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The Horn of Africa which has geostrategic importance is endowed with huge natural resources. However, the region is one of the conflict-prone regions in the world. Deficiencies in governance systems, deprivations and poverty, resource-based inter-communal conflicts and unduly interventions of external powers in the internal affairs of the countries have been the main triggers of conflicts. With the persistence of conflicts, the Horn of African countries have remained underdeveloped with poor development outcomes. The conflicts in the region, thus, must be reversed through genuine cooperation among the Horn of African countries. For regional durable peace and sustainable development in the Horn of Africa, the following measures are suggested: (i) Political recommitment and political willingness of leaderships in the Horn of African countries for broader regional cooperation for durable peace and development to address regional challenges jointly. (ii) Promote good governance and democratic principles. (iii) Strengthen regional cooperation among institutions of higher education to facilitate access to global knowledge. (iv) Establishment of regional media that promotes good images of the Horn of Africa. (v) Establishment of Horn of Africa Institute for Peace and Development to cultivate good governance and tolerance. (vi) Provision of civic education at all levels of education to promote understanding among different ethnic groups. (vii) Increase investments to improve the livelihoods of marginalised groups, particularly nomadic communities and unemployed youth. (viii) Refrainment of external powers from meddling in the internal affairs of the Horn of African countries.

This study aims to contribute to discussions on peace between hostile nonmajor powers by focusing on the behavior of major powers. Specifically, alliances between nonmajor and major powers are explored to determine whether such ties contribute to transitions to higher levels of peace. Moreover, systemic factors involving power dynamics and relationships between major powers are also evaluated.

Multiple data sets which altogether covered the era from 1816 to 2010 were analyzed. All pairs of countries that were former foes were considered. Cox hazard regression was conducted.

Systemic instability is influential at transitions from lowest levels of peace for nonmajor power dyads. Eras where major powers are operating multilaterally appear to play a highly limited role in nonmajor powers attaining stable peace. However, alliances with major powers are relatively more crucial in these discussions for nonmajor powers and contribute to higher levels of peace being attained by nonmajor powers.

Further research in particular with case studies can help to elucidate and extend the statistical findings.

Based on the findings, the design and operations of alliances can create more space to hear a wider range of issues that allies can be facing.

While major powers clearly have considerable capacity and global outreach, there has been little attention to whether and how they contribute to former foes attaining higher quality of peace.

What kinds of support do interstate rivals provide to domestic actors in ongoing civil wars? And how do domestic actors utilize the support they receive? This chapter answers these questions by comparing Iranian and Saudi military and non-military (mediation, foreign aid and religious soft-power promotion) support to the Houthis and to the Government of Yemen (GoY) during the Saada wars (2004–2010) and the internationalized civil war (2015–2018). It also focuses on the processes through which the GoY and the Houthis have utilized this support for their own strategic purposes. This chapter applies a structured, focused comparison methodology and relies on data from a review of both primary and secondary sources complemented by 14 interviews. This chapter finds that there were less external interventions in the conflict in Saada than in the internationalized civil war. During the latter, a broader set of intervention strategies enabled further instrumentalization by domestic actors, which in turn contributed to the protracted nature of the conflict. This chapter contributes to the literature on interstate rivalry and third-party intervention. The framework of analysis is applicable to civil wars that experience intervention by rivals, such as Syria or Libya.

The Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 outlines sustainability as associated with peace, good governance and justice. The perception of international tourists about security measures and risks is a key factor affecting destination choices, tourist flow and overall satisfaction. Thus, we investigate the impact of armed forces personnel, prices, economic stability, financial development and infrastructure on tourism.

This research used data from 130 countries from 1995 to 2019, which were divided into four income groups. This study employs a two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) technique and a novel tourism index comprising five relevant indicators of tourism.

A 1% increase in armed forces personnel expands tourism in all income groups – 0.369% High Income Countries (HICs), 0.348% Upper Middle Income Countries (UMICs), 0.247% Lower Middle Income Countries (LMICs) and 0.139% Low Income Countries (LICs). The size of the tourism-safety coefficient decreases from high to low-income groups. The impact of inflation is significantly negative in all panels, excluding LICs. The reduction in tourism was 0.033% in HICs, 0.049% in UMICs and 0.029% in LMICs for a 1% increase in prices. The increase in the global tourism index is more in LICs (0.055%), followed by LMICs (0.024%), UMICs (0.009%) and HICs (0.004%) for a 1% expansion in the gross domestic product (GDP)/capita growth. However, the magnitude of the growth-led tourism impact is greater in developing countries. A positive impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow was found in all panels like 0.016% in HICs, 0.050% in UMICs and 0.119% in LMICs for a 1% increase in FDI inflow. The rise in the global tourism index is 0.097% (HICs), 0.124% (UMICs) and 0.310% (LMICs) for a 1% rise in the financial development index. The increase in the global tourism index is 0.487% (HICs), 0.420% (UMICs) and 0.136% (LICs) for a 1% rise in the infrastructure index.

Empirical analysis infers important policy implications such as (a) establishment of a peaceful environment via recruitment of security personnel, use of safe city cameras, modern technology and law enforcement; (b) provision of basic facilities to tourists like sanitation, drinking water, electricity, accommodation, quality food, fuel and communication network and (c) price stability through different tools of monetary and fiscal policy.

First, it explains the effect of security personnel on a comprehensive index of tourism instead of a single variable of tourism. Second, it captures the importance of economic stability (i.e., economic growth, financial development and FDI inflow) in the tourism–peace nexus.

This paper aims to seek to and understand how civil conflict and international claims inform one another. Does the existence of ongoing civil and international conflicts affect how a government addresses an international claim? The paper builds on existing literature that link international and domestic conflict. However, it suggests that the logic behind civil conflicts may be different from that for international ones as states decide how to deal with any one claim.

The paper posits that states faced with domestic conflicts and additional international claims are more likely to seek to resolve an international claim than those without similar conflicts. It develops a series of hypotheses about the likelihood of claim escalation and peaceful settlement attempts and proceed to test them quantitatively using the Issue Correlates of War data combined with the uppsala conflict data program/peace research institute oslo Armed Conflict Data.

On the one hand, the paper finds support for the argument regarding the difficulty states are faced with when seeking to resolve multiple international claims. On the other hand, it finds that the presence of civil conflicts incentivizes states to resolve international claims either by force or peacefully, suggesting internal violence can both lead to diversionary behavior and attempts at conflict resolution.

The findings have important implications for work considering the complexity of domestic and international conflict linkages.

While many studies of claim militarization and peaceful attempts focus on dyadic and international characteristics, this paper creates a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of this foreign policy decision process.

This research aimed to assess the leadership role of principals in the implementation of peace education in selected secondary schools in the Western Cape, South Africa.

This study employed qualitative research approach to assess the leadership role of principals in the implementation of peace education in selected secondary schools in the Western Cape, South Africa. Data were gathered from a small sample of six principals from six selected secondary schools which were engaged in the implementation of a peace education programme, and data were analysed using thematic content analyses.

Findings of the study suggest that principals possess a low level of understanding or awareness of their leadership role in the implementation of peace education. The study pointed out the constraints such as time constraints and learners' negative attitudes and social influences hinder the effective implementation of peace education in selected secondary schools.

First, the data were self-reported and therefore subject to social desirability bias; participants may have provided socially desirable responses rather than their true belief or experiences. Thus, participants may have overstated their role in and commitment to the peace education programme.

Studies that aim to explore alternative approaches to combat violence, such as peace education, are still limited in South Africa. Hence, this paper served to close that gap by contributing to the growing body of research on the leadership role of the principal in the implementation of peace education in the school and exploring barriers hampering its effective implementation.

The purpuse of this study is to answer the following two questions. Do conflict management efforts mitigate the recurrence and severity of civil conflict? If so, how? Do some conflict management strategies fare better than others in these tasks? This study theorizes about the connection between the costliness of a conflict management strategy – with respect to both the disputants and third parties – and civil conflict outcomes. This theory produces two contradictory predictions: that more costly strategies either increase or decrease violence. This study not only adjudicates between these two possibilities but also incorporates the role of timing. The early use of more costly strategies, for example, may encourage disputants to reduce violence in civil conflicts.

To evaluate the predications that the authors derive from their theoretical argument, the authors quantitatively analyze the effect of conflict management strategies’ relative cost on various measures of civil conflict recurrence and severity. The authors first identify the set of international–civil militarized conflicts (I-CMCs) during the period 1946–2010. I-CMCs contain two dimensions – interstate and intrastate – making them the most complex and dangerous form of militarized conflict. To each I-CMC, the authors then link all third-party attempts to manage the I-CMC’s civil conflict dimension. Finally, after developing quantitative indicators, a series of regression equations explore the relationships of primary interest.

Two main findings emerge. First, when third parties use a relatively more costly conflict management strategy to manage a civil conflict (e.g. a peace operation or military intervention, as opposed to mediation), the severity of the conflict increases, while conflict recurrence rates remain unchanged. Second, this study uncovers a trade-off. The early use of a relatively more costly management strategy lowers a civil conflict’s severity in the short-term. It also, however, increases the likelihood – and speed with which – civil conflict recurs. The timing of certain conflict management strategies matters.

Scholars typically isolate conflict management strategies in number (i.e. consider efforts as independent of one another, even those within the same conflict) and kind (i.e. examine mediation but not peace operations). This study, in contrast, includes the following: the full menu of conflict management strategies available to third parties – negotiation, mediation, adjudication/arbitration, peace operations, sanctions and military intervention – over a lengthy time period (1946–2010); theorizes about the relative merits of these strategies; and considers the timing of certain conflict management efforts. In so doing, it highlights a policy trade-off and proposes promising areas for future research.

This study aims to explore the role of rebel group legitimacy and ideology in durable peace (DP) following peace agreements to end civil wars. It builds on earlier research showing that justice and civil society involvement are critical in achieving DP. This study adds the impacts of rebel group activities and support on DP. Activities include service delivery and mobilization. Support is gauged with outcomes of presidential and parliamentary elections held following peace agreements.

Five data sets were used to measure the key variables: DP, inclusive commissions (IC), legitimacy symmetry (electoral outcomes), service delivery and ideological mobilization. A measure of rebel group integration in the political system was also constructed. Impacts of the integration, legitimacy and ideology variables were assessed with a hierarchical regression model (HRM). This study begins with a base model drawn from earlier research showing the key predictors were procedural justice (PJ) and IC. The authors ask about the extent to which the rebel group variables contribute additional variance to the prediction of DP.

The main contributors to the prediction of DP were PJ, IC and integration in the political system. None of the legitimacy or mobilization variables added significant variance to the prediction. Only one of the mobilization variables, forced recruitment, was significant. The decision to integrate into the political system following the agreement did not mediate the relationship between PJ in the negotiation process and DP. Results of a factor analysis showed that DP, PJ, IC and integration formed a cluster with strong loadings on the first factor.

The negative results for the legitimacy and mobilization variables may not be the last word on rebel group influences. Lack of support for the key hypotheses spurs attempts to discover other sources that contribute to the survival of rebel group actors in the political system and, in turn, to DP.

The issues raised by this study contribute to debates about ways to attain peaceful relations among competing groups following a civil war. It appears that attention to factors inside and around the negotiation process (PJ, ICs and conversion) may be more important than rebel group activities outside of these processes. The results call attention, in particular, to the important role played by political integration. From a policy perspective, it would be useful to develop levers for encouraging rebel groups to emerge as political actors in the post-agreement environment.

Developing measures of the symmetry of rebel group legitimacy and integration in the context of a comparative case study are the primary original contributions of this study. Furthermore, the mode of analysis (HRM) is novel in this literature. This approach builds on and extends the earlier research on factors influencing DP.