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This study aims to examine whether China's unique dual audit policy affects one specific aspect of audit quality: auditor conservatism. In China, listed companies issuing B/H-shares in addition to A-shares must release two financial reports – one based on Chinese accounting standards and the other based on international accounting standards (ISA). The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) further requires that the financial reports following Chinese accounting standards should be audited by a domestic CPA firm, and the financial reports following ISA should be audited by an approved overseas CPA firm. This study investigates whether the dual audit requirement induces more auditor conservatism.

Based on a sample of 7,046 firm-year observations that issue A-shares from 2001 to 2006, the authors empirically test whether the dual audit requirement induces more auditor conservatism, measured by the level of discretionary accruals.

The authors find the dual audit requirement significantly restricts the use of income-increasing discretionary accruals but not income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Moreover, financial reporting becomes most conservative when two auditors are from two un-affiliated audit firms. Nevertheless, the difference-in-difference analysis fails to show a significant decrease in auditor conservatism after the revocation of the dual audit rule for the treatment group with dual audit before but no dual audit after 2007 comparing to the control group that experience no change in 2007.

First, the previous studies examine issues regarding the effects of supervision pressure through experimental setting. The authors extend the literature by examining empirically the impact of perceived peer pressure on auditor conservatism. Second, the findings from China regarding the effect of the dual audit system on auditor conservatism serve as a reference for other emerging markets that have not yet established sound audit systems.

The authors’ examination of corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores in dual-class firms provides a window on firms’ CSR performance when insulated from external pressure. Dual-class ownership confers greater voting rights on a superior class of shares held by insiders; consequently, managers of dual-class firms are insulated from external pressure from inferior class shareholders and, potentially, from society. The authors compare CSR scores in dual- and single-class firms and investigate the association between CSR scores and cash flow rights in dual-class firms. This analysis reveals that dual-class firms have lower CSR scores than their single-class counterparts and that CSR scores in dual-class firms are positively related to the relative cost of CSR borne by the superior class of shares. The findings suggest that external accountability encourages CSR performance, and CSR performance is higher when the superior class bears a smaller portion of the cost of CSR activities. It follows that the analysis suggests the importance of governance structures for encouraging CSR, and the dampening impact of cost to CSR performance.

The purpose of this paper is to explain whether the level of managerial quality and growth opportunities influences the operating and return performance between single and dual class IPOs.

The sample includes 281 initial public offerings under a dual class share structure. This paper measures managerial ability using a score method design produced by (Demerjian et al., 2012). This paper follows (Chemmanur et al., 2011) in measuring post-IPO operating performance between dual and single-class firms. This paper follows Lyon et al. (1999) and Chemmanur et al. (2011) in measuring long-term post-IPO buy-and-hold return performance. This paper employs two measures of growth/investment using Tobin’s q and expenditures such as capital, research and development, and selling, general and administrative scaled to total assets (Daniel et al., 2016).

Firms with high-quality managers experience more underpricing than low-quality managers. Likewise, dual class firms of all manager and growth types hold less cash and leverage. Using Tobin’s q as a proxy for growth, dual class firms experience higher post-IPO operating performance regardless of managerial quality. Furthermore, the findings indicate minimal evidence that dual class firms underperform single-class IPOs, lending minimal support for the managerial entrenchment hypothesis.

This paper is the first to partition dual and single-class IPOs based on managerial quality and growth opportunities to test long-term differences in operating and return performance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the dividend payments and share repurchases of dual-class firms that have both their superior voting shares and inferior voting shares publicly traded.

This paper uses matched dual-class and single-class samples from 1994 to 2015 and logit models to evaluate the likelihoods of dividend payment and share repurchase between dual-class firms and single-class firms.

The results show that dual-class firms are more likely than the matched sample of single-class firms to pay dividends in both share classes. Dual-class firms, however, are more likely to repurchase their superior shares than single-class firms and their inferior shares.

The results suggest that dual-class firms do not use corporate payouts to either mitigate agency problems or maintain the private benefits of control. Instead, dual-class firms use dividend payments to mitigate agency problems while using repurchases of superior shares to maintain the private benefits of control, which supports the agency payout hypothesis.

This paper highlights the differences between dividend payments and share repurchases as forms of corporate payouts and suggests that firms may choose a particular form for a particular purpose.

This paper provides the first piece of empirical evidence on the corporate payouts of dual-class firms separating their superior voting shares and inferior voting shares.

The purpose of this paper is to critically review the relevant literature from the perspective of dual-class firms and to provide suggestions for future research on dual-class firms, and on methodological issues that should be addressed in such research.

The research design consists of three parts: an introduction to dual-class firms (motivations for; firm life cycle effects) in Part 1; concerns with firms with such share class structures (valuation; governance; accounting and corporate policy issues) in Part 2; and some solutions or ways to accommodate the trade-offs involved with such share class structures (retention arguments; index/exchange exclusions; contractual provisions; external monitoring) in Part 3. Throughout the paper, the authors provide some critiques of existing studies, particularly from a methodological perspective, the authors’ opinion on the state of the literature and suggestions for future areas of research.

While motivations for the use of dual-class voting structures include flexibility so that the idiosyncratic vision of their entrepreneurs/founders can be pursued in a less encumbered fashion, greater innovation and long-term managerial orientation, there are many possible costs (e.g. underinvestment and managerial entrenchment) to this ownership structure. Nevertheless, the authors believe that such firms should have provisions in place that facilitate a reversion to a single-class structure longer term when such firms have become more mature, less dependent on the idiosyncratic vision of the entrepreneurs/founders at IPO and have attracted more managerial talent.

The literature arrives at no consensus on the benefits/drawbacks of this type of share ownership structure which means that many topics of research require further academic examination. The authors provide suggested directions for such future enquiries.

The chapter investigates three channels through which private benefits are hypothesized to be extracted in dual class companies: excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditures and excess cash holdings.

With a propensity score matched sample of S&P 1500 dual class and single class companies with concentrated control, the chapter analyzes the relationship between the valuation discount of dual class companies and measures of excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditure and excess cash holdings.

Executives in dual class firms earn greater compensation relative to their counterparts in single class firms. This excess compensation is more pronounced when the executive is a family member. The value of dual class shares is discounted most when cash holdings and executive compensation of dual class are excessive. Excess compensation is highest for executives who are family members of dual class companies. The dual class discount is not related to excess capital expenditures.

The research shows that the discount in the value of dual class shares in relation to the value of closely controlled single class company shares is directly related to the channels through which controlling shareholder-managers can extract private benefits.

The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of short‐sale constraints and differences of opinions on the price premium of dual listed Chinese A‐H shares.

The analysis mainly follows the Miller's model, which indicates that the relaxation of stringent short‐sale constraint could reduce the upward bias in stock prices. Following the literature, the paper uses the idiosyncratic return volatility and monthly turnover rate as two main proxies of differences of opinions.

This study shows that the high level of A‐share differences of opinions will lead to the high price premium of A‐share portfolio with the short‐sale constraint in the A‐share market. However, the high level of H‐share differences of opinions has no effect on the price premium of H‐share portfolio and has also positively contributed to the A‐share price premium. The price premium of shorted A‐share portfolio is declined more significantly than those of non‐shorted ones after the relaxation of short‐sale constraint in the A‐share market.

The findings in this study provide further evidence that dual listed Chinese A‐shares with high level of differences of opinions and short‐sale constraints tend to be overvalued.

This study supports Miller's hypothesis that with the control of short‐sale constraint, the high level of differences of opinions could lead to the high degree of overvaluation of A‐share portfolio. The market capitalization and book‐to‐market ratio of A‐shares also generate significant positive effect to the A‐share price premium. Finally, the introduction of short‐sale mechanism in A‐share market could partially eliminate the mispricing of dual‐listed A‐shares and improve the price efficiency of A‐share market.

This study is mainly focused on the joint effects of differences of opinions and short‐sale constraints on the A‐share price premium. The new short‐sale policy in A‐share market in March 2010 provides us an opportunity to study the effect of relaxation of stringent short‐sale constraint on the A‐share price premium. In the literatures so far, all studies assumed A‐shares are strictly prohibited to be sold short.

From 2000 to 2007, 14 Chinese accounting firms had their audit licenses terminated or suspended for different reasons, forcing clients of these accounting firms to select new auditors within a short period of time. The purpose of this paper is to examine the auditor switching patterns and audit partner following decision of these clients and the effect of both client and (terminated or suspended) auditor characteristics on the auditor change decisions.

By using 245 (191) clients of terminated or suspended audit firms, the authors apply logistic regressions to investigate clients’ switching decision (following decision).

The empirical results indicate that state-owned enterprises tend not to switch to Big 4 audit firms; clients with dual shares tend to choose from the Big 4 for their succeeding audit firms. Moreover, companies whose preceding auditors received severe regulatory sanctions are less likely to switch to auditors of higher quality; companies who hired local auditors are more likely to follow their preceding audit partners as a result of forced auditor change.

This study enriches forced auditor change literature by discussing both clients’ and preceding auditor’s attributes on clients’ switching and following decisions.

The purpose of this study is to explain the poor informativeness of earnings in dual-class firms by examining the quality of earnings and the information environment.

The earnings informativeness, earnings quality and information environment of dual-class firms are compared with a matched sample of single-class firms. The authors have performed the returns-earnings association tests, examine the quality of earnings by using proxies for discretionary accruals, and examine the information environment by employing four empirical constructs: the analyst forecast dispersion, absolute forecast errors, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure, and the bid-ask spread.

The results show that the quality of earnings is better while the quality of the information environment is worse in dual-class firms compared to single-class firms. Overall, the results suggest that an inferior information environment is a plausible explanation for the low informativeness of dual-class firms’ earnings.

The results provide empirical support for Dechow et al. (2010) that the use of the earnings-returns association measure to draw conclusions about the quality of earnings is not appropriate in the presence of a poor information environment.

This is the first study to empirically show that low earnings informativeness in dual-class firms can be explained by the inferior quality of the information environment.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of governance quality on firms with multiple voting structures.

The sample includes 487 acquisitions undertaken by dual-class firms from 1996 to 2009. The author used event studies (Patell, 1976) for short-term performance analysis around merger announcement dates; Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) methods to identify the motive behind these transactions; and standard benchmark adjusted return on assets (and return on sales) (Barber and Lyon, 1996) and BHAR (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000) to analyze long-term post-acquisition performance.

First, dual-class acquirers with better governance quality show stronger performance around takeovers which indicates that these firms make better acquisition decisions. These results hold even after controlling for different firm and deal characteristics. Second, transactions undertaken by acquirers with good governance show little or no sign of agency motive. This reinforces the findings in first. Third, the author reports that acquirers with above-median governance quality display stronger long-term post-acquisition operating as well as stock performances. These results are robust to different benchmarks used for this study.

This paper expands the literature on dual-class firms by showing the impact of governance quality on acquisition activities undertaken by these firms. This is the first study to show that despite agency issues inherent in the dual-class structure, improving governance quality would have a positive impact, at least in the case of corporate takeovers.