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Using a sample of 9,898 firm-year observations from 1,821 unique Chinese listed firms over the period from 2004 to 2019, this study aims to investigate whether the market rewards meeting or beating analyst earnings expectations (MBE).

The authors use an event study methodology to capture market reactions to MBE.

The authors document a stock return premium for beating analyst forecasts by a wide margin. However, there is no stock return premium for firms that meet or just beat analyst forecasts, suggesting that the market is skeptical of earnings management by these firms. This market underreaction is more pronounced for firms with weak external monitoring. Further analysis shows that meeting or just beating analyst forecasts is indicative of superior future financial performance. The authors do not find firms using earnings management to meet or just beat analyst forecasts.

The authors provide evidence of market underreaction to meeting or just beating analyst forecasts, with the market's over-skepticism of earnings management being a plausible mechanism for this phenomenon.

The findings of this study are informative to researchers, market participants and regulators concerned about the impact of analysts and earnings management and interested in detecting and constraining managers' earnings management.

The authors provide new insights into how the market reacts to MBE by showing that the market appears to focus on using meeting or just beating analyst forecasts as an indicator of earnings management, while it does not detect managed MBE. Meeting or just beating analyst forecasts is commonly used as a proxy for earnings management in the literature. However, the findings suggest that it is a noisy proxy for earnings management.

Krull (2004) finds that US multinational corporations (MNCs) increase amounts designated as permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) to maximize reported after-tax earnings and meet earnings targets. We extend this research by examining the relationship between executive equity compensation and the opportunistic use of PRE by US MNCs, and the market reaction to earnings management using PRE designations. Firms use equity compensation to incentivize executives to strive for maximum shareholder wealth. One unintended consequence is that executives may engage in earnings management activities to increase their equity compensation. In this study, we examine whether the equity incentives of management are associated with an increased use of PRE. We predict and find strong evidence that the changes in PRE are positively associated with the portion of top managers' compensation that is tied to stock performance. In addition, we find this relationship to be strongest for firms that meet or beat forecasts, but only with the use of PRE to inflate income, suggesting that equity compensation incentivizes managers to opportunistically use PRE, especially to meet analyst forecasts.

Further, we provide evidence that investors react negatively to beating analysts' forecasts with the use of PRE, suggesting that investors find this behavior opportunistic and not fully convincing. This chapter makes an important contribution to what we know about the joint effects of tax policy, generally accepted accounting principles, and incentive compensation on the earnings reporting process.

Prior literature has revealed three key earnings benchmarks: earnings level; earnings change; and analysts’ expectations. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, the authors seek to establish which earnings benchmark induces the largest extent of earnings management. Second, the authors explore the implications of earnings management on firm future performance. Both of these purposes are investigated for Chinese listed companies during China’s IFRS/ISA reporting era.

The authors rely upon the unique regulations and incentives for Chinese listed companies in order to develop four testable hypotheses. Next, the authors employ both logistic and ordinary least squares regressions to test the hypotheses.

The results suggest that Chinese listed firms have the highest level of income increasing discretionary accruals around the earnings level benchmark, followed by the earnings change benchmark. The authors do not find any evidence of earnings management to beat analysts’ expectation. In addition, the authors find evidence that Chinese listed firms with relatively high level of earnings management and low earnings exhibit relatively weak future stock performance.

The findings are the first to document an earnings management benchmark hierarchy with respect to the extent of income increasing discretionary accruals, while simultaneously establishing a link between earnings management and firm future stock performance, for Chinese listed companies. The findings are valuable for regulators and investors by suggesting that management intervention in the reporting process during China’s IFRS/ISA reporting era may act to circumvent delisting regulations and cloud earnings signal for firms that beat certain earnings benchmarks.

Much in accounting research depends upon equity valuation. Too often, what the stock of publicly traded companies trade at is taken at its face value. Knowing that valuation is a function of performance relative to consensus security analyst expectations, more needs to be known about how these expectations are created and changed. The paper aims to assert that the guidance provided by top-level company management is important to the work product of analysts. The paper develops information from managers involved in these interactions.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 31 high-level executives employed by large USA companies in several industries. What those companies provided was interpreted through the theoretical lens of institutional theory and amounts to a qualitative content analysis approach to the subject.

The authors find that institutional theory well describes the important features of analyst guidance. Participants are aware of the broad societal interest that exists in the outcome of the guidance process. The participants accept the need for independent analyst opinions about their companies and their future prospects. In many ways, executives provide analysts more than just raw information and employ strategic structuring for analysts to produce expectations that will allow their companies a favorable pathway to future success as such is judged by the markets. The result is understood as being in the best interests of all market participants, even if it disproportionately benefits current corporate leadership.

Results are dependent upon the interview process, needing the correct questions to be asked and the willingness of interviewees to speak their lived truth. The paper calls into question traditional capital markets studies that evaluate quantitative relationships between projected accounting balances and subsequent stock market prices as a literal truth or as the result of scientific calculation.

Market participants should be somewhat more skeptical about companies that are routinely able to meet analyst expectations. To a large extent, such displays do not just happen but instead are manufactured to take place by virtual of a careful dance that is mindful of excesses on several sides.

The antagonistic interests of two important groups in the stock market is actually an unrecognized symbiotic dependency that prioritizes continued permission.

The accounting literature is very dependent on the work product of analysts. This is a rare opportunity to peak behind the curtain of their expertise in a critical fashion. The paper breaks ranks with the literature by trying to understand the thinking behind the narratives of capital market participants.

It is largely believed that stock pricing is influenced by disclosure of earnings. This motivates the corporate to exercise earnings management practices. This paper aims to analyse and detect the earnings management practices of Indian firms over earnings cycles. The earnings behaviour of the firms has been analysed at three levels of earnings cycles for the pricing effect: complete, incomplete and prospective. In India, the corporate ownership model is promoter-dominated shareholders’model (PDSHM) which highlights the relevance of the study for earnings-management motivation. This paper contributes by examining earnings management of the units at three levels of earnings cycle with regard to stock pricing. Earnings cycles have been decomposed into three components: complete, incomplete and prospective. While earnings management has been studied extensively, virtually all studies have focused on firm-specific effects. This study relates earnings management to the cycle of the earnings for stock-price effect.

The cash-flow model has been used for the computation of accruals (Collins and Hribar, 1999), and D’Angelo model (for calculating discretionary accruals) has been used for detecting earnings management in the present study, being comprehensive in nature and detailed in approach. The results of the “complete earnings cycle”are measured by net income. The results of the “incomplete earnings cycle” are measured by the ratio of gross margin over sales multiplied by inventory. It yields an approximate measure of the unrealized holding gains and losses. The “prospective earnings cycle” stems from the management decision to choose a rate of income growth. Statistical tools have been used for testing the results. These include regression analysis and descriptive statistics like arithmetic mean, median and standard deviation.

An examination of the units shows that firms report more discretionary accruals (DACC) at complete cycle, i.e. when financial markets are more certain about their future prospects which influence their securities’ pricing. It verified that unrealized income and growth prospects have very little role to play in determining returns. The results indicated that each of the components of the earnings cycle has a relevance factor for returns. In complete earnings cycle, DACC had the highest significance on returns than operating cash flows (OCF) and non-discretionary accruals (NDACC). Its determination content is the highest. So, the firms report more negative DACC when financial markets are less certain about their future prospects. Stock-price responses to earnings surprises are moderated when firm-level uncertainty is high, consistent with performance being attributed more to chance rather than performance.

The present study could be confined to only top 12 profit-making corporate enterprises in the private sector in India, leaving all other enterprises due to data non-availability. Of 25 enterprises, there were public sector undertakings too which had to be excluded. The period in the study is of five years (from 2003-2004 to 2007-2008) to highlight earnings management motivation. This period is best suited to identify the effects of global recession on the practice of earnings management in India. Researchers may like to select a different time-period based on their perspective.

It is hoped that the study would improve the understanding of the manner in which the capital markets process the publicly available earnings and its components for global firms. The findings of this study are significant not only for organisations that function in India but also for other companies that are based in economies with relatively mature corporate governance mechanisms. So, the authors’ findings have important policy implications for the Western world, as the sample companies are multinationals and operate globally. Similar efforts in other countries would be rewarding in controlling the management of reported earnings and enhance the reliability and transparency of reported earnings to promote economic efficiency.

Evidence on this issue could bring a new dimension to how the capital markets interpret these reported earnings and its components (cash flows, DACC and NDACC) at different levels of earnings cycles for minority shareholders in particular. Further, the evidence could also provide insights into the economic incentives for discretionary accounting choice and disclosure of the results of these earnings cycles.

It is an original paper which highlights the earnings behaviour and its motivation in Indian corporate enterprises for earnings cycles with regard to stock pricing.

The paper aims to argue that stock‐based compensation for top leaders is a very recent phenomenon that is associated with lower shareholder returns, bubbles and crashes and huge corporate scandals and that it is time to bring an end to it and find a better, more authentic approach that will enable corporations, stakeholders and the financial community to thrive.

The paper details how many executives engage in a dangerous and little‐discussed practice that comes very close to the line of illegality, one that betrays the spirit of securities laws and accounting regulation: earnings management. It concludes that far too many corporate leaders are now using their talents and corporate resources to smooth earnings, and bump up the stock price, rather than to build their companies.

The paper proposes that corporations find a way to restore the focus of the executive on the real market and on an authentic life by eliminating the use of stock‐based compensation as an incentive.

The author's remedy: top executives should be prevented from selling any stock – for any reason – while serving as a corporate leader, and indeed for several years after leaving their post.

The author calls for an end to stock‐based compensation because it is associated with lower shareholder returns, bubbles and crashes and huge corporate scandals.

Most prior literature focuses on how managers’ immediate needs affect their current earnings management. The purpose of this paper is to expand this body of literature by investigating the managerial motivation in a multi-period setting. The authors believe that managers’ incentive to engage in earning management around current equity issues is not only determined by the companies’ immediate need, but that it is also determined by their longer-term financing need.

The authors examine all issuances of common stock, whether they are issued as seasoned equity offerings or whether as a reissuance of previously repurchased stock. They believe that the motivations for earnings management are similar for all these various stock-issuance events, which result in an increase in the number of outstanding common stock items.

The results of this paper reveal that those firms with less of a need for subsequent equity issuances are more likely to engage in “income- increasing” earnings management before their equity issuances. Conversely, equity issuers with more of a need for subsequent equity issuances would be more concerned about the potential impact of current earnings management on their future reported earnings and, therefore, would be less likely to manage earnings.

This paper contributes to the literature by extending the findings of the prior literature, showing that managerial discretion does not only affect the total magnitude of earnings management, but that it also impacts the timing of the earnings management activities. Insights gained from our research may contribute to the literature and enable a better understanding of firms’ financial reporting strategy from a longer-run view.

This paper explores the relationship between earnings management and firms' value through the moderating effect of the missing elements – corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure and state ownership in Russian companies. The main argument of the paper is that CSR disclosure can be used as a mitigating mechanism to weaken the negative relationship between earnings manipulation and market value. Additionally test whether state ownership is an important moderating factor in this relationship are conducted as state has always played an important role in the emerging Russian market.

The hypotheses are tested on panel data for 223 publicly listed Russian firms for the period 2012–2018. A number of robustness tests are used to check the obtained results for consistency. Following previous research GMM method is employed to address endogeneity concerns.

Supported by stakeholder theory, it is observed that firms that disclosed more CSR information experience a weaker negative relationship between earnings management and market value because investors and other stakeholders positively evaluate a positive CSR image. This negative effect of earnings management on market value is even weaker for state-owned companies as market participants appreciate involvement of state-owned companies in CSR activities and place greater expectations on these firms to be responsible without clear understanding whether these actions are “window dressing” for this type of companies or not.

The study results provide new insights into the relation between earnings management, firm's value, CSR disclosure and state ownership in emerging-market firms. The paper highlight the importance of considering country-specific factors, such as state ownership, while analysing the market reaction on CSR disclosure and earnings management since the institutional peculiarities may help to explain differences in the obtained results.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of IFRS adoption on financial statement data and their usefulness in Greece. Additionally, the authors examine the effect on the informativeness/usefulness of financial statement data for stock prices in Greece and the effect of the Greek Financial Crisis.

This study examine the effects of IFRS adoption on financial statement data and their usefulness in Greece. Additionally, the authors examine the effect on the informativeness/usefulness of financial statement data for stock prices in Greece and the effect of the Greek Financial Crisis.

The results indicate that several financial ratios were dramatically affected by IFRS adoption in Greece. In contrast to other countries, IFRS has not resulted in improved statistical behavior of these ratios in Greece: the ratios are highly skewed and the normality of their distribution is not improved. Additionally, when examining the usefulness of financial statement data for stock prices in Greece, results indicate that IFRS adoption did not necessarily improve the usefulness of the financial statements. However, the authors do find that since the financial crisis in Greece these IFRS financial statement measures are significant when regressed on stock prices.

The authors are not able to necessarily rule out other causal factors that may have occurred in Greece during the sample period. The authors do look at the financial crisis as a potential confounding factor, but other factors such as political or macroeconomic factors have not necessarily been ruled out. Also, this study only examines the Greek situation.

This study may have implications for other countries in similar situations as that found in Greece – IFRS adoption and severe economic crisis.

To date only the impact of IFRS on earnings, stockholders’ equity, and some financial ratios has been investigated in prior Greek research studies (Hellenic Capital Market Commission, 2006; Grant Thornton, 2006). However, no academic research has been developed in this area. In addition, the authors examine the impact of IFRS on stock prices emphasizing the mandatory financial disclosure and IFRS adoption in a financially and politically distressed country – Greece.

This study aims to examine whether Chinese firms increase their concerns about analysts’ earnings forecasts following the split-share structure reform (SSR) in 2005, which removed trading restrictions on approximately 70% of the shares of listed firms.

Using data from 2002 to 2019, the authors empirically test the association between meeting or beating analysts’ earnings expectations and the implementation of SSR.

The authors find that firms are more inclined to meet analysts’ earnings expectations after the introduction of SSR. Further analysis shows that firms guide analysts to walk their forecasts down by manipulating third-quarter earnings, suggesting enhanced value relevance between analysts’ forecasts and third-quarter earnings management in the postreform period.

The findings reveal an undesirable side effect of SSR and suggest that policymakers and regulators should consider and carefully manage the complex relationships between firms and analysts.

In contrast to prior studies that predominantly focus on the positive effects of the reform, this study reveals the side effects of SSR and provides new evidence on the mechanisms of meeting or beating analysts’ earnings expectations.