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The aim of this paper is to investigate whether a Nash equilibrium of a two-country trading economy is symmetry-breaking or not.

The approach to tackle this topic is a theoretical treatment by the general equilibrium trade theory and game theory.

If each government's domestic policy serving private production is diminishing to the private production scale, the Nash equilibrium is not symmetry-breaking.

In the existing study of Chatterjee (2017), a similar result is derived by focusing on the properties of each country's GDP function. The authors, however, consider an economy where each country's PPF is strictly concave and show that the Nash equilibrium uniquely exists and this equilibrium is symmetry.

The authors characterize the conditions under which a country may eventually split and when it splits within an infinite horizon multi-stage differential game.

In contrast to the existing literature, the authors do not assume that after splitting, players will adopt Markovian strategies. Instead, the authors assume that while the splitting country plays Markovian, the remaining coalition remains committed to the collective control of pollution and plays open-loop.

Within a full linear-quadratic model, the authors characterize the optimal strategies. The authors later compare with the outcomes of the case where the splitting country and the remaining coalition play both Markovian. The authors highlight several interesting results in terms of the implications for long-term pollution levels and the duration of coalitions under heterogenous strategies as compared to Markovian behavior.

In this paper, the authors have illustrated the richness of the simplications of enlarging the set of strategies in terms of the emergence of coalitions, their duration and the implied welfare levels per player. Varying only three parameters (the technological gap, pollution damage and coalition payoff share distribution across players), the authors have been able to generate, among other findings, quite different rankings of welfare per player depending on whether the remaining coalitions after split play Markovian or stay precommited to the pre-splitting period decisions.

The purpose of this manuscript is to highlight how gamification is transforming recruitment, retention and training to resolve employee engagement challenges in the ever-changing workplace. In collaborating with game industry experts and designers, the authors taught students team leadership skills by demonstrating how to design and play their own original cooperative strategy games. In doing so, students learn what gamification is and how it can be used to train our multigenerational workforce; how designing board games teaches team leadership skills (e.g. communication, conflict management, power, decision-making); and how to develop cooperative strategy game elements (player characters, roles and actions) that motivate engaging gameplay with successful learning outcomes.

In this paper, the authors discuss the practical implications of a three-phase semester-long experiential learning experience, where game design demonstrates to students how employees can work collaboratively together in teams. Students’ developed storylines (i.e. strategic objectives) including motivation challenges, social media communication breakdowns, sabotage, global sustainability and other real-world challenges. In Phase 1, students learn about how companies are using gamification in training high-performing teams. In Phase 2, students play a cooperative strategy game Forbidden Island with their student teams. In Phase 3, students design (and play) their original cooperative strategy game, instructions booklet and build a facilitation guide.

Approximately, 400 students developed 48 original cooperative strategy games that can be used to teach team leadership skills. These student teams designed cooperative strategy board games – in which the entire team either wins or loses based on their control of valued resources and player actions as key decision-making points. The data and feedback indicate that the learning experience helped them practically consider team interdependence in making effective decisions, and in creating creative self-efficacy, resilience and self-confidence in their own leadership voice. In this manuscript, the authors focus on providing an overview and implementation plan for our semester-long experiential learning exercise.

This experiential exercise was implemented from 2019 to 2023 in different learning modalities (face-to-face, hybrid, 100% synchronous online learning) and during challenging times (prepandemic, pandemic and postpandemic learning environments). These varying experiences provided them with a challenge to persevere and learn about their own interpersonal skills and resilience in a creative engaging way with limited resources. Students developed 26 original games during 100% synchronous remote learning due to COVID. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no other business school is working with gaming industry experts and game designers to teach team leadership to this degree during pre- and postpandemic environments.

In this paper, the author presents a hybrid method along with its error analysis to solve (1+2)-dimensional non-linear time-space fractional partial differential equations (FPDEs).

The proposed method is a combination of Sumudu transform and a semi-analytc technique Daftardar-Gejji and Jafari method (DGJM).

The author solves various non-trivial examples using the proposed method. Moreover, the author obtained the solutions either in exact form or in a series that converges to a closed-form solution. The proposed method is a very good tool to solve this type of equations.

The present work is original. To the best of the author's knowledge, this work is not done by anyone in the literature.

This paper develops a debt-run model to study the effects of liquidity injections on debt markets in the presence of a renegotiation option. In the model, creditors decide when to withdraw their funding and equityholders can renegotiate the contract terms of debt. We show that when equityholders have a large bargaining power, liquidity injections into distressed firms can rather cause more aggressive runs from their creditors, hurting the debt value. This outcome occurs because equityholders can strategically utilize the renegotiation option as a bankruptcy threat, pushing down the debt value below the potential liquidation value of the firm. In such a scenario, a deterred default resulting from emergency capital injections could be detrimental to creditors.

This paper attempts to develop a simple, static model of tax administration that is capable of explaining the widespread collusive petty tax administration corruption observed in developing countries.

This paper utilizes a positivist research framework and adopts a theoretical method of analysis, although secondary data will also be mentioned to support theoretical arguments whenever it is appropriate to do so.

A high rate of collusive tax corruption is inevitable in developing countries.

The model is static and needs to be extended into a dynamic model.

Traditional enforcement tools such as higher audits or a higher penalty regime against tax evasion do not work. Tax simplification can lessen the incidence of tax corruption.

Fighting tax corruption requires significant changes in the attitudes of taxpayers and tax auditors.

This paper combines the literature on Kantian economics and tax compliance in an innovative fashion.

This paper is a dedication to Professor Ngo Van Long who introduced the idea of Kant–Nash equilibrium. The author extends this analysis to the study of adult and child labor markets.

This is a game theoretic analysis of the market for adult and child workers when some firms behave in the neoclassical Nashian way and some firms follow a Kantian social norm.

The presence of Kantian firms in the output market in addition to Nashian lowers industry output and labor demand. This raises the possibility that Kantian behavior in the output market could lower wages sufficiently and increase the incidence of child labor. If firms engage in Kantian behavior in the labor market by not hiring child workers, adult wage rises but could lower child wage as children if they work can only work for Nashian firms. When labor demand is sufficiently high, more Kantians could raise adult wage above subsistence and eliminate child labor supply.

This is the first paper to apply Kant–Nash equilibrium to the labor market. The result that Kantian behavior could have an unintended negative spillover effect in other markets is new. The paper keeps alive the ideas of Professor Long, which hopefully will stimulate further work and build on his ideas.

As of December 2022, there were 119,000 gas stations, 10,800 gas stations and 4,488,000 charging piles nationwide, while the number of vehicles reached 312 million, including 11.49 million new energy vehicles. The imbalance between transportation energy supply and energy replenishment demand leads to crowded queues of vehicles at some stations and idle resources in others. How to reduce the phenomenon of large queues and improve the utilization rate of idle resources is the key to alleviating the imbalance between supply and demand.

Therefore, from the perspective of spatio-temporal equilibrium of urban transportation energy supply stations, multi-energy supply station cooperation is established in view of the phenomenon of large spatio-temporal differences among different energy supply stations, and corresponding inducing strategies are adopted for energy supplement vehicles in the road network, so that part of queued users go to energy supply stations with fewer vehicles, so as to balance the supply and demand of transportation energy in the region. On this basis, the income distribution of urban transportation energy supply station is discussed.

The total revenue after the cooperation was 13,095, an increase of 22.9%. Secondly, in terms of distribution rationality, three impact factors are selected and Shapley correction value is used to distribute the total income. Compared with independent operation, both sites have a certain degree of increase.

Traffic congestion at energy supply stations is closely related to the number, location and number of vehicles at energy supply stations. Therefore, using a cooperative approach of energy trading cannot solve the queuing problem. In addition, there are a few research results on the equalization of energy supply station services considering time-of-use pricing. However, these studies do not consider the vehicular grooming at congested stations. As far as the authors know, there are no relevant research results in the research on the service equilibrium of energy supply stations based on cooperative games.

The authors consider the mutual benefits of the ceding company and reinsurance company in the design of reinsurance contracts. Two objective functions to maximize social expected utilities are established, which are to maximize the sum of the expected utilities of both the ceding company and reinsurance company, and to maximize their products. The first objective function, additive, emphasizes the total gains of both parties, while the second, multiplicative, accounts for the degree of substitution of gains of one party through the loss of the other party. The optimal price and retention of reinsurance are found by a grid search method, and numerical analysis is conducted. The results indicate that the optimal solutions for two objective functions are quite different. However, optimal solutions are sensitive to the change of the means and volatilities of the claim loss for both objective functions. The results are potentially valuable to insurance regulators and government entities acting as reinsurers of last resort.

In this paper, the authors apply relatively simple, but in the view significant, methods and models to discuss the optimization of excess loss reinsurance strategy. The authors only consider the influence of loss distribution on optimal retention and reinsurance price but neglect the investment factor. The authors also consider the benefits of both ceding company and reinsurance company to determine optimal premium and retention of reinsurance jointly based on maximizing social utility: the sum (or the product) of expected utilities of reinsurance company and ceding company. The authors solve for optimal solutions numerically, applying simulation.

This paper establishes two optimization models of excess-of-loss reinsurance contract against catastrophic losses to determine optimal premium and retention. One model considers the sum of the expected utilities of a ceding company and a reinsurance company's expected utility; another considers the product of them. With an example, the authors find the optimal solutions of premium and retention of excess loss reinsurance. Finally, the authors carry out the sensitivity analysis. The results show that increasing the means and the volatilities of claim loss will increase the optimal retention and premium. For objective function I, increasing the coefficients of risk aversion of or reducing the coefficients of risk aversion of will make the optimal retention reduced but the optimal premium increased, and vice versa. However, for objective function 2, the change of coefficient of risk aversion has no effect on optimal solutions.

Utility of the two partners: The ceding company and the reinsurance company, may have different weights and different significance. The authors have not studied their relative significance. The simulation approach in numerical methods limits us to the probability distributions and stochastic processes the authors use, based on, generally speaking, lognormal models of rates of return. This may need to be generalized to other returns, including possible models of shocks through jump processes.

In the recent two decades, reinsurance companies have played a great role in hedging mega-catastrophic losses. For example, reinsurance companies (and special loss sharing arrangements) paid as much as two-thirds of the insured losses for the September 11, 2001 tragedy. Furthermore, large catastrophic events have increased the role of governments and regulators as reinsurers of last resort. The authors hope that the authors provide guidance for possible balancing of the needs of two counterparties to reinsurance contracts.

Nearly all governments around the world are engaged in regulation of insurance and reinsurance, and some are reinsurers themselves. The authors provide guidance for them in these activities.

The authors believe this paper to be a completely new and original contribution in the area, by providing models for balancing the utility to the ceding insurance company and the reinsurance company.

我們探討分出公司和再保險公司在再保險合約的設計上、如何能達至互利互惠。研究確立了兩個目標函數，分別為把分出公司和再保險公司兩者之預期效用的總和最大化，以及把它們的產品最佳化。第一個目標函數是加法的，強調兩個參與方的總增益;而第二個目標函數則是乘法的，這個目標函數，闡釋參與方因另一方虧損而有所收益之取代度。再保險的最佳價格和自留額是利用網格搜索法找出的，數值分析也予以進行。研究結果顯示，兩個目標函數的最佳解決方案甚為不同。唯最佳解決方案會對就這兩個目標函數而言的追討損失的波動、以及其平均值之改變產生敏感反應。研究結果將會見其價值於作為在萬不得已的時候的再保險人的保險業規管機構和政府實體。

在這學術論文裡，我們採用了相對簡單、但我們認為是重要的方法和模型，來探討超額賠款再保險策略的優化課題。我們只考慮虧損分佈對最佳自留額和再保險價格的影響，而不去檢視投資因素。我們亦考慮對分出公司和再保險公司兩者的利益，來釐定最佳保費和再保險的自留額，而這兩者則共同建基於把社會效益最大化之上：再保險公司和分出公司的預期效益的總和 (或其積數) 。 我們採用類比模仿方法、來解決尋求在數字上最佳解決方案的問題。

本研究建立了就應對嚴重虧損而設的兩個超額賠款再保險合約的優化模型，來釐定最佳的保費和自留額。其中一個模型考慮了分出公司和再保險公司兩者各自的預期效益的總和。另外的一個模型則考慮了兩者的預期效益的積數。透過例子，我們找到了保費和超額虧損再保險自留額的最佳解決方案。最後，我們進行了敏感度分析。研究結果顯示、若增加追討損失的平均值和波動，則最佳自留額和保費也會隨之而增加。就第一個目標函數而言，若增加風險規避係數、或減少這個係數，則最佳自留額會隨之而減少，但最佳保費卻會隨之而增加，反之亦然。唯就第二個目標函數而言，風險規避係數的改變，對最佳解決方案是沒有影響的。

• – 有關的兩個夥伴之效用性：分出公司和再保險公司或有不同的份量和重要性。我們沒有探討兩者的相對重要性。

• – 我們以數值方法為核心的類比模仿研究法、使我們局限於機率分配和一般而言建基於投資報酬率對數常態模型之隨機過程的使用。我們或許需要調節研究法。以能概括其它回報收益，包括透過跳躍過程而可能達至之沖擊模型。

– 有關的兩個夥伴之效用性：分出公司和再保險公司或有不同的份量和重要性。我們沒有探討兩者的相對重要性。

– 我們以數值方法為核心的類比模仿研究法、使我們局限於機率分配和一般而言建基於投資報酬率對數常態模型之隨機過程的使用。我們或許需要調節研究法。以能概括其它回報收益，包括透過跳躍過程而可能達至之沖擊模型。

在過去20年裡，再保險公司在控制極嚴重災難性的損失上曾扮演重要的角色。例如、再保險公司 (以及特殊的損失分擔安排) 為了2001年9月11日的災難事件而支付多至保險損失的三分之二的費用。而且，重大的災難性事件使政府及作為最後出路再保險人的調控者得扮演更重要的角色。我們希望研究結果能為再保險合約兩對手提供指導，以平衡雙方的需要。

全球差不多每個政府都參與保險和再保險的管理工作，有部份更加本身就是再保險人。研究結果為他們的管理工作提供了指導。

我們相信本學術論文、提供了平衡分出保險公司和再保險公司效用性的模型，就此而言，本論文在相關的領域上作出了全新和獨創性的貢獻。