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The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of management earnings forecasts on the level of information asymmetry around subsequent earnings announcement.

Employing the adverse selection cost method suggested by George et al., the paper compares for each sample firm the adverse selection cost around earnings announcement in forecasting years with that in non‐forecasting years.

Consistent with Diamond and Verrecchia is the finding that the earnings announcement in non‐forecasting years decreases information asymmetry during a three‐day announcement period and increases in a post‐announcement period up to seven days. No significant change in information asymmetry between pre‐ and post‐announcement periods when firms released a “good” news forecast is found. The firms that previously released a “bad” news forecast experience a significantly lower information asymmetry than those that did not forecast during announcement or post‐announcement days, and experience a decrease in information asymmetry in a five to seven‐day post‐announcement period.

This paper provides the first empirical reports on the different information asymmetry changes around earnings announcements followed by a “good” news management forecast from those followed by a “bad” news forecast.

We evaluate the performance of financial analysts versus naïve models in making long-term earnings forecasts. Long-term earnings forecasts are generally defined as third-, fourth-, and fifth-year earnings forecasts. We find that for the fourth and fifth years, analysts' forecasts are no more accurate than naïve random walk (RW) forecasts or naïve RW with economic growth forecasts. Furthermore, naïve model forecasts contain a large amount of incremental information over analysts' long-term forecasts in explaining future actual earnings. Tests based on subsamples show that the performance of analysts' long-term forecasts declines relative to naïve model forecasts for firms with high past earnings growth and low analyst coverage. Furthermore, a model that combines a naïve benchmark (last year's earnings) with the analyst long-term earnings growth forecast does not perform better than analysts' forecasts or naïve model forecasts. Our findings suggest that analysts' long-term earnings forecasts should be used with caution by researchers and practitioners. Also, when analysts' earnings forecasts are unavailable, naïve model earnings forecasts may be sufficient for measuring long-term earnings expectations.

Financial analysts act as crucial conduits of information between firms and stakeholders. However, comparatively little is known about how these information intermediaries evaluate the believability and importance of corporate disclosures. We argue that a firm’s level of managerial discretion, or latitude of executive action, acts as a cue for financial analysts, which helps them interpret and respond to voluntary management earnings forecasts. Our study provides strong, robust evidence that financial analysts find management forecasts significantly less believable in low-discretion than in high-discretion environments, and therefore tend to be much less responsive to these forecasts. We also show that managerial discretion is especially impactful on analysts’ responses in those circumstances where analysts are typically most uncertain about how to interpret management forecasts.

We highlight two mechanisms of limited attention for expert information intermediaries, i.e., analysts, and the effects of such limited attention on the market price discovery process. We approach analysts' limited attention from the perspective of day-to-day arrival of information and processing of tasks. We examine the attention-limiting role of competing tasks (number of earnings announcements and forecasts for portfolio firms) and distracting events (number of earnings announcements for non-portfolio firms) in analysts' forecast accuracy and the effects of such, on the subsequent price discovery process. Our results show that competing tasks worsen analysts' forecast accuracy, and competing task induced limited attention delays the market price adjustment process. On the other hand, distracting events can improve analysts' forecast accuracy and accelerate market price adjustments when such events relate to analysts' portfolio firms through industry memberships.

This study aims to examine whether Chinese firms increase their concerns about analysts’ earnings forecasts following the split-share structure reform (SSR) in 2005, which removed trading restrictions on approximately 70% of the shares of listed firms.

Using data from 2002 to 2019, the authors empirically test the association between meeting or beating analysts’ earnings expectations and the implementation of SSR.

The authors find that firms are more inclined to meet analysts’ earnings expectations after the introduction of SSR. Further analysis shows that firms guide analysts to walk their forecasts down by manipulating third-quarter earnings, suggesting enhanced value relevance between analysts’ forecasts and third-quarter earnings management in the postreform period.

The findings reveal an undesirable side effect of SSR and suggest that policymakers and regulators should consider and carefully manage the complex relationships between firms and analysts.

In contrast to prior studies that predominantly focus on the positive effects of the reform, this study reveals the side effects of SSR and provides new evidence on the mechanisms of meeting or beating analysts’ earnings expectations.

The main purpose of this study is to examine the disclosure of earnings forecasts in firms' prospectuses to explain investor demands or, in other words, oversubscription rates of Malaysian initial public offerings (IPOs).

Ordinary least squares and robust methods were used to examine cross-sectional data comprising 466 fixed-price IPOs reported for the period from January 2000 to February 2020 on Bursa Malaysia.

The results showed that IPOs with earnings forecasts obtained higher oversubscription rates than those without earnings forecasts. IPOs with earnings forecasts provide value-relevant signals to prospective investors about the good prospects of firms, resulting in an increase in the demand for IPO shares. For the IPO samples listed during the global financial crisis (GFC) period, IPOs with earnings forecasts had negative impacts on the oversubscription rates. These results were robust to quantile methods and the two-stage least squares method.

The research findings provide fresh information for investors regarding the importance of earnings forecasts as a trustworthy signal of a firm’s quality when making share subscription decisions.

The regulator is advised to encourage issuers to include earnings forecasts in their prospectuses since such forecasts help to increase the demand for IPOs.

This study contributes to the literature by offering empirical evidence regarding the signalling impact of earnings forecast disclosures on investor demands for Malaysian IPOs. Moreover, this study provides evidence demonstrating the impact of earnings forecast disclosures on oversubscription rates of Malaysian IPOs during the GFC period.

Using a sample of 9,898 firm-year observations from 1,821 unique Chinese listed firms over the period from 2004 to 2019, this study aims to investigate whether the market rewards meeting or beating analyst earnings expectations (MBE).

The authors use an event study methodology to capture market reactions to MBE.

The authors document a stock return premium for beating analyst forecasts by a wide margin. However, there is no stock return premium for firms that meet or just beat analyst forecasts, suggesting that the market is skeptical of earnings management by these firms. This market underreaction is more pronounced for firms with weak external monitoring. Further analysis shows that meeting or just beating analyst forecasts is indicative of superior future financial performance. The authors do not find firms using earnings management to meet or just beat analyst forecasts.

The authors provide evidence of market underreaction to meeting or just beating analyst forecasts, with the market's over-skepticism of earnings management being a plausible mechanism for this phenomenon.

The findings of this study are informative to researchers, market participants and regulators concerned about the impact of analysts and earnings management and interested in detecting and constraining managers' earnings management.

The authors provide new insights into how the market reacts to MBE by showing that the market appears to focus on using meeting or just beating analyst forecasts as an indicator of earnings management, while it does not detect managed MBE. Meeting or just beating analyst forecasts is commonly used as a proxy for earnings management in the literature. However, the findings suggest that it is a noisy proxy for earnings management.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relevance of American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) to management voluntary forecasts of earnings. The authors further investigate whether the market reacts to such forecasts in respect of satisfaction.

The authors’ econometric models are constructed from previous work in accounting to specify the effect of ACSI on the issuance and optimism of management forecasts. Our model also specifies the impact of management optimism with respect to ACSI on stock returns. The data consisting of US firms in the 2001-2010 is collated from several databases and analyzed using multiple regression procedures.

Results indicate that ACSI is positively associated with the likelihood of issuing management forecasts and boosts management optimism. It is also found that investors react negatively to management optimism that is inherent in forecasts and results from satisfaction.

The authors’ research findings not only complement prior work on the linkage between customer satisfaction and firm value by incorporating a managerial perspective but also respond to the recent call for further work on how relevant marketing metrics drive organizational decisions and firms’ financial performance. It should be noted that findings are limited to firms that release both a voluntary issuance of management forecasts and ACSI.

The study results shed light on the justification of marketing expenditures and provide a response to the call for marketing accountability. The study results also enable managers to make better decisions about whether and when to issue a forecast. The authors’ research further calls stakeholders’ attention to the presence of management forecast optimism with respect to satisfaction.

Despite the importance of managers as primary information generators and disseminators in the capital markets, there appears to be little discussion on the satisfaction’s relevance to market participants, particularly in relation to the role of managers. Therefore, this investigation is the first to empirically show the relevance of ACSI to management earnings forecasts that have been ignored in the marketing literature.

Islam stresses on the practice of transparency and sufficient disclosure particularly when it concerns the ethical identity of Islamic institutions. This is to make sure that the activities conducted in business adhere to Shari’ah principles. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of Shari’ah-compliant status on the accuracy of initial public offering (IPO) earnings forecasts and to investigate the effect of the existence of Muslim directors on IPO companies’ board of directors on the accuracy of earnings forecasts.

This study makes use of absolute forecast error as a proxy for earnings forecast accuracy. As obtained from the list of Shari’ah-compliant securities established by the Shari’ah Advisory Council of the Malaysian Securities Commission, the study sample comprised 190 Shari’ah-compliant and non-compliant IPOs. The collected data were analyzed through univariate analysis and ordinary least squares regression.

The initial findings show that during the study period, the earnings forecasts of Malaysian IPOs are accurate to some level, although such level is still unsatisfactory. The findings also showed that Shari’ah-compliant status and Muslim directorship do not positively affect the accuracy of IPO earnings forecasts.

The findings of the study provide some implications for regulators, financial analysts, investors and users of financial statements, particularly those desirous of investing in Islamic capital market.

The present study provides a new and far-reaching contribution into the debate about the earnings forecasts disclosure in the context of Islamic ethical perspective. In addition, this study is considered as the first study to extend IPO literature by examining the impact of Shari’ah-compliant status and Muslim directorship on the accuracy of management earnings forecasts disclosed in the IPO prospectus.

This paper aims to extend the research on the Malaysian initial public offering (IPO) management earnings forecasts by examining the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and earnings forecasts accuracy. It seeks to investigate whether effective corporate governance is a credible signal of improving the quality of financial information.

A sample of 235 IPO companies that went public during the period 1999‐2006 was used. Absolute forecast error was used to proxy for earnings forecast accuracy and to represent financial disclosure quality.

Companies with a higher percentage of non‐executive directors in the audit committees and larger audit committee size exhibit greater forecast accuracy. The accuracy of IPO earnings forecast is also positively influenced by the use of brand‐name auditor.

The results suggest that effective corporate governance is a credible signal of improving the quality of financial information. The role of audit committee as financial monitors as suggested by the agency theory supports this paper.

The results are consistent with the belief that effective corporate governance is associated with higher financial disclosure quality. The results also support the decisions made by Malaysian regulators such as the Securities Commission to enhance the quality of financial disclosure by revising the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance to encourage public companies to implement good governance practices such as audit committee independence.