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This paper examines the effect of restrictions on executive pay and high CEOs’ compensation on bank performance following the “2008 UK bank rescue policy”.

Using the difference-in-difference estimation technique we assess the relationship between executive compensation and financial performance of rescued banks relative to non-rescued banks over the period 1999–2019.

Our main finding indicates that the relationship between executive compensation and financial performance declines in rescued banks relative to non-rescued banks. Further, we document that performance continues to deteriorate in rescued banks relative to non-rescued banks. Our results are robust to different estimation techniques.

This study contributes to the literature that examines the efficacy of government bailouts during the 2008 crisis. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is among the first to examine the long-term implications of bank rescue and pay restrictions on executive compensation and performance post–rescue.

Based on upper echelon theory and signaling theory, we aim to examine the impact of returnee executives on firms’ relative exploratory innovation focus and the moderating effect of economic policy uncertainty on this relationship.

Using panel data of Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2020, we obtained empirical evidence to support our arguments.

Returnee executives positively influence firms’ relative exploratory innovation focus. This means that firms with returnee executives will shift the focus of their innovation activities toward exploratory innovation more than exploitative innovation. In addition, we find that economic policy uncertainty strengthens this relationship.

First, by showing how returnee executives positively influence firms’ shift in focus to exploratory rather than exploitative innovation, we expand our understanding of firms’ trade-offs between exploratory and exploitative innovation. Second, this study examines how returnee executives influence the relative importance that firms place on exploratory and exploitative innovation, allowing us to build a realistic and nuanced view of how returnee executives influence firms’ strategic choices. Finally, this study expands the strategic leadership literature and responds directly to the call for studies focusing on how institutional environmental conditions and executive characteristics work together to shape firm outcomes.

This study aims to contribute to the ongoing assessment of executive compensation by investigating the nexus between managerial entrenchment factors, adopting a multifaceted perspective encompassing both economic and non-economic dimensions.

This research employs pooled cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and Least Squares with Dummy Variables (LSDV) models with fixed effects to examine the determinants of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation.

This research identifies firm size, performance (via ROA and Tobin’s Q), and CEO characteristics (age, tenure, stock ownership, MBA degree) as significant determinants of executive compensation at the 0.05 level. In contrast, the prestige of educational institutions, doctoral degrees, and the MBA’s relevance to short-term performance, along with CEO tenure, do not significantly affect pay. Additionally, the study highlights the significance of industry type (manufacturing vs technology) in shaping compensation, emphasizing the role of firm metrics and CEO credentials in designing executive pay packages.

This research introduces an innovative approach to controlling unobserved heterogeneity and adjusting for the dynamic nature of CEO compensation attributes across diverse CEO characteristics. By integrating both pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) models, the study addresses the challenges posed by time-invariant variables and unobservable heterogeneity. Such issues have historically skewed the accuracy of traditional OLS models in identifying the comprehensive array of factors—both economic and non-economic—that influence CEO compensation. This novel methodological framework significantly advances the examination of unobservable variables that may vary not only across the firms selected for analysis but also over time periods, thereby offering a more detailed understanding of the determinants of CEO pay.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between Chinese female executives and corporate risk-taking the contingencies that affect this relationship.

A integrated theoretical framework was established, on the basis of which theoretical hypotheses were developed and tested using 20,315 firm-year observations collected from China’s publicly listed companies during the period 2005–2020. Data were collected from China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share Stock Exchanges and analyzed using a moderated regression analysis, PSM, 2SLS-IV and PSM-DID model.

The empirical results indicate a negative effect of the ratio of female executives in top management team on corporate risk-taking, and this negative effect can be weakened by the social capital of board directors and the regional marketization.

The paper contributes to research on the relationship between female executives and risk-taking by considering the effect of eastern culture on female executives’ business decision-making and examining the moderating factors inside and outside the firm.

The paper illustrates the active steps that corporations can take to enhance female executives' willingness and capacity to take firm-related risks so as to improve the firm value in the long run.

The paper explores how Chinese culture and Chinese traditional value affect female executives’ decision-making on risky projects or uncertain investments. In addition, our study for the first time examines the moderating effect of board social capital as an internal factor and marketization as an external one on the relationship between Chinese female executives and corporate risk taking. The research examines the gender inequality in the work and competitive environment facing female executives in the areas of different marketization level, which would affect female executives’ cognition and motivation in corporate risk taking.

Excessive borrowing significantly contributes to pushing businesses towards default and their transition into zombie enterprises. Despite government efforts to implement deleveraging policies and guide bank credit flows, it’s essential to delve into the internal dynamics that steer the borrowing behavior of these zombie enterprises at a micro level. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the issue, this study focuses on examining the incentives that drive corporate executives of zombie enterprises to consistently engage in large-scale borrowing from banks.

In this study, panel data analysis is utilized, incorporating firm-, industry- and year-fixed effects. Drawing from data pertaining to listed companies in China spanning from 2007 to 2020, we employ a one-by-one identification method to pinpoint zombie enterprises. Ultimately, a total of 2,533 samples of zombie enterprises were obtained.

The results indicate that as bank loans to zombie enterprises increase, executive monetary compensation decreases, while on-the-job consumption by executives increases, and they are less likely to be forced into rotation. Mechanism testing reveals that corporate performance partially mediates the relationship between bank loans and executive monetary compensation, but this mediation is ineffective for on-the-job consumption and job rotation. Further investigation suggests that the property rights nature of central enterprises and modified audit opinions can exacerbate the adverse impact of bank loans on the monetary compensation of zombie corporate executives, without significantly affecting on-the-job consumption or job rotation. Conversely, executive power does not enhance the positive effects of bank loans on monetary compensation or on-the-job consumption, but it diminishes the negative impact of bank loans on the forced rotation of zombie executives.

These results indicate that while bank loans may have a negative impact on corporate value, they function as safeguards for the positions and interests of executives. As a result, bank loans serve as incentives for executives of zombie enterprises.

This study holds theoretical significance as it explores the motivations behind non-performing loans in high-borrowing enterprises, sheds light on corporate governance challenges encountered by zombie enterprises and provides policy insights aimed at addressing the underlying causes of persistent non-performing loans in high-borrowing enterprises, including zombie enterprises.

This article empirically tests the impact of risk appetite of the executive team on the re-innovation strategy after technological innovation failure using a panel regression model from the perspective of regional financial development level of enterprises.

By means of time series global principal component analysis and panel regression model method, the study validated and analyzed the impact of risk appetite of the executive team on the re-innovation strategy after enterprise technological innovation failure.

The research found that the higher the risk appetite of executive team, the more inclined the enterprise is to choose the “focusing on quantity, ignoring quality” re-innovation strategy after technological innovation failure. The better the financial development level of the region where the enterprise is located, the better it can effectively reduce the re-innovation strategy of “focusing on quantity, ignoring quality” of the enterprise due to the high risk appetite of the executive team.

The findings of this study are helpful in improving the financial development level of the region where the enterprise is located. It can help the executive team of the enterprise to more objectively choose the innovation strategy after technological innovation failure, and reduce the phenomenon that the executive team of the enterprise only pays attention to the quantity of re-innovation and underestimates the quality of re-innovation after technological innovation failure due to its high risk appetite.

Executive isolation, also known as workplace loneliness, its factors and impact are major issues for organizational development, future of work for leadership and learning culture. The purpose of this study is to examine the Executive isolation phenomenon where relationships between power distance, organizational culture and executive isolation of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are analysed on how it is considered by their teams. The same is contextualized through the inputs received through interviews conducted with CEOs and employee surveys.

The qualitative in-depth interviews of five CEOs, and survey across 34 of the 50 employees, were undertaken over the course of two phases of this study. The investigation focused on identifying executive isolation of CEOs and perspectives of employees that can impact the leadership and learning progress of organizations based on work culture, power distance and decision-making; awareness and experience of executive isolation; workplace friendliness and rejection; and management development initiatives to minimize the impact of executive isolation. Qualitative data analysis was conducted using MAXQDA 2022 (Verbi Software, Berlin, Germany), which is a qualitative data analysis software.

The findings highlight and expose the significant gap between understanding and analysing of the factors due to which the CEOs undergo executive isolation. It also extends to providing details related to the lack of awareness of the teams’ actions contributing to the CEOs’ isolation. It further highlights the fact that the difference of perspectives between the CEOs and teams leads to the organization slowing in its learning activities due to the leaders’ own challenges of executive isolation The findings also provide immense need of developing knowledge assets and management development initiatives for learning interventions, to help understand, analyse and mitigate executive isolation, in the interest of the organizational learning and development.

Earlier research work have contextualized the executive isolation impact on CEOs ability to be a leader. This study extends it to include the implications of leadership and learning culture on the teams that are affected by organization culture, power distance, decision-making and analysing the gap between the understandings about executive isolation of the CEOs. Eventually, it interprets how CEOs courting the executive isolation impacts the overall developmental culture of the organization. This will help in asserting the serious need of new learning frameworks needed to minimize the impact of CEO-level executive isolation.

This study investigates whether the underrepresentation of women in executive-level roles within the supply chain management (SCM) field is justified or the result of gender injustices. The analysis examines if there is a gender compensation gap within executive-level SCM roles and whether performance differences or other observable factors explain disparities.

Publicly reported executive compensation and financial data are merged to empirically test if gender differences exist and investigate whether the underrepresentation of women in executive-level SCM roles is unjust.

Women occupy only 6.29% of the positions in the sample of 447 SCM executives. Unlike prior studies, we find that women executives receive higher compensation. The analysis does not identify observable factors explaining the limited inclusion of women in top-level roles, suggesting that gender injustices are prevalent in SCM.

This study only considers observable factors and cannot conclusively determine if discrimination is occurring. The low level of inclusion of women in executive roles suggests that gender injustice is intrinsic within the SCM profession. These findings will hopefully motivate firms to undertake transformative actions that result in outcomes that advance gender equity, ultimately leading to social justice for female SCM executives.

The use of social justice and feminist theories, a focus on SCM roles, and an empirical methodology utilizing objective measures represents a novel approach to investigating gender discrimination in SCM organizations, complementing prior survey-based studies.

This study aims to examine the effect of CEO compensation risk, as measured by the proportion of equity-based pay (option and stock awards) relative to total compensation and pay sensitivity to stock volatility, on CEO pay for luck asymmetry. This paper also empirically examines CEO compensation risk as a mediating variable between the regulatory changes and CEO pay for luck asymmetry.

This paper test the proposed two hypothesis that CEO compensation risk is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry; and the pay related regulations implemented around 2006 could mitigate the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry using the fixed-effects regression models.

Consistent with the managerial talent retention hypothesis, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk, as measured by the equity-based pay as a proportion of CEO total compensation and CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility, is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, this paper find that CEO pay for luck asymmetry is significantly reduced by the major regulatory changes on executive compensation implemented around 2006.

This study is among the very few studies exploring the impact of CEO compensation risk on pay for luck asymmetry in the literature. While the major purpose of the widely used stock options is to align executive interests and shareholder values, it also tends to increase the risk level of CEO compensation. So, a well-designed CEO pay package should protect risk-averse CEOs from bad luck for the retention purpose, which is also beneficial to shareholder wealth maximization. Therefore, future research on executive compensation needs to examine the issue from various perspectives.

For board of directors who is responsible for the compensation of CEOs, it is necessary to consider a broad range of factors when designing an optimal CEO pay package.

The findings on the impact of regulations on CEO pay for luck asymmetry suggest that the executive-pay-related regulations around 2006 have indeed achieved some of their intended goals to significantly lower pay for nonperformance asymmetry, whereby CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility has been identified as a major mediating variable.

This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck asymmetry in several perspectives. First, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk has a positive impact on the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. Second, this paper finds that the CEO pay for luck asymmetry has been mitigated after 2006 when various regulatory changes on executive compensation began to be implemented in the USA. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the very few studies investigating these issues in the literature.

The purpose of this viewpoint is to comment on the implications of the Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) Review and Consultation Documents expected to update regulation governing the determination/reporting of executive remuneration in UK stock market listed companies. Practical points from actors involved in executive remuneration decision-making/reporting are presented, set within the context of neo-institutional theory.

This qualitative research systematically analyses UK Corporate Governance Codes, the FRC’s recent Review/Consultation and peer-reviewed published studies of executive pay determination based on in-depth interviews with non-executive directors, institutional investors, executive pay advisers and human resources (HR) professionals.

Further regulation, while providing coercive influence over executive remuneration decision-making, is likely to lead to only limited change in processes and reporting due to benchmarking, the make-up of Remco membership and shareholders' preferences. Mimetic and normative isomorphic forces work against coercive isomorphism leading to resistance to change as decision-makers strive to safeguard their social status/reputations.

Reviewing executive remuneration package components and paying attention to company strategy, sustainability and values in pay determination are welcomed but recognised as difficult to achieve. Drawing upon a wider range of information sources/voices can assist in broadening the discussion. HR professionals can help widen stakeholder input to executive remuneration decision-making.

The authors’ viewpoint is grounded in peer-reviewed empirical data that draws directly upon the views/experiences of executive remuneration decision-makers to identify problems in adhering to FRC recommendations for change. The authors extend the meta-theoretical perspective of neo-institutional theory – specifically institutional isomorphism – as providing explanatory and predictive power to understand executive pay decision-making.