides empirical evidence that supports the hypothesis that a period of sustained supernormal firm performance (for up to five years before fraud commission) creates financial pressure on actors/agents so they have a propensity to behave fraudulently to keep the good times (apparently) rolling.

The economic doctrine of market efficiency plays an essential role in securities fraud litigation. In lawsuits alleging violations of SEC Rule 10b-5, the plaintiffs typically must argue that the market for the relevant security is efficient, and therefore that the “fraud on the market” doctrine applies. However, the term “market efficiency” is often applied imprecisely. In this chapter, we discuss properties of efficient markets that have been proposed in academic research, legal scholarship, and case law. We explore what must be assumed about capital markets for each of these properties to hold. We then ask how, in practice, each property could be rebutted.

There was a time in Britain when even senior representatives of the financial services industry were prepared to be quoted in the press as expressing doubts as to whether there was anything intrinsically wrong with directors and other corporate insiders taking advantage of their better knowledge about their companies in their own investment dealings. Indeed, some even went so far as to say that this was both proper and natural. True it is that, in Britain or for that much in continental Europe, there are few, even among the groves of academia, that would have advanced the theories justifying insider dealing that Professor Henry Manne so clearly articulated in ‘Insider Trading and the Stock Market’. Nonetheless, in what was then the leading book on the law and practice of the stock market, the authors, a leading Queen's Counsel and an eminent stockbroker, expressed the view in 1972 that a stockbroker who learnt even privileged information should not allow this to operate to the detriment of his client. Having said this, Sir Winston Churchill complained that it was defamatory to assert that advantage had been taken of ‘inside information’ during the so‐called Marconi scandal in 1911, and there are comments in a report to the House of Commons by special commissioners as early as November 1696 roundly criticising promoters of over‐valued stock selling out, in the entrepreneurial fashion eloquently advocated by Professor Manne, on the basis of their privileged knowledge and position. Thus, discussion of the pros and cons of insider dealing, at least in Britain, has tended to be emotional rather than based on economic or even pseudo‐economic analysis of empirical data. Even the surveys that have been conducted on attitudes to the practice would hardly impress a statistician.

To explain the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. and its implications for private class action litigation under the federal securities laws.

Explains the background on the Halliburton decision, including the prior case history and key precedents, analyzes the key reasoning and holdings of the decision, and discusses the implications of the decision and how it will impact private class actions brought under the securities laws.

While there was considerable pontification in the bar that the Halliburton case might provide a vehicle to curtail many class actions brought under the securities laws, the Halliburton decision left prior law and practice largely intact, but provides defendants in such cases a tool to challenge viability of lawsuits in certain circumstances.

Practical guidance from experienced securities litigators.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the appropriateness and effectiveness of using the right of private action against perpetrators of market manipulation.

The author examines legislation in the USA, which gives victims the right to pursue private legal action against market manipulators, and discusses the eligibility criteria that plaintiffs have to meet before they are allowed to pursue private proceedings.

In spite of the importance placed on private claims by courts, regulators and legal firms in the USA, research has shown that relying on this type of redress alone, is fraught with difficulties as it may not be appropriate in a modern day economic climate, because the doctrines of the law of tort, such as reliance and causation, are ill‐suited to the impersonal nature of financial market trading. Common law tort has placed obstacles in the way of effective private civil action, making it inconvenient for those wishing to pursue this route to do so.

The study concludes that private action can work as a secondary or tool against market manipulation, but it cannot replace or reduce the power of public enforcement.

The study examines in detail the experience of the USA in using private action as a remedy against perpetrators of market manipulation. It discusses the eligibility criteria that plaintiffs have to meet before they are allowed to pursue private proceedings. It addresses the question of whether other countries such as the UK should use private enforcement against market manipulation.